


















































I	 further	 state	 that	no	substantial	part	of	my	dissertation	has	already	been	submitted,	or,	 is	being	
concurrently	 submitted	 for	 any	 such	 degree,	 diploma	 or	 other	 qualification	 at	 the	 University	 of	
Cambridge	 or	 any	 other	 University	 or	 similar	 institution	 except	 as	 declared	 in	 the	 Preface	 and	
specified	in	the	text.	











Despite	governments’	 recognition	of	 the	 importance	of	maintaining	a	 forward-looking	approach	 in	
policymaking,	 the	 actual	 inclusion	 of	 information	 and	 insight	 concerning	 the	 future	 into	 policy	
development	 does	 not	 appear	 widely	 implemented.	 	 However,	 existing	 literature	 on	 ‘public’	
Foresight	 appears	 predominantly	 prescriptive,	 offering	 limited	 information	 concerning	 its	 actual	
practices	and	their	possible	consequences	on	both	the	output	and	its	acceptance	and	uptake.	
The	investigation	focussed	on	how	Foresight	activities	(“FAs”)	are	being	carried	out	within	the	public	
sector,	 in	 order	 to	 identify	 which	 practices	 –	 in	 their	 preparation,	 execution,	 and	management	 –	
could	be	ultimately	affecting	the	way	the	insight	thus	generated	is	accepted	and	used	(or	not).	
This	enquiry	is	 intended	to	help	identify	best	practices	for	FAs	that	can	support	both	the	quality	of	
any	 insight	produced	and	 its	ability	to	contribute	to	policy	design	and	–	ultimately	–	delivery.	 	The	
goal	was	to	explore	and	understand	current	practices	and	their	possible	effects	and	implications,	in	
order	to	‘abduce’	from	them	the	theory	components	that	would	underpin	said	recommendations.		
Data	 collection	 for	 this	 Grounded	 Theory	 approach	 was	 carried	 out	 first	 during	 an	 in-depth	 case	
study,	and	subsequently	during	focused	interviews	carried	out	six	years	after	the	case.		This	made	it	
possible	 for	 the	 events	 to	 play	 out	 fully,	 as	 well	 as	 allowing	 the	 subjects	 interviewed	 sufficient	
perspective	and	emotional	distance	from	the	facts.	
The	data	analysis	 led	the	Researcher	to	 identify	 fifteen	elements	of	practice	that	appear	to	have	a	
crucial	impact	on	the	quality	and	performance	of	the	outcomes	of	Foresight	activities	and	exercises,	
as	well	as	thirteen	areas	of	impact	which	clarify	where	and	how	such	quality	and	performance	may	















































































business	 section	of	 airport	bookstores,	by	 the	proliferation	of	 courses,	 seminars,	 and	 talks	on	 this	
topic,	or	by	newspaper	headlines	lamenting	some	decision	or	other	recently	made	by	politicians.	
Despite	differences	in	the	techniques,	tips,	and	tools	proposed,	most	experts	agree	that	the	quality	
of	 a	 decision	 will	 depend	 not	 only	 on	 the	 process	 followed,	 but	 also	 on	 the	 amount	 as	 well	 as	
accuracy	and	relevance	of	the	information	used	(Saaty,	2008).	Indeed,	assessments	of	decisions	are	
(or	should	be)	made	on	the	basis	of	what	information	was	available	at	the	time.	
Most	 decisions,	 even	 the	most	mundane,	 require	 amongst	 other	 things	 some	 sort	 of	 information	
about	 the	 future	 (de	 Jouvenel,	 1967).	 	 However	 the	 future	 can	 not	 be	 known	 with	 certainty,	 so	
assumptions	are	made	–	even	when	not	clearly	stated,	they	are	not	absent	but	simply	implicit	(thus	
potentially	 even	 more	 dangerous,	 as	 those	 deciding	 may	 be	 unaware	 of	 them),	 by	 default	
incorporating	 a	 belief	 that	 the	 future	 will	 continue	 as	 present	 or,	 when	 a	 dynamic	 element	 is	
considered,	along	the	same	trajectory.	
While	 small	 decisions	 typically	 have	 small	 consequences,	 big	 decisions	 such	 as	 those	 forming	 the	
object	 of	 policymaking	have	 large	 consequences	 affecting	many.	 Furthermore,	 their	 timeframe,	 in	
terms	 of	 results	 as	 well	 as	 more	 or	 less	 intended	 consequences,	 is	 the	 medium-long	 term.	
Unsurprisingly	 then	 the	 1999	Modernising	Government	White	 Paper	 required	UK	 policymakers	 to	
explicitly	 include	 the	 future	 dimension	 in	 their	 assessments	 and	 decisions	 and	 “become	 more	
forward-	and	outward-looking”.			
This	 is	not	new	–	 in	the	old	times	virtually	all	people	 in	power	were	trying	to	figure	out	the	future	
and	reduce	uncertainty	before	important	decisions,	as	shown	by	the	brisk	trade	enjoyed	by	famous	
oracles.	 	 There	has	been,	however,	 an	evolution	 in	 the	way	a	nation’s	 key	decision-makers	would	
obtain	 information	 concerning	 the	 future,	 going	 from	 the	 reading	 and	 interpretation	 of	 some	




Over	 the	 past	 five	 decades,	 interesting	 techniques	 have	 emerged	 that	 aim	 at	 helping	 decision	
makers	 look	ahead,	driven	by	advances	in	sciences	and	technologies	as	well	as	by	need,	as	 leaders	
faced	 increasing	uncertainty	and	complexity,	while	 the	potential	costs	of	mistakes	and	unintended	
consequences	 have	 soared.	 	 Nevertheless,	 despite	 the	White	 Paper	 and	 subsequent	 government	
	 8	
publications,	 and	despite	 the	ongoing	 efforts	 aimed	 at	 generating	 insight	 about	 the	 future,	 actual	
attempts	 to	 integrate	 said	 future	 insight	 into	 policymaking	 –	 particularly	 when	 considering	
policymaking	in	its	entirety,	that	is	up	to	and	including	implementation	–	do	not	seem	to	have	met	





During	her	work	at	 the	World	Economic	Forum,	 the	Researcher	was	part	of	 the	 team	that	 led	 the	
development	of	a	number	of	scenario	building	exercises,	whose	results	were	typically	published	and	
presented	 to	 the	Forum’s	members	and	other	business	and	political	 leaders.	 	Despite	 the	 interest	
expressed	 by	 such	 recipients,	 who	 often	 remarked	 on	 the	 importance	 and	 consequence	 of	 such	
insight,	the	Researcher	was	struck	by	the	fact	that	at	the	same	time	most	of	those	same	recipients	
confessed	to	be	unsure	of	“what	to	do	with	it”	in	practice.		The	Researcher	noticed	similar	reactions	
from	 clients	 and	 audiences	 in	 her	 later	 professional	 experiences,	 while	 managing	 and	 facilitating	
scenario	building	and	other	foresight	exercises.	
Between	 2008	 and	 2012,	 as	 a	 member	 of	 the	 Foresight	 Action	 Network2,	 a	 forum	 aimed	 at	
facilitating	 networking	 and	 the	 exchange	 of	 information	 between	 public,	 private,	 academic,	 and	
voluntary	 sectors	about	making	effective	use	of	 strategic	 futures	 thinking,	 the	Researcher	became	
increasingly	 aware	 of	 the	 frustration	 repeatedly	 expressed	 by	 futures	 professionals	 in	 the	 public	
sector	with	regards	to	both	the	acceptance	and	the	subsequent	use	of	the	results	of	their	activities	
in	the	context	of	policy	development.	
Since	 there	 is	 evidence	 that	 futures-oriented	 analysis	 continues	 to	 be	 carried	 out	 in	 the	 UK,	 the	
Researcher	considers	it	important	to	ask:	what	is	stopping	policymakers	from	using	it,	and	what	may	
be	compromising	its	translation	into	action?	
Experts	 such	 as	 Ringland	 (Ringland,	 2002)	 and	Horton	 (Horton,	 2009),	who	 themselves	 had	 direct	
experience	 in	 carrying	 out	 future	 oriented	 work	 within	 the	 public	 sector,	 mention	 a	 number	 of	
challenges	 met	 by	 futures	 work	 in	 policymaking,	 both	 within	 the	 public	 sector	 itself	 (such	 as	
attitudes	 towards	 uncertainty	 and	 towards	 the	 ‘evidence’	 generated	 by	 foresight	 activities,	 short-







The	 Researcher	 chose	 to	 study	 how	 the	 actual	 practice	 of	 conducting	 futures-oriented	 analysis	
aimed	 at	 supporting	 policymaking	 could	 be	 changed	 in	 order	 to	 improve	 both	 its	 uptake	 and	 its	
delivery.		
Therefore	the	Researcher	decided	to	undertake	an	 investigation	focusing	on	how	the	futures	work	
itself	 is	 being	 carried	 out	 within	 the	 public	 sector,	 in	 order	 to	 identify	 which	 practices	 could	 be	
ultimately	affecting	the	way	the	insight	generated	is	accepted	(or	not)	and	used	(or	not).	
The	identified	Research	Objective	was	therefore:	How	can	Foresight	practice	be	improved,	in	order	
to	 better	 support	 Public	 Policymaking	 –	 where	 ‘Foresight	 practice’	 encompasses	 the	 preparation,	
execution,	 and	 management	 of	 Foresight	 exercises	 and	 activities,	 while	 the	 ‘support	 of	 Public	
Policymaking’	extends	from	the	stimulation	and	information	of	the	political	debate	up	to	the	delivery	
and	implementation	of	the	resulting	policy	directives.	











and	 the	 use	 of	 Foresight	 in	 the	 Policymaking	 context	 (section	 2.5).	 Section	 2.6	 presents	 a	 brief	
overview	 of	 selected	 areas	 of	 research	 on	 aspects	 of	 Participatory	 processes	 that	 appear	 to	 offer	
some	interesting	contributions	to	the	Research	Topic;	section	2.7	reviews	literature	that	specifically	
focuses	 on	 the	 participatory	 aspects	 of	 Policymaking	 and	 Governance,	 while	 section	 2.8	 looks	 at	
research	on	(‘properly’)	Participatory	Foresight	in	the	context	of	Policymaking.	




While	many	authors,	 in	 the	context	of	Grounded	Theory	 (“GT”)	approach	 (see	3.3.1	below),	argue	
against	 conducting	 a	 literature	 review	 too	 early	 in	 the	 research	 progress,	 the	 Researcher	 aligned	
with	 Dunne’s	 view	 that	 one	 should	 approach	 the	 research	 process	 “open	 minded,	 not	 empty-
minded”	(Dunne,	2014),	and	carried	out	a	summary	literature	review,	mostly	to	ensure	that	the	issue	




the	objective	of	 this	 review	was	to	enhance	the	Researcher’s	own	theoretical	sensitivity	 (see	3.6.1	
below)	and	to	engage	critically	with	existing	knowledge	(Thornberg,	2012),	rather	than	to	adopt	and	
apply	pre-existing	theories	and	concepts	(Glaser,	1998).		














to	 revisiting	 the	 Researcher’s	 keywords	 list.	 	 The	 process	 was	 then	 repeated	 until	 a	 point	 of	
saturation	was	reached,	when	no	new	(significantly)	relevant	articles	were	identified.			
As	 consistent	with	 the	GT	 approach,	 the	 activities	 of	 data	 gathering	 and	 analysis	 also	 contributed	
new	 keywords	 and	 concepts	 –	 such	 as	 “procedural	 fairness”	 and	 “social	 capital”	 –	 that	were	 also	
included	in	the	later	search.		This	was	an	ongoing	process.	
A	second,	more	 focused	 literature	review	was	conducted	alongside	and	after	both	the	preliminary	
data	 analysis	 described	 in	 3.3.4	 below	and	 the	 second	phase	of	 data	 collection	 described	 in	 3.3.5	
below	in	order	to	compare,	build	on,	and	integrate	existing	literature	and	knowledge	in	the	field,	or	
offer	alternative	perspectives	–	again,	this	 is	recognised	and	encouraged	in	GT	(Glaser	and	Strauss,	






Most	decisions	 and	actions	 taken	daily,	 from	 the	most	mundane	 to	more	 strategic	 and	 important	
ones,	are	 to	 some	extent	 contingent	on	assumptions	about	 the	 future	and	what	will	happen	 in	 it.		
According	 to	 de	 Jouvenel	 (de	 Jouvenel,	 1967),	 futura	 (events	 or	 situations	 which	 happen	 in	 the	
future,	as	opposed	to	facta,	which	happened	in	the	past)	are	the	only	thing	worth	knowing,	despite	
the	fact	that	such	knowledge	is,	strictly	speaking,	impossible.		The	artist	and	sociologist	John	McHale	
believed	 that	 humans	 become	 such	when	 they	 start	 to	 think	 about	 the	 future,	 and	 for	 them	 the	
future	 is	a	powerful	symbol	 that	allows	men	to	endure	the	present	and	to	ascribe	meaning	to	 the	









rather	 the	activities	and	processes	undertaken,	of	generally	 looking	ahead4;	and	 there	 is	Foresight	
(which	 will	 be	 written	 with	 a	 capital	 ‘F’),	 a	 more	 recent	 incarnation	 of	 foresight/Futures	 Studies	
which	is	much	more	“product	oriented”	in	the	sense	that	is	meant	to	be	much	more	closely	linked	to	
(public)	action	and	strategy	(Sardar,	2010).			
Bell	 (Bell,	 2004)	 presents	 foresight	 as	 the	 act	 of	 inventing,	 examining,	 evaluating,	 and	 proposing	
possible,	probable,	and	preferable	futures.		Kuosa	(Kuosa,	2012)	defines	it	as	“a	process	of	visioning	
alternative	futures	through	a	combination	of	hindsight,	insight	and	forecasting”.		
Miles	 (Miles	 et	 al.,	 2002)	 defines	 Foresight	 as	 “approaches	 to	 informing	 decision-making,	 by	
improving	 inputs	concerning	 the	 longer-term	 future	and	by	drawing	on	wider	 social	networks	 than	
has	 been	 the	 case	 in	much	 ‘futures	 studies’	 or	 long-range	planning”.	 In	 the	UK,	 Foresight	 became	
particularly	 important	 in	 the	 1990s	 in	 the	 context	 of	 national	 Technology	 Foresight	 programmes,	
which	remain	a	major	area	of	activity	(Miles	et	al.,	2002,	Miles,	2010).		Kuosa	(Kuosa,	2012)	calls	this	
type	 of	 Foresight	 ‘technological	 assessment’,	 considering	 it	 less	 concerned	 with	 the	 creation	 of	
alternatives,	and	more	with	systematic	planning.		
Such	 separation	 however	 is	 not	 always	 clear	 and	 well	 defined	 in	 the	 available	 literature	 –	 often	
experts	talking	about	Foresight	are	actually	talking	about	Technology	Foresight	(not	exactly	the	same	
thing);	 while	 others	 who	 are	 talking	 generally	 about	 Futures	 Studies	 may	 stray	 into	 Foresight	
territory5.		While	the	focus	of	this	research	is	on	Foresight	in	its	policy-supporting	role,	the	review	of	
relevant	 literature	 has	 thus	 been	 extended	 to	 materials	 under	 different	 headings	 and	 labels,	





(Adam	 and	 Grove,	 2007).	 The	 first	 way	 of	 thinking	 about	 the	 future	 based	 its	 argument	 on	 a	










The	 dominance	 of	 this	 first	 paradigm	 for	 considering	 the	 future	 continued	 all	 the	 way	 through	
Illuminism;	 it	 was	 only	 at	 the	 beginning	 of	 the	 20th	 century	 that,	 thanks	 to	 new	 discoveries	 and	
achievements	in	science	and	technology,	a	new	paradigm	started	emerging,	signalling	the	beginning	
of	modern	Futures	 Studies	–	 although	 it	 only	 really	 took	off	 in	earnest	 after	World	War	 II.	 	While	
previously	the	predominant	view	was	of	a	pre-set	fate	defeating	men’s	efforts	to	alter	its	direction,	





technological	 foresight	 and	 assessment	 in	 general.	 	 Think	 tanks	 and	 research	 centres	 of	 the	 US	




expanded	 due	 to	 increasing	 awareness	 of	 the	 long-term	 consequences	 of	 population,	 economic	
growth,	 social	 movements,	 the	 threat	 of	 nuclear	 war,	 and	 the	 energy	 crisis.	 	 In	 1966	 Cornish	
established	the	World	Future	Society	in	the	US;	the	Club	of	Rome	was	created	in	1968,	while	1973	
saw	 the	 birth	 of	 the	 World	 Futures	 Studies	 Federation	 (“WFSF”),	 founded	 in	 Paris	 as	 a	 global	
network	of	 leading	futurists	who	already	in	the	1960s	conceived	the	idea	of	Futures	Studies	at	the	




behavioural	 sciences,	 strategic	 management,	 etc.	 brought	 important	 contributions	 (Berkhout	 and	
Hertin,	 2002).	 	 The	 term	 “Foresight”,	 used	 for	 the	 first	 time	 by	 H.G.	 Wells	 in	 19326,	 was	 re-
appropriated	and	used	more	extensively	 from	the	1980s	 thanks	 to	 the	 influential	 studies	by	 Irving	
and	Martin	on	how	research	priorities	are	set	(Miles,	2010)	to	indicate	“the	techniques,	mechanisms	

















for	 the	 way	 individuals	 and	 organisations	 think	 about	 the	 future	 differs	 between	 countries	 and	
especially	 between	 cultures	 (Barbieri	Masini,	 2010),	 and	 is	 significantly	 influenced	 and	 shaped	 by	
local	cultural,	social,	and	political	circumstances	(Krawczyk	and	Slaughter,	2010).	
After	World	War	 II,	 the	 development	 of	 Futures	 Studies	 in	 the	US	 focused	primarily	 on	 economic	
development	 and	 military	 advancement,	 with	 methods	 grounded	 in	 strategic	 planning	 and	
operational	 research	 and	 mainly	 based	 on	 expert	 judgements,	 trend	 analysis,	 and	 scientific	
modelling	techniques.			
European	 interests	 were	 centred	 more	 around	 social	 and	 cultural	 themes	 and	 human	 potential,	
aspiring	 to	 help	 people	 shape	 their	 own	 future;	 Futures	 Studies	 developed	 under	 significant	
influence	 from	 the	 French	 La	 Prospective	 school,	 which	 considered	 the	 study	 of	 the	 future	 to	 be	
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more	an	art	than	simply	a	science.		Highly	active	and	networked	academics	in	France,	Italy,	the	UK,	
and	 Germany	 produced	 a	 type	 of	 foresight	 that	 was	 much	 more	 ‘bottom-up’	 compared	 to	 their	
Stateside	counterparts	(Dreyer	and	Stang,	2013).		







from	 studies	 and	 activities	 carried	 out	 by	 experts	 of	 their	 own	 initiative.	 	 Indeed,	 according	 to	
Barbieri	Masini	 (Barbieri	Masini,	 2010),	 a	 normative	 component	 (see	 2.3.4.4	 below)	 is	 present,	 at	
different	levels,	in	all	Futures	Studies.	
Berger	coined	the	term	‘Prospective’	in	France	in	the	1950s,	which	has	then	been	applied	by	Godet	
for	 many	 years.	 Central	 to	 La	 Prospective	 is	 the	 connection	 between	 understanding	 a	 situation	
through	qualitative	or	quantitative	data,	and	the	choosing	and	acting	in	‘strategic	planning’	based	on	
human	 values	 and	 aspirations.	 Still	 in	 France,	 de	 Jouvenel	 (de	 Jouvenel,	 1967)	 distinguished	
‘futuribles’	–	possible	futures	-	from	‘futurables’	–	possible	futures	that	are	identified	as	desirable	-	
and	 suggested	 that	 futurists	 have	 a	 duty	 of	 acting	 to	 promote	 the	 latter.	 The	word	 he	 used	was	
‘conjecture’,	which	 is	not	 knowing	and	understanding,	but	 rather	having	an	opinion,	a	 thought,	an	
imagination.	 	He	also	distinguished	a	 ‘dominating	 future’	–	a	 future	dominating	an	agent	–	 from	a	
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to	develop	 scenario	capabilities	and	engage	 in	 scenario	planning;	however	 the	 following	 recession	
and	consequent	reductions	in	corporate	staffing	and	budgets	caused	the	majority	of	such	efforts	to	
be	 short	 lived.	 	 Some	 managers	 became	 also	 disappointed	 with	 the	 results	 of	 their	 scenario	
activities,	although	this	may	also	have	been	due	to	oversimplification	of	the	process	and	use,	as	well	
as	misplaced	expectations	that	confused	story-telling	with	forecasting	(Chermack	et	al.,	2001).	




out	 their	 very	 own	 futures	 activity.	 	 Another	 implication	 of	 commercial	 and	 private	 organisations	
being	 the	 recipients	 and	 users	 of	 much	 foresight	 activities	 and	 efforts	 is	 that	 any	 conclusions,	
applications,	 and	 results	 are	 seldom	 publicly	 accessible,	 and	 in	 the	 majority	 of	 cases	 difficult	 to	
generalise.	
Since	 the	 late	 ‘80s	 there	 has	 been	 renewed	 interest	 and	 investment	 in	 developing	 futures	
intelligence	to	support	government	policymaking,	particularly	as	Technological	Foresight	to	support	
























Studies	 –	which	 gives	 an	 initial	 answer	 to	 the	question	of	 “what	 are	we	 looking	at”	when	 looking	
ahead.	 	 Sections	 2.3.4.2	 and	 2.3.4.3	 below	 look	 at	 the	 evolution	 of	 the	 theory	 of	 Futures	 Studies	
from	 forecasting	 to	 Foresight	 and	 at	 the	 Foresight	 process	 –	 further	 addressing	 the	 question	 of	
“what	are	we	looking	at,	and	what	for”,	as	well	as	“how”.	
2.3.4.1 Epistemological	Evolution	of	Futures	Studies	




stating	 that	 explaining	 and	 predicting	 events	 are	 logically	 and	methodologically	 identical	 (Aligica,	
2003).		
The	positivist	paradigm	is	at	the	basis	of	the	Empirical/Predictive	theoretical	 framework	for	Future	
Studies,	 while	 the	 development	 of	 post-positivist	 paradigms	 in	 social	 sciences	 from	 the	 1970s	
allowed	 for	 the	 emergence	 of	 a	 plurality	 of	 approaches	 to	 Futures	 Studies,	 such	 as	 the	







Most	 futurists	agree	 that	 foresight	 is	a	 social	 construction	process	 (van	Asselt	et	al.,	2010),	as	 the	
future	 is	not	something	 ‘out	 there’	waiting	to	be	discovered,	but	rather	 the	result	of	dialogue	and	
negotiations	between	those	involved;	as	such,	it	is	constructed.		More	recently,	greater	attention	has	
been	placed	on	man’s	role	in	the	choice	and	construction	of	his	own	future,	and	on	the	importance	





Milojević	 and	 Inayatullah	 (Milojević	 and	 Inayatullah,	 2015)	 describe	 the	 increasing	 interest	 in	
narrative	 that	 has	 emerged	 over	 the	 past	 decade	 in	 many	 social	 sciences,	 and	 the	 growing	







The	 ‘behavioural	 revolution’	 of	 the	 1950s	 and	 1960s	 in	 political	 science	 placed	 emphasis	 on	
quantitative	 methods	 and	 formal	 modelling,	 supporting	 the	 belief	 it	 was	 possible	 to	 predict	 the	





























































































































































futures	 research’	 paradigm.	 	 The	 descriptive/positivistic	 approach	 is	 usually	 associated	with	 trend	
extrapolation,	establishment	of	time	series	and	point	estimates	concerning	future	events,	and	aims	





credibility	 was	 undermined.	 	 Given	 that	 in	 the	 1970s	 and	 1980s	 the	 ability	 to	 provide	 a	 ‘correct’	
prediction	was	still	considered	the	only	criterion	for	forecasting	and	Futures	Studies	in	general,	long-
term	 Futures	 Studies	 were	 consequently	 regarded	 with	 suspicion	 and	 neglected	 by	 planners	 and	
policymakers	(Cuhls,	2003).	
The	oil	 crisis	 and	other	events	questioned	 the	validity	of	 thinking	 in	 terms	of	 forecasts	of	 a	 single	
future	 that	 could	 be	 extrapolated	 and	 precisely	 forecasted;	 the	 increasing	 awareness	 of	 the	
uncertainty	surrounding	what	lays	ahead	moved	the	conversation	to	the	need	to	consider	–	explore	
–	 the	 whole	 ‘possibility	 space’	 (Berkhout	 and	 Hertin,	 2002),	 thus	 moving	 towards	 a	 ‘scenario’	




adoption	 and	 use	 of	 the	 term	 ‘Futures	 Studies’	 –	with	 emphasis	 on	 the	 plural	 ‘s’	 for	 both	words	
(Barbieri	Masini,	2010).			
Bell	and	other	experts	in	Futures	Studies	see	their	purposes	in	“maintaining	or	improving	the	welfare	
of	humankind	and	the	 life-sustaining	capacities	of	 the	earth	 itself	 […]	their	distinctive	obligation	to	
the	future	invites	them	to	speak	for	the	freedom	and	wellbeing	of	future	generations,	the	coming	as-
yet-unborn	 people	 of	 the	 future	who	 in	 the	 present	 have	 no	 voice	 of	 their	 own”	 (Bell,	 2002);	 and	








technology	 push,	 to	 progressively	 placing	 greater	 emphasis	 on	 societal	 pull	 and	 influence	 and	
eventually	to	beginning	to	focus	on	complex	social	issues	and	problems	–	see	2.5.3	below.	
2.3.4.3 The	Foresight	Process	















































































objectives.	 	 Saritas	 also	 sees	 a	 seventh	 phase,	 Interaction,	 characterised	 by	 participation	 and	
inclusivity,	 central	 to	 all	 other	 phases.	 	 Upon	 completion	 of	 the	 process,	 the	 phases	 link	 back	 to	
create	a	full	circle	of	Foresight	 in	a	continuous	 learning	 loop,	allowing	the	systems	to	continuously	
develop	and	adapt.		














Of	 these,	 only	 the	 first	 falls	 within	 the	 classic	 policy	 analysis	 role	 of	 information	 provision	 (see	









policy-free	 scenarios	 –	 scenarios	 describing	 possible	 futures	 where	 the	 policy	 context	 is	 set	 and	




questioned	 in	 organisational	 foresight	 as	 encouraging	 a	 purely	 reactive	 mindset	 and	 attitude	
towards	the	future;	in	policy-oriented	Foresight	both	the	theoretical	grounding	and	the	attainability	
of	 the	 policy-free	 principle,	 as	 well	 as	 its	 desirability,	 have	 been	 put	 in	 doubt,	 although	 it	 often	
remains	the	preferred	stance	for	experts	since	it	is	associated	with	being	apolitical,	as	well	as	being	
perceived	as	more	academically	valid	(van	Asselt	et	al.,	2010,	van	Asselt	et	al.,	2014)	
Kuosa	 (Kuosa,	 2011)	 states	 that,	 unlike	 normal	 sciences	 which	 aim	 to	 be	 value-neutral,	 futures	
research	 is	value-rational	as	 it	 takes	a	 stance	vis-à-vis	different	alternatives	and	describes	 	its	own	





Ogilvy,	 Bell,	Dator,	 and	many	other	 futurists	 argue	 for	 a	 normative/value-rational	 role	 for	 Futures	
Studies	as	well	 as	Foresight,	which	 they	 see	as	being	much	more	embedded	 in	 society	 (Slaughter,	
2002)	
Regulatory	Foresight	 is	a	strategic	activity	undertaken	by	governments	and	policy-makers,	focused	
specifically	 on	 the	identification	 of	 future	 challenges	 in	 regulatory	 regimes;	 it	 supports	 regulatory	






Kuosa	 (Kuosa,	 2012)	 distinguishes	 Participatory	 from	 Strategic	 Foresight,	 and	 describes	










a	 number	 of	 widely	 recognised	 experts	 and	 bodies.	 	 The	 definition	 proposed	 by	 FOREN	 –	 the	
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Foresight	 for	 Regional	 Development	 Network	 established	 by	 the	 European	 Commission	 –	 is	 “a	
systematic,	 participatory,	 future	 intelligence	 gathering	 and	 medium-	 to	 long-term	 vision	 building	
process	aimed	at	present-day	decisions	and	mobilising	 joint	actions”	 (FOREN,	2001).	 	According	 to	
Havas	(Havas,	2005),	for	foresight	activities	to	be	considered	Foresight	programmes	they	need	to	be		
“action-oriented,	 participatory,	 and	 consider	 alternative	 futures”,	 where	 the	 conditions	 for	 being	
participatory	are	that	a	programme:	
- Involves	participants	from	at	least	two	different	stakeholder	groups;	




of	Fully	 Fledged	 Foresight	 (Miles	et	al.,	2002)	 to	define	approaches	 that	place	emphasis	on	policy	
networking	as	well	as	on	longer-term	analysis	to	inform	present	day	decisions.	
Indeed,	 the	 involvement	 of	 major	 stakeholders	 –	 who	 have	 the	 power	 to	 significantly	 influence	
underlying	trends	through	their	organisations’	strategies	and	policies	–	is	seen	as	crucial	in	order	to	
enable	 Foresight	 processes	 to	 reduce	 (although	 not	 to	 completely	 eliminate)	 uncertainty	 by	
encouraging	participants	to	align	their	endeavours	through	a	shared	vision	(Havas,	2005).	
Another	 advantage	 is	 that,	 by	 involving	 other	 stakeholders	 who	 themselves	 have	 carried	 out	
foresight	activities	of	 their	own,	 such	as	business	 firms,	 the	knowledge	 they	generated	can	be	 fed	
into	public	policy	Foresight	(Miles	et	al.,	2008a).	
Figure	2.3.4.5		illustrates	how	the	model	of	Fully	Fledged	Foresight	is	clearly	linked	to	policy	action,	
but	 also	 draws	 on	 wider	 sources	 of	 knowledge	 beyond	 the	 expert	 groups,	 while	 the	 networking	




Miles	 and	 colleagues	 (Miles	 et	 al.,	 2008b)	 indicate	 a	 key	 characteristic	 of	 Foresight	 as	 ‘diversed’:	
“must	keep	an	ear	open	to	unpopular	views	and	not	rush	to	a	consensus;	relevant	(and	seemingly	less	
	 27	
relevant)	 stakeholders	 should	 be	 engaged	wherever	 possible,	 either	 in	 the	 exercise	 itself	 or	 in	 pre-	
and	post-	foresight	activities”.		
It	 is	useful	at	 this	point	 to	provide	a	definition	of	stakeholder:	Freeman’s	definition	 (Freeman	and	
Reed,	 1983)	 is	 of	 “any	 group	 or	 individual	 who	 can	 affect	 the	 achievement	 of	 an	 organisation’s	
objectives	 or	 is	 affected	by	 the	 achievement	 of	 an	organisation’s	 objectives”.	 	 It	 is	 also	defined	 as	
persons,	 groups	or	organisations	 that	must	 somehow	be	 taken	 into	account	by	 leaders,	managers	
and	 front-line	staff	 (Bryson,	2004)	as	well	as	“All	parties	who	will	be	affected	by	or	will	affect	 [the	
organisation’s]	 strategy”	 or	 “Any	 person	 group	 or	 organisation	 that	 can	 place	 a	 claim	 on	 the	
organisation’s	attention,	 resources,	or	output,	or	 is	affected	by	 that	output”	–	 it	depends	on	what	
perspective	is	used:	managerial,	political	sciences,	or	public	and	non-profit	management.		
Voß	 (Voß,	 2006)	 links	 Participatory	 Foresight	 exercises	 to	 reflexive	 governance	 approaches	 that	
reflect	the	complex	interactions	underlying	the	management	or	solution	of	a	(complex)	problem.		By	
being	exposed	to	each	other’s	problem	perceptions,	assessment	criteria	and	action	strategies,	actors	
can	 begin	 to	 adapt	 their	 perceptions,	 criteria	 and	 strategies	 before	 becoming	 entrenched	 in	
ineffective/inappropriate	positions	(see	2.4.3.1	below).				
2.3.5 Looking	Ahead:	in	Practice	-	Brief	Overview	of	Main	Methods	and	Techniques	




practitioners	 to	 suit	 the	 (specific)	 needs	 of	 their	 clients	 (Bishop	 et	 al.,	 2007).	 	 	 As	 a	 result,	 the	
literature	 on	 the	 topic	 is	 significantly	 practice-	 and	 practitioner-driven,	 much	 of	 it	 focussing	 on	
method-	and	tool-specific	manuals	and	how-to.		Furthermore,	as	described	in	2.3.4.3	above,	most	of	














































































Delphi	 –	 Developed	 in	 the	 1950s	 by	 RAND,	 it	 is	 a	 consultation	 process	 aimed	 at	 collecting	 and	
harmonising	 the	opinions	of	a	 selection	of	experts	on	 the	 issue	considered,	and	 the	method	most	
frequently	used	 in	 technology	 foresight	 (Faucheux	and	Hue,	2001).	 	 In	 the	original	Delphi	method,	
questions	 are	 sent	 to	 a	 panel	 of	 experts	 in	 various	 rounds,	 where	 each	 panellist	 responds	
anonymously	 to	 the	 questions.	 	 The	 result	 is	 a	 consensus	 forecast	 or	 judgement	 (Börjeson	 et	 al.,	
2006).	 According	 to	 Bell	 (Bell,	 2004),	 it	was	 created	 and	 survives	 because	 it	 is	 “cheap	and	quick”,	
convenient	when	there	is	a	shortage	of	data,	inadequate	models,	and	lack	of	time	or	resources	for	a	
thorough	scientific	study.		
Horizon	 Scanning	–	The	systematic	examination	of	emerging	 issues	 that	begin	 to	appear	and	may	
present	threats	or	opportunities	for	society	and	policy,	using	a	creative	process	of	‘collective	sense	
making’	 (Könnöla	 et	 al.,	 2012),	 and	 their	 assessment	 and	 prioritisation	 for	 decision	 making	
(Loveridge,	2009).	 	Typically	a	back-office/desk-based	activity,	not	requiring	participatory	activities,	






which	 may	 emerge	 as	 a	 result	 of	 conflict	 between	 the	 embedded	 present	 and	 these	 imagined	
futures	during	a	transitional	period	(Horizon	2,	the	medium	term)	when	present	and	desired	future	
collide	(Curry	and	Hodgson,	2008).		
Trend	 Analysis/Drivers	 Analysis	 –	 looks	 at	 how	 a	 potential	 driver	 of	 change	 has	 developed	 over	
time,	and	how	it	is	likely	to	develop	in	the	future.			
Trend	 Impact	 Analysis	 –	 a	 simple	 forecasting	 approach,	 combining	 qualitative	 and	 quantitative	
aspects,	 that	extrapolates	historical	data	 into	 the	 future,	while	 taking	 into	account	unprecedented	
future	events.	Starting	 from	a	 'surprise-free'	projection	based	on	historical	data,	 future	events	are	
identified	 that	 might	 cause	 deviations	 from	 the	 surprise-free	 projection	 (i.e.,	 interruptions	 to	 a	
trend),	and	their	likelihood	and	potential	strength	are	calibrated	(Gordon,	2003).	
STEEP	–	an	analysis	of	the	contextual	environment	for	the	issue/organisation	considered	in	order	to	
identify	and	characterise	the	drivers	 that	are	 (or	will	be)	at	work	and	to	consider	what	effect	 they	
might	 have	 on	 the	 issue/organisation’s	 future	 development	 and	 operations	 (Waverley,	 2012).		
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Drivers	 are	 typically	 categorised	 as	 Societal,	 Technological,	 Environmental,	 Economic	 and	Political,	








foresight	 toolbox,	 and	 in	 both	 the	 private	 and	 public	 sector	 it	 is	 often	 “seen	 as	 the	 only	 way	 of	
exploring	the	future”	(Sardar,	2010).	 	Culminating	 in	the	description	of	some	possible	future	states	
and/or	 stories	about	how	such	states	might	come	about,	 it	 is	 considered	by	many	an	archetypical	
product	of	Futures	Studies	because	it	embodies	their	central	principles	who	stress	the	need	to	think	
“deeply	 and	 creatively”	 and	 prepare	 for	 “multiple	 plausible	 futures”	 (Bishop	 et	 al.,	 2007).	 The	
predominant	scenario	technique	in	both	corporate	and	government	organisations	is	the	Royal	Dutch	









where	 they	 can	 realistically	 expect	 and	 wish	 to	 be	 in	 the	 future.	 Participants	 use	 a	 number	 of	
questions	to	describe	a	desirable	future,	before	identifying	how	the	current	reality	needs	to	change	
to	 ensure	 success.	 Most	 practitioners	 agree	 on	 the	 importance	 of	 a	 shared	 vision	 for	 successful	
action	(van	der	Helm,	2009).	
Backcasting	–	can	be	considered	a	form	of	explicitly	normative	scenario	analysis,	 involving	working	
backwards	 from	 a	 particular	 desired	 future	 end-point	 to	 the	 present,	 in	 order	 to	 determine	 the	
feasibility	of	that	future	and	 its	requirements	 (Robinson,	2003).	 	This	technique	can	be	particularly	
relevant	when	the	objective	is	not	the	identification	of	the	most	likely	future	but	the	contribution	to	
the	 creation	of	 a	more	desirable	one,	 revealing	 its	possibility	 and	 testing	 its	 feasibility	 and	 impact	
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(Robinson,	1988).		Backcasting	aims	at	encouraging	searching	for	new	paths	for	the	development	of	




happen	 through	 the	 direct	 involvement	 and	 participation	 of	 stakeholders,	 or	 the	 source	 of	 the	
normative	content	may	be	external	to	the	exercise	itself.		
5th	 Scenario	 –	 Starting	 from	 an	 existing	 set	 of	 scenarios,	 a	 ‘customised’	 scenario	 is	 developed	
building	 on	 its	 opportunities	 and	 desirable	 outcomes	 and	 overcoming	 the	 threats	 and	 potential	
pitfalls	 identified.	 	 Once	 this	 new,	 ‘willed’	 view	 of	 the	 future	 is	 developed,	 users	 are	 asked	 to	
describe	the	steps	they	will	take	to	deliver	it.		While	in	some	aspects	it	is	similar	to	backcasting,	this	
approach	 takes	 into	 consideration	 uncertainty	 by	 looking	 at	 scenarios	 which	 have	 explored	 said	
uncertainty	(Waverley,	2012).	
Reverse	Engineering	–	Generally	using	a	set	of	scenarios	as	a	starting	point,	this	tool	begins	with	the	
identification	 of	 events	 that	 are	 certain	 to	 occur	 and	 likely	 to	 have	 a	 high	 impact	 on	 the	 issue	 or	
organisation,	and	aims	 the	discussion	at	 the	 identification	and	exploration	of	options	as	well	as	of	
possible	risks	and	opportunities.	
Narrative	–	Narrative	foresight	aims	at	developing	‘stories’	that	facilitate	desired	(preferred/wished	
for)	 futures.	 	 It	 focuses	on	 linking	data,	quantitative	analysis	and	empirical	 findings	with	the	socio-







‘roads’,	 towards	 specified	 performance	 objectives	within	 a	 determined	 time-frame,	 and	 is	 needs-	
rather	 than	 solution-driven	 (Garcia	 and	 Bray,	 1997).	 Indeed,	 relevance	 to	 future	 actions	 is	 a	
characteristic	 and	 requirement	 of	 high-quality	 roadmaps	 (Kostoff	 and	 Schaller,	 2001).	 	 The	








is	 ‘technology	 roadmap’,	 followed	 by	 ‘product	 roadmap’,	 reflecting	 the	 origins	 of	 this	 technique	
(Phaal	et	al.,	2005).	While	there	is	no	unique/standard	method,	typically	all	roadmapping	exercises	
include	an	 insight	 and	knowledge	gathering	 stage	during	which	knowledge	 is	 captured,	 structured	
and	shared	between	participants	in	order	to	identify	issues,	set	objectives,	and	agree	upon	and	plan	
actions	(Phaal	et	al.,	2003,	Kostoff	and	Schaller,	2001).		
Windtunnelling	 –	 starting	 from	 a	 set	 of	 scenarios,	 decision	 makers	 can	 test	 the	 robustness	 of	 a	




Stakeholder/Plausibility	 Matrix	 –	 Participants	 are	 asked	 to	 consider	 the	 scenarios	 and	 describe	
which	one(s)	they	favour.	
Causal	 Layered	 Analysis	 –	 Identifies,	 through	 discussion	 and	 deconstruction	 of	 conventional	
thinking,	 the	 driving	 forces	 and	 worldviews	 underpinning,	 at	 different	 levels	 of	 reality	 (Litany,	
Systemic	Causes,	Worldview	and	Metaphor),	diverse	possible	perspectives	about	 the	problem	and	
about	 the	 future,	and	 the	different	meanings	assigned	by	different	groups.	CLA	 seeks	 to	 integrate	
these	 four	 levels	 of	 understanding.	 Solutions	 need	 to	 be	 found	 at	 each	 level,	 requiring	 policy	
solutions	to	be	deeper	(Inayatullah,	2008).		
Futures	 Wheel	 –	 This	 tool	 involves	 a	 graphical	 visualisation	 of	 direct	 and	 indirect	 future	
consequences	of	 a	 change	or	development	by	 looking	 further	 than	 just	 the	 first	order	 impacts,	 to	
second	 order	 impacts	 and	 beyond.	 It	 intends	 to	 explore	 and	 deduce	 unintended	 consequences	
(Inayatullah,	 2008).	 Futures	 Wheels	 can	 also	 be	 used	 in	 decision-making	 (to	 choose	 between	
options)	and	in	change	management	(to	identify	the	consequences	of	change).		







referred,	 either	 explicitly	or	 implicitly,	 to	modern	day	democratic10	political	 systems	 such	as	 those	
found	in	the	UK	and	the	rest	of	Western	Europe,	North	America,	and	Australia.	













Method/Technique	 Desk-based	 Participatory	 Note	
Delphi	 ✓ 	 	 Typically	non	participative,	it	aims	at	identifying	convergences	
of	opinions	by	eliminating	any	areas	of	discordance	or	conflict	
Horizon	Scanning	 ✓ 	 	 It	can	include	expert	panels	
Three	Horizons	 	 ✓ 	 	
Trend	Analysis	 ✓ 	 	 	
Trend/Impact	Analysis	 ✓ 	 	 Mostly	desk-based,	although	expert	opinions	are	sought	
STEEP	 ✓ 	 	 Mostly	 desk-based,	 although	 output	 can	 be	 discussed	 and	
integrated	in	a	participative	way	
7	Questions	 ✓ 	 	 	
Scenarios	 	 ✓ 	 	
Visioning	 	 ✓ 	 	
Backcasting	 	 ✓ 	 	
5th	Scenario	 	 ✓ 	 	
Reverse	Engineering	 	 ✓ 	 	
Narrative	 	 ✓ 	 	
Roadmapping	 	 ✓ 	 Process	 is	 normally	 expert-driven,	 involving	 social	
mechanisms	
Windunnelling	 	 ✓ 	 	
Stakeholder	Matrix	 	 ✓ 	 	
Causal	Layered	
Analysis	
	 ✓ 	 Particularly	 useful	 when	 different	 groups	 hold	 different	
perspectives	on	essence	and	future	of	policy	topic	




Policymakers:	 Although	 this	 definition	 is	 normally	 used	 to	 indicate	 officials	 formally	 elected	 or	







government	with	 the	power	 to	make	 things	happen,	 to	a	more	descriptive	and	pragmatic	 view	of	
complex	 interactions	 between	 actors	 and	 networks	 both	 within	 and	 outwith	 the	 central	
government,	 governance	 as	 “the	 manner,	 method	 or	 system	 by	 which	 a	 particular	 society	 is	
governed”	has	moved	from	being	essentially	identified	with	government	to	new	processes	and	styles	
of	 governing	 where	 the	 boundaries	 and	 responsibilities	 between	 and	 within	 public	 and	 private	
sectors	have	become	blurred	(Rhodes,	1996,	Stoker,	1998).	 	The	broader	definition	the	Researcher	
considers	most	fitting	in	the	context	of	this	Research	is:	“All	those	interactive	arrangements	in	which	
public	as	well	 as	private	actors	participate	aimed	at	 solving	 societal	problems,	or	 creating	 societal	





cycle	 and	 breaking	 it	 down,	 while	 assuming	 an	 ideal	 policymaker	 blessed	 with	 comprehensive	
rationality	and	with	perfect	ability	to	produce,	research,	and	introduce	their	policy	preferences.		
Lasswell,	 Lerner	 and	 others	 promoted	 the	 creation	 of	 policy	 sciences	 in	 the	 early	 1950s	with	 the	
purposes	 of	 studying	 the	 policy	 and	 decision-making	 processes	 themselves,	 and	 providing	
information	 to	 assist	 decision-makers	 in	 their	 tasks	 (Bell,	 2002).	 	 The	 belief	 was	 that	 particular	
scientific	 methods	 could	 and	 should	 be	 applied	 to	 policy	 analysis,	 which	 could	 be	 used	 by	
policymakers	 to	better	understand	and	make	decisions	 (Cairney,	2011).	 	Central	 to	policy	 sciences	
was	 the	 relationship	 between	 knowledge,	 policymaking,	 and	 power	 (Parsons,	 2002).	 Lasswell	
(Lasswell,	1970)	defined	policy	sciences	as	concerned	with	both	knowledge	of	the	policy	process	and	
knowledge	 in	 the	 process,	 and	 saw	 them	 as	 a	 problem-oriented	 endeavour,	 for	 which	 it	 is	




















More	 recently,	 the	 validity	 of	 the	 policy	 cycle,	 and	 indeed	 its	 existence,	 has	 been	 questioned;	 in	
practice,	 it	mostly	remain	as	an	organizing	framework	for	the	study	and/or	discussion	of	the	policy	
process,	and	as	a	metaphor	suggesting	how	the	 final	 stage	of	policy	n	–	evaluation	–	provides	 the	
input	 for	 the	 initial	 stage	of	 policy	n+1,	 rather	 than	 as	 a	 prescriptive	 tool	 for	 activity	 organization	
(Cairney,	2011,	Cairney,	2015).			
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Many	 of	 the	 criticisms	 of	 the	 rational	 model	 focus	 on	 its	 inadequate	 representation	 of	 the	
policymaking	 process	 in	 practice	 (Nutley	 and	 Webb,	 2004)	 and	 on	 the	 unattainability	 of	





In	 alternative	 to	 this	 rational-comprehensive	 analysis,	 Lindblom	 (Lindblom,	 1959)	 proposed	 the	
incrementalist	 approach	 of	 “successive	 limited	 comparisons”,	 where	 only	 a	 limited	 number	 of	
policies	 that	 differ	 marginally	 from	 current/status-quo	 policies	 are	 compared,	 and	 policymakers	
proceed	 through	 a	 succession	 of	 incremental	 changes	 to	 approximate	 desired	 objectives.	 	 Two	
decades	 later	 the	prevalence	of	 the	 incrementalist	 approach	had	 indeed	become	one	of	 the	most	
common	 views	 in	 policy	 theory	 and	 practice,	 although	 for	 many	 policy	 theorists	 and	makers	 the	
aspiration	 to	move	 towards	 a	model	 that	was	 closer	 to	 the	 rational-comprehensive	 side	was	 still	
strong,	as	that	was	perceived	as	a	better	model	(Lindblom,	1979).		In	particular,	many	experts	held	
the	view	that	by	 taking	bigger	and	more	 integrated	steps	while	undertaking	a	more	complete	and	
comprehensive	 –	 scientific	 –	 analysis	 of	 policy	 alternatives	 it	 could	 be	 possible	 to	 improve	 policy	
making.		
Lindblom	and	others	however	posed	that	the	complexity	of	problems,	coupled	with	the	uncertainty	
of	 the	 future,	 made	 a	 complete,	 ‘synoptic’	 analysis	 as	 a	 norm	 for	 policymaking	 an	 impossible	






Lindblom	 also	 saw	 incremental	 politics	 as	 the	 most	 likely	 to	 succeed	 in	 introducing	 change	 –	
although	by	his	own	admission	such	views	were	shaped	by	his	experience	and	observations	of	 the	
American	policymaking	system	of	the	time.	
Others	 tried	 to	 find	 a	middle/mixed	 approach	 –	 for	 example	 Etzioni	 (Etzioni,	 1967,	 Etzioni,	 1986)	


















optimal	 for	 a	 best	 estimate	 future;	 and	 such	 policies	 should	 combine	 actions	 addressing	 urgent	




a	process	usually	 involving	 three	 central	 variables:	 the	overarching	goals,	 the	 techniques	or	policy	
instruments	used	 to	attain	 those	goals,	and	 the	precise	 settings	of	 these	 instruments.	 	 Experience	
and	new	knowledge	can	lead	to	a	change	only	in	the	setting	of	the	instruments	(first	order	change),	
on	the	policy	instruments	(second	order	change),	or	on	the	goals	themselves	(third	order	change)	in	
what	can	be	defined	a	shift	of	policy	paradigm,	that	 is	of	 the	 interpretive	 framework	within	which	
policymakers	operate	(Hall,	1993).	
The	 Garbage	 can/Policy	 Streams	 model	 of	 policy	 settings	 developed	 by	 Kingdon	 in	 the	 1980s	
conceives	of	government	as	an	“organized	anarchy"	manifesting	aspects	of	both	order	and	disorder,	
where	 policymaking	 results	 from	 three	 largely	 unrelated	 ‘streams’:	 a	 problem	 stream,	 a	 policy	
stream,	 and	 a	 political	 stream	 (Sabatier,	 1991).	 At	 any	 given	 time,	 the	 particular	 items	 on	 the	
policymakers’	agenda	are	a	function	of	the	mix	of	‘garbage’	in	the	can.	The	items	in	the	can	get	on	
the	agenda	when	"a	problem	 is	 recognized,	a	 solution	 is	available,	and	 the	political	 climate	makes	






Most	 implementation	 research	 has	 highlighted	 that	 the	 development	 and	 execution	 of	 domestic	
policy	 both	 in	 the	US	 and	Western	 Europe	 involves	 numerous	 agencies	 and	 interest	 groups	 at	 all	
levels	 of	 government,	 thus	 in	 order	 to	 understand	 the	 policy	 process	 requires	 to	 look	 at	 an	




carried	 out	 by	many	 independent	 people	 and	 groups	within	 a	 policy	 process	 that	 is	 complex	 and	
messy	(Cairney,	2015),	and	further	input	has	been	offered	by	Organisational	Studies	(Rhodes,	2007).	




and	 takes	 into	 consideration	 the	 increasingly	 fragmented	 and	 uncertain	 nature	 of	 public	
management.		The	state	is	seen	both	as	plural,	where	the	delivery	of	public	services	is	carried	out	by	
multiple	 inter-dependent	 actors,	 and	 pluralist,	 where	 the	 policy	 making	 system	 is	 informed	 by	
multiple	 processes,	 and	 the	 emphasis	 is	 on	 the	 design	 and	 evaluation	 of	 enduring	 inter-
organizational	 relationships,	 where	 the	 core	 governance	mechanisms	 are	 trust,	 relational	 capital,	
and	 relational	 contracts	 (Osborne,	 2006).	 	 This	 perspective	 argues	 for	 a	 shift	 of	 focus	 away	 from	
formalities	and	a	concern	with	‘what	should	be’,	to	a	focus	on	actual	behaviour	and	‘what	is’,	which	





a	 shift	 in	 power	 between	 subsystems	 (Cairney,	 2011).	 Policy	 may	 change	 as	 a	 function	 of	 the	
interaction	between	competing	advocacy	coalitions,	changes	external	to	the	political	subsystem,	and	
the	effect	of	system	parameters	such	as	social	structure,	constitutional	rules,	etc.	 (Sabatier,	1991),	
but	also	due	to	changes	 in	the	 leading	coalition’s	belief	system	thanks	to	 information	and	 learning	
(Schlager	 and	 Blomquist,	 1996).	 The	 advocacy	 coalitions’	 methods	 of	 operation	 include:	 the	
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In	 the	 Politics	 of	 Structural	 Choice,	 Moe	 (Moe,	 1990)	 describes	 public	 policies	 as	 institutional	
arrangements.	 	 In	 the	context	of	democratic	politics,	 they	arise	 from	the	 interaction	of	politicians,	
interest	groups,	and	bureaucrats	who	strive	to	gain	control	of	government	in	order	to	achieve	their	
preferred	 arrangements	 and	 policies	 (Schlager	 and	 Blomquist,	 1996).	 Given	 the	 political	
environment	 in	which	 structural	 choice	occurs,	 however,	 the	 resulting	 policies	 are	 not	 necessarily	
designed	 to	 be	 efficient	 or	 even	 effective.	 	 Furthermore,	 issues	 may	 emerge	 as	 changes	 in	 the	
political	 landscapes	may	mean	that	the	group	currently	 in	power	 loses	power	and	thus	may	find	 it	
difficult	to	enforce	designed	policies.	
Punctuated	 Equilibrium	 (“PE”)	 explains	why	 some	policies	may	 remain	 the	 same	 for	 long	 periods	
while	 others	 change	 quickly	 and	 dramatically	 through	 a	 mix	 of	 bounded	 rationality	 and	 agenda	
setting:	as	policymakers	can	not	deal	with	all	the	issues	for	which	they	are	responsible,	they	ignore	
most	and	only	a	few	reach	their	to	do	list.			For	those	issues	that	reach	the	top	of	the	agenda	there	is	
a	 lot	 of	 attention,	 creating	 the	 most	 potential	 for	 significant	 policymaking	 instability	 and	 policy	
change	(Cairney,	2015).			For	those	issues	that	remain	ignored,	groups	and	officials	can	keep	closed	
policy	 communities	where	 little	 change	occur,	 so	 there	 is	 relative	 stability	 and	 continuity.	 Change	




governments	 necessitates	 breaking	 policy	 formation	 and	 implementation	 down	 into	 manageable	
units.		The	responsibilities	of	government	are	divided	into	sectors	and	subsectors,	and	civil	servants	
establish	 formal	 and	 informal	 institutional	 linkages	 with	 other	 actors,	 interest	 groups,	 and	 other	
participants	 around	 shared	 interests	 in	 public	 policymaking	 and	 implementation.	 	 Governmental	
departments	 need	 cooperation	 as	 well	 as	 information	 and	 advice	 from	 the	 non-governmental	
participants,	while	these	actors	need	financing	and	 legislative	authority;	thus	policies	emerge	from	
the	 bargaining	 between	 the	 networks’	members	 (Rhodes,	 2007).	 In	 today’s	 world	 the	 number	 of	
groups,	experts,	and	other	policy	participants	has	grown	significantly,	and	the	debates	and	dealings	
are	 much	 more	 in	 the	 public	 spotlight	 (Cairney,	 2011),	 therefore	 requiring	 greater	 transparency.		
“Shared	values	and	norms	are	the	glue	which	holds	the	complex	set	of	relationships	together;	trust	is	
essential	 for	 cooperative	 behaviour	 and,	 therefore,	 the	 existence	 of	 the	 network”,	 (Rhodes,	 2007)	
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the	 EU	 context	 (Cairney,	 2011).	 	MLG	 suggests	 that	 the	 policymaking	 process	 is	 messy,	 as	 many	
actors	may	be	involved	at	various	level	of	government	and	their	relationships	vary	across	time	and	
policy	 issue,	 with	 no	 single,	 central	 decision-maker	 or	 decision-making	 organisation.	 	 There	 are	
multiple	centres	of	authority	and	the	central	government	is	replaced	by	bargaining	government	and	
incrementalism	(Cairney,	2015),	making	policy	outcomes	difficult	to	predict	(Cairney,	2011).			
New	 Institutionalism	 treats	 institutions	 as	 a	 set	 of	 rules,	 norms,	 established	 practices	 and	
relationships	that	produce	regular	patterns	of	policymaking	behaviours.		
The	 Rational	 Choice	 theory	 uses	 ‘methodological	 individualism’,	 that	 is	 explains	 socio-political	
outcomes	 as	 the	 aggregation	 of	 decisions	 of	 individuals.	 	 In	 the	 Institutional	 Rational	 Choice,	
individual	 actions	 are	 seen	 as	 a	 function	 of	 both	 the	 attributes	 (values	 and	 resources)	 of	 the	
individual	and	the	attributes	of	the	decision	situation,	which	in	turn	depends	on	institutional	rules,	
the	 nature	 of	 the	 relevant	 good,	 and	 the	 attributes	 of	 the	 community	 (Sabatier,	 1991).	 The	






efforts.	 	 The	 various	 governance	 models	 that	 fall	 in	 this	 category	 all	 see	 participation,	
experimentation,	 and	 collective	 learning	 as	 key	 elements	 of	 governance	 (Voß	 and	 Bornemann,	






The	 Policy	 Analysis	 (“PA”)	 process	 generally	 involves	 a	 set	 of	 logical	 steps,	 such	 as	 illustrated	 in	





While	normative	PA	 saw	 comprehensive	 rationality	 as	 an	 ideal	 to	 aspire	 to,	 descriptive	PA	 saw	at	
best	examples	of	bounded	rationality	where	people	use	shortcuts	(due	to	limits	in	the	information,	
cognitive	 abilities,	 and	 time	available,	 and	 to	 complexity	of	 the	 issue	 considered)	 in	order	 to	 seek	
satisfactory,	rather	than	optimal,	solutions	(Cairney,	2011).	
Radin	(Radin,	2013)	identifies	three	broad	eras	in	PA:	the	1960s,	the	1990s,	and	the	2010s.			
1960s:	 this	 period	 saw	 the	 emergence	 of	 analytic	 techniques	 including	 system	 analysis	 and	




as	 integral	 to	 the	 formulation	 stage	 of	 the	 policy	 making	 process,	 when	 analysts	 would	 explore	
alternative	approaches	to	solve	the	issue	considered.	Focus	was	on	getting	as	much	information	and	





the	 1990s,	 focus	 had	 expanded	 to	 evaluation	 of	 previous	 initiatives,	 experiments,	 and	 policies,	 as	
well	 as	 moving	 progressively	 towards	 implementation,	 with	 greater	 interest	 in	 the	 relationship	
between	program	objectives	and	means	–	the	how	rather	than	the	what.		



















- Confront	 the	 trade-offs:	clarify	the	trade-offs	between	outcomes	associated	with	different	
policy	options	
- Decide	
- Tell	 your	 story:	 communicate	 the	 outcomes	 of	 the	 analysis	 using	 the	 most	 appropriate	
format(s)	depending	on	audience	and	purposes.			










organisational	 structures	 that	 offer	 advice.	 Staff	 members	 are	 experienced	 officials	 in	 the	 career	




- Taking	a	difficult	and	sometimes	poorly	understood	problem	or	 issue	and	structuring	 it	 so	
that	it	can	be	thought	about	in	a	systematic	way	
- Gathering	 the	 minimum	 necessary	 information	 and	 applying	 the	 appropriate	 analytical	
methods	
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- Formulating	 effective	 options	 addressing,	 where	 necessary,	 mechanisms	 for	
implementation,	monitoring	and	evaluation;	and	
- Communicating	 the	results	of	the	work	to	the	government	 in	a	timely	and	understandable	
way.	
Radin	 also	 suggests	 that	 New	 Public	 Management	 approaches	 have	 led	 to	 a	 greater	 focus	 on	
performance	and	outcome	assessment	(see	also	2.4.2.5	below),	and	even	in	parliamentary	systems	
there	 has	 been	 a	 growth	 in	 the	 number	 and	 importance	 of	 PA	 groups	 that	 are	 outside	 of	
government.	
2.4.2.5 Policy	Analysis:	The	recent	UK	Experience	
Nutley	 (Nutley	 and	Webb,	 2004)	 offers	 a	 history	 of	 the	 relationship	 between	 research	 and	 public	
policy	 in	 the	UK	and	 indicates	how	modern	 relationship	between	 social	 research	and	 social	 policy	
started	in	the	19th	century.		At	the	core	of	this	framework	is	the	belief	that:		





was	 followed	 by	 increasing	 disillusionment	 about	 such	 an	 approach,	which	manifested	 as	 a	more	
general	breakdown	of	the	social	democratic	consensus	in	British	politics	emerged.	
In	 contrast	 to	 the	Public	 Administration	paradigm,	 that	 saw	 a	 central	 role	 of	 the	 bureaucracy	 in	
policy	 making	 and	 implementation	 and	 a	 focus	 on	 the	 essentially	 political	 nature	 of	 public	
administration	 and	 on	 the	 complexity	 of	 the	 public	 policy	 making	 process,	 from	 the	 late	 1970s	
onward	gained	popularity	the	view	that	the	managerial	techniques	developed	in	the	private	sector	
could	be	 applied	 in	 the	public	 sector,	 leading	 to	 greater	 efficiency	 and	effectiveness	 of	 the	public	
services.	 	This	view	resulted	 in	Managerialism	and	New	 Institutional	 Economics	 (“NIE”).	 	The	 first	
stressed	 hands-on	 professional	 management;	 explicit	 standards;	 inputs	 and	 output	 control	 and	
evaluation;	 performance	 management	 and	 audit;	 managing	 by	 results;	 value	 for	 money;	 and	
closeness	 to	 customers.	 	 NIE	 led	 to	 the	 introduction	 of	 incentive	 structures	 such	 as	 market	
competition	 in	 the	 provision	 of	 public	 services	 (Rhodes,	 1996).	 	 This	 New	 Public	 Management	





while	 non-governmental	 organisations	were	 contracted	 to	deliver	 services.	 The	 resulting	decision-
making	 (and	 thus	 policymaking)	 is	 not	 centralised,	 but	 rather	 shared	 across	 many	 levels	 of	
governments	 as	well	 as	with	NGOs	 and	QUANGOs,	with	 elected	policymakers	 forced	 to	 negotiate	
and	make	shared	decisions	with	actors	outside	of	the	government.		
Evidence	Based	Policy	Making	
In	 an	 effort	 to	 move	 policymaking	 beyond	 a	 simple	 ‘muddling	 through’,	 Evidence	 Based	 Policy	
Making	(“EBPM”)	emerged	in	the	90s	and	became	prominent	in	the	UK	in	1999,	during	the	first	Blair	
government,	promoted	as	a	mean	of	ensuring	that	what	 is	being	done	 is	worthwhile	and	that	 it	 is	
being	done	in	the	best	possible	way	(Nutley	et	al.,	2000).		The	main	factors	behind	this	phenomenon	
and	parallel	decline	in	popularity	of	judgment-based	practices	were	the	expansion	and	availability	of	
relevant	 social	 science	 knowledge,	 the	 decline	 in	 deference	 to	 governments,	 and	 the	 demand	 for	
greater	public	accountability	(Davies	et	al.,	2004).			
While	 the	 Economic	 and	 Social	 Research	 Council	 was	 working	 to	 establish	 a	 national	 Resource	
Centre	 for	Evidence-Based	Policy,	 the	White	Paper	“Modernising	Government”	published	 in	March	
1999	 indicated	 the	 Government’s	 commitment	 towards	 an	 evidence	 based	 approach,	 as	 did	 the	
setting	 up	 of	 new	 units	 such	 as	 the	 Performance	 and	 Innovation	 Unit,	 Social	 Exclusion	 Unit	 and	
Centre	for	Management	and	Policy	Studies	(Parsons,	2002).		In	their	“What	Works?	Evidence-based	
policy	and	practice	 in	public	services”,	 first	published	 in	2000,	Davies	and	colleagues	 (Davies	et	al.,	
2004)	define	evidence	as	something	that	“(however	construed)	can	be	 independently	observed	and	
verified,	and	that	there	is	broad	consensus	as	to	its	contents	(if	not	its	interpretation)”.		
The	 1999	 White	 Paper	 expressed	 the	 need	 for	 a	 more	 professional	 approach	 to	 policymaking,	
demanding	that	policymakers	have	available	to	them	the	widest	and	latest	information	on	research	













already	 “failed	 to	 deliver”,	 and	 focusing	 on	 a	 model	 better	 suited	 to	 project	 management,	















What evidence is 
needed/available to 
test the ‘real world’ 
problem?




and contribution to 
corporate objectives 
be reviewed?
How does the problem/policy fit 
with government manifesto/
priorities?
What policy conflict/priorities 
need to be resolved? 
Is a cross-cutting approach 
needed?
Who else within government 
needs to be involved and how?
What is the impact of 
devolution?
What is the role of the EU?
How should work be organised? 
How should front-line staff be 
involved?
What sort of cross-
cutting intervention is 
required (if any)?
What is the impact of 
other existing and 
developing policies?
What are the costs/










What training and 
support for front-line 
staff is needed?
What IS changes are 
needed?
What needs to happen 
to ensure policy 
become self-
sustaining?




Are Ministers signed 
up?
What is the strategy 
for presenting policy?
Who needs to be told 
what, when and how?
How can stakeholders be 
kept committed and 
involved?
What are the quick wins?
How can different solutions be tested?
What are the desired policy 
outcomes?
Which are the most effective outputs 
for achieving these outcomes?
Who are the key stakeholders and 
how should they be involved?
What are the needs 
and views of those the 
policy needs to 
influence/affect?
What evidence is 
available, relevant and 
useful?
What have the 
experiences of other 
countries been?
What are the risks to 
the policy and how can 
they be managed?
What is the impact of 

















and	 complex	 issues,	 while	 Sanderson	 decries	 the	 difficulties	 of	 evaluating	 policy	 interventions	 in	
increasingly	 complex	 social	 systems,	 as	well	 as	 the	 need	 for	 better	 analysis	 and	 understanding	 of	












monopolies,	and	 information	asymmetries	–	provide	 the	 traditional	economic	 rationales	 for	public	
participation	 in	 private	 affairs,	 to	 which	 other	 limitations	 of	 the	 competitive	 framework	 can	 be	
added	such	as	thin	markets,	preference	problems,	etc.	(Weimer	and	Vining,	2014).	
In	 addition,	 there	 can	 be	 other	 situations	 that	 can	 be	 defined	 as	 public	 problems,	 such	 as:	
breakdown	of	systems	(such	as	family	relationships)	that	occur	largely	outside	of	markets,	low	living	
standards	 that	 do	 not	 reward	 individuals	 lacking	 marketable	 talents	 or	 skills,	 existence	 of	
discrimination	 against	 racial	 and	 other	minorities,	 failure	 of	 government	 to	 function	well	 in	 areas	














identified	 or	 worked	 through.	 	 Indeed,	 they	 posed,	 nearly	 all	 public	 policy	 issues	 are	 wicked	
problems	(Rittel	and	Webber,	1973).		Ackoff	in	1974	called	them	‘social	messes’,	complex	systems	of	
strongly	 interacting	 problems	 that	 affect	 society	 and	 where	 the	 attempts	 at	 solving	 individual	
problems	independently	typically	exacerbate	the	‘mess’	(Ackoff,	1997).	
The	 ‘grand	 challenges’	 that	 European	 governments	 should	 focus	 on,	 according	 to	 the	 LUND	
Declaration12,	have	all	 the	hallmarks	of	wicked	problems.	 	 In	order	to	tackle	them,	the	Declaration	
advises,	 governments	 “should	 involve	 stakeholders	 from	 both	 public	 and	 private	 sectors	 in	
transparent	processes”.		
Wicked	problems	 are	 linked	 to	 social	 pluralism,	 institutional	 complexity,	 and	 scientific	 uncertainty	
(Head	 and	 Alford,	 2008),	 and	 have	 the	 following	 characteristics	 (Rittel	 and	Webber,	 1973,	Weber	
and	Khademian,	2008,	APSC,	2012):	
- No	 definitive	 formulation	 –	 they	 are	 difficult	 to	 clearly	 define,	 and	 different	 stakeholders	
have	different	views	and	understanding	of	the	problem	
- No	 clear	 stopping	 rule	 –	 no	 definitive	 solution,	 while	 solutions	 are	 not	 true-or-false,	 but	
good-or-bad	
- No	immediate	and	no	ultimate	test	of	a	solution	




- Every	 problem	 can	 be	 considered	 the	 symptom	 of	 another	 problem	 –	 they	 have	 many	
interdependencies	and	are	often	multi-causal,	this	is	also	what	makes	them	hard	to	define	














Traditional,	 linear	 management	 approaches	 are	 not	 compatible	 with	 the	 need	 to	 work	 across	
organisational	 boundaries,	 encompassing	 interactions	 between	 different	 activities	 and	 objectives,	
requiring	 instead	 more	 horizontal	 and	 holistic	 ways	 of	 working	 (Clarke,	 1997).	 	 Indeed,	 the	
application	 of	 rationalist	 problem-solving	 leads	 to	 unintended	 consequences	 –	 the	 ‘messier’	 and	
interconnected	 the	 problem,	 the	 greater	 the	 amount	 of	 interdependencies	 and	 “dimensions	 of	
embeddedness”	ignored	in	the	development	and	implementation	of	rationalist	solutions,	the	wider	
and	 stronger	 the	 impact	 of	 unintended	 consequences	 (Voß,	 2006).	 Handling	 wicked	 issues	 too	










involvement,	 commitment,	 and	 coordination	 of	 multiple	 organisations	 and	 stakeholders	 to	 be	
delivered	effectively,	this	‘involvement,	commitment,	and	coordination’	needs	to	be	ensured.	It	also	













policymaking	 process	 (2.5.2),	 2.5.3	 looks	 at	 how	 the	 type	 and	 objectives	 of	 foresight	 (as	 well	 as	
Foresight)	activities	have	evolved	over	the	years.	
The	section	then	looks	at	specific	aspects	of	Foresight	use	in	Policymaking,	such	as	issues	concerning	





Already	 in	 2.3.2	 above	 it	 was	 mentioned	 how	 foresight	 was	 originally	 developed	 to	 support	
governments	 in	 their	 strategies	 and	 policy	 development,	 in	 the	 two	 main	 areas	 of	 planning	 and	
military/strategy.		
Lasswell	 was	 amongst	 the	 first	 scholars	 to	 state	 that	 decision-making	 and	 policymaking	 rely	 on	
anticipation	 of	 the	 future	 and	 formulated	 the	 idea	 of	 the	 ‘developmental	 construct’,	 a	 concept	
similar	 to	 that	 of	 ‘image	 of	 the	 future’,	 calling	 his	method	 “developmental	 analysis”	 (Bell,	 2002).		









of	 the	 election	 cycle,	 although	 some	 still	 see	 the	 institutional	 set-up	 of	 foresight	 exercises	 and	
initiatives	as	also	too	closely	attached	to	the	election	cycle	(Dreyer	and	Stang,	2013).	
Several	 experts	 see	 Foresight	 as	 particularly	 appropriate	 in	 situations	 characterised	 by	 high	




the	 focused	and	 intensive	 interactions	between	 stakeholders	during	Foresight	 exercises	 as	 further	
contributing	 to	 manage	 uncertainty	 –	 more	 effectively	 than	 efforts	 at	 reducing	 said	 uncertainty	
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through	planning	 (Van	der	Meulen	 et	 al.,	 2003)(see	 links	with	 2.3.4.5	 and	2.4.2.5	 above).	 	 Indeed	
Sardar	 (Sardar,	2010)	 in	his	 ‘First	 Law	of	Futures	Studies’	 states	 that	Futures	Studies	 (should)	deal	
almost	exclusively	with	wicked	problems.	
Foresight	 can	 also	 help	 identify	 when	 fundamental	 re-assessment	 and	 re-alignment	 of	 existing	
policies	 are	 needed	 by	 allowing	 the	 identification	 and	 picking-up	 of	 ‘weak	 signals’	 (Havas	 et	 al.,	
2010).	
2.5.2 Role	
According	 to	 the	 futurist	 Coates	 in	 1985,	 talking	 about	 government	 policy	 activities	 in	 the	 US:	
“Foresight	 in	 government	 cannot	 define	 policy,	 but	 it	 can	 help	 condition	 policies	 to	 be	 more	
appropriate,	 more	 flexible,	 and	more	 robust	 in	 their	 implementation,	 as	 times	 and	 circumstances	
change.		It	is	therefore	closely	tied	to	planning.		It	is	not	planning	–	merely	a	step	in	planning”	(Cuhls,	
2003).	




strategic	research	and	directing	 investments,	 to	 ‘pick	the	winners’	 (Martin	and	Johnston,	1999),	as	
well	as	in	some	way	to	‘pick	the	losers’	(Cuhls,	2003).	
















- Facilitating	 the	 participation	 of	 civil	 society	 in	 the	 policymaking	 process,	 engaging	
stakeholders	and	the	public	as	part	of	a	broader	democratic	process	




By	 engaging	 stakeholders	 and	 civil	 society,	 and	 allowing	 their	 contribution	 in	 the	 policymaking	
process,	 Foresight	 can	 also	 improve	 the	 latter’s	 transparency	 and	 legitimacy	 (Dreyer	 and	 Stang,	
2013),	while	the	greater	transparency	of	the	decision-making	process	can	help	ensure	greater	public	
support,	ensuring	smoother	implementation	(Havas	et	al.,	2010).		
Eriksson	 and	 Weber	 state	 that	 a	 key	 role	 for	 Foresight	 is	 to	 enable	 decision-makers	 to	 better	
understand	and	deal	with	uncertainty	and	complexity	(Eriksson	and	Weber,	2008).	
Harper	 distinguishes	 two	 roles	 for	 Foresight:	 an	 advisory	 and	 strategic	 function	 (“Foresight	 for/in	
policy”),	 where	 it	 is	 but	 a	 tool	 to	 inform	 policymaking	 in	 any	 area	 or	 to	 coordinate	 policy	 across	
sectors,	 and	 an	 instrumental	 role	 (“Foresight	 as	 a	 policy	 instrument”),	 used	 to	 support	
implementation	 of	 budgetary,	 structural	 or	 cultural	 changes	 in	 the	 domain	 of	 research	 and/or	
innovation	policy	(Harper,	2013).	
There	 is	however	some	scepticism	concerning	the	ability	of	 foresight	to	actually	 influence	decision	
making,	with	 critiques	 centring	 on	 the	 need	 for	 foresight	 to	 provide	more	 support	 for	 action	 and	




approach,	 came	 into	 vogue	 in	 the	1960s	 and	1970s	 and	 is	 by	many	 referred	 to	 as	policy-oriented	
foresight	 (van	Asselt	et	al.,	2010).	 	Early	examples	 include	Khan’s	“The	Year	2000”	and	the	Club	of	
Rome’s	“Limits	to	Growth”,	which	aimed	at	raising	awareness	of	long-term	trends	and	developments	
among	politicians	and	wider	public.		
The	 first	 incarnation	 of	 foresight	 in	 its	 support	 to	 public	 planning	 consisted	 essentially	 in	
extrapolations	 and	 projections,	 with	 emphasis	 placed	 on	 dataset-based	 forecasting;	 however,	 as	
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complexity	 and	 uncertainty	 increased	 globally,	 their	 failures	 made	 people	 disenchanted	 and	
sceptical	 of	 such	 activities.	 	 Following	 the	 end	 of	 the	 Cold	War	 in	 the	 1980s,	 interest	 in	 military	
foresight	work	decreased	significantly,	while	governments	started	focusing	on	economic	growth	and	
competition	(Dreyer	and	Stang,	2013).		
The	 objective	 of	 government-led	 Foresight	 studies	 was	 to	 provide	 an	 occasion	 for	 wide-ranging	
government-industry	discussions	 (such	as	 the	UK	Foresight	exercises),	 to	gather	expert	opinion	on	
technology	futures	(such	as	the	Science	and	Technology	Agency	30-year	forecasts	in	Japan14),	or	to	
offer	 initial	 guidelines	 for	 government	 action	 (such	 as	 in	 the	Netherlands	 and	 other	 Scandinavian	
countries).		Wagner	and	Popper	(Wagner	and	Popper,	2003)	point	out	how	the	countries	engaging	in	




- An	 approach	 for	 identifying	 priorities	 and	 making	 choices	 in	 relation	 to	 science	 and	
technology	R&D	investments	
- A	 mechanism	 for	 integrating	 research	 opportunities	 (the	 technology	 and	 science	 ‘push’)	
with	economic	and	social	needs	(society’s	demand	or	‘pull’)	and	thereby	linking	science	and	
technology	more	closely	with	innovation,	wealth	creation,	and	enhanced	quality	of	life	


























shift	 from	 extrapolation	 and	 forecasting	 to	 more	 open	 and	 adaptive	 Foresight.	 This	 can	 be	
interpreted	as	a	reflection	of	the	abandoning	of	 linear	models	of	technological	change	in	favour	of	
adopting	a	more	systemic	understanding	of	socio-technical	change	(see	also	2.5.5	below)	(Eriksson	
and	Weber,	 2008).	 Other	 government	 Foresight	 activities	 have	 seen	 a	 progressive	 integration	 of	
themes	around	development	 issues	and	social,	political	and	environmental	challenges	 (Dreyer	and	
Stang,	2013).	
Recent	 international	 surveys	 of	 Foresight	 exercises	 in	 several	 industrialized-,	 transition-,	 and	
developing	 countries	worldwide	 since	 the	 1990s	 show	 that	 countries	 have	 applied	 quite	 different	
conceptions	 of	 Foresight,	 particularly	 in	 terms	 of	 how	broadly	 the	 policy	 areas	 to	 be	 covered	 are	
conceived.		Most	studies	still	follow	a	narrow	focus	on	science	and	technology,	but	some	have	begun	
to	integrate	societal	or	economic	issues	focusing	on	other	policy	areas	such	as	public	health,	national	
security,	 or	 the	 environment	 (Habegger,	 2010).	 	 Descriptions,	 comparisons,	 and	 evaluation	 of	
different	 national	 Foresight	 programmes	 have	 been	 carried	 out	 by	 several	 authors	 (Dreyer	 and	
Stang,	2013,	Georghiou	and	Keenan,	2006,	Keenan	and	Popper,	2008,	Jemala,	2010).	
In	parallel	to	the	shift	of	attention	towards	social	and	systemic	approaches,	Foresight	has	become	an	













Table	 2.5.3	 presents	 a	 summary	of	 the	different	 ‘generations’	 of	 Foresight.	Harper	 (Harper,	 2013)	






































































































Several	authors	point	out	 the	 influence	of	national	 culture	and	political	 traditions	 in	 the	choice	of	
different	 styles	 of	 Foresight,	 and	 of	 how	 such	 ‘internal	 context’	 affects	 the	 objectives,	 scope,	
integration,	 and	 ultimately	 the	 results	 of	 national	 Foresight	 exercises	 (Keenan	 and	 Popper,	 2008,	
Andersen	and	Rasmussen,	2014).		This	is	further	discussed	in	2.5.6	below.		
Literature	 concerning	 the	 actual	 carrying	 out	 of	 Foresight	 activities	 and	 their	 use	 is	 scarce,	 and	 it	
appears	 to	offer	 only	 limited	 insight	 into	 the	 reality	 faced	by	 those	 charged	with	 carrying	out	 the	
activities	and	then	acting	on	the	results.	 Indeed,	even	 in	a	context	such	as	 the	Netherlands	where	
there	 is	 a	 long-standing	 tradition	 of	 production	 and	 use	 of	 Foresight	 activities,	 van	 Asselt	 and	
colleagues	noted	that	“We	observed	that	methodological	accounts	are	often	lacking	and,	if	available,	
are	 stylized	 […]	methodological	 accounts	 are	 usually	 short	 descriptions	 of	 some	main	 steps	 or	 are	
confined	 to	 a	 simple	 scheme.	 	 As	 a	 result,	 a	 linear	 and	 step-wise	 process	 is	 suggested:	 choices,	
considerations,	 discussions,	 struggles,	 compromises,	 unproductive	 steps,	 flaws,	 practical	
adjustments,	 experiments,	 difficulties,	 challenges	 and	 local	 solutions	 are	 concealed”	 (van	Asselt	 et	
al.,	2010).	
2.5.4 Policy-free	Approach	in	Foresight	for	Policymaking	
The	 idea	 underlying	 the	 development	 of	 ‘policy-free	 scenarios’,	 which	 is	 the	 approach	 often	
portrayed	 and	 recommended	 in	 scenario	 textbooks,	 is	 grounded	 in	 the	 practice	 within	 business	
contexts.		According	to	this	approach,	future	policy	should	not	be	included	in	the	scenarios	in	order	
to	 allow	 policy-makers	 to	 properly	 ‘wind-tunnel’	 (see	 2.3.5	 above)	 their	 future	 policies:	 by	
considering	different	policies	vis-à-vis	various	possible	futures,	it	is	possible	to	identify	which	policy	




that	 the	majority	 of	 futurists	 appear	 to	 feel	 that	 it	 is	 important	 for	 them	 to	 (be	 perceived	 to)	 be	
apolitical,	as	such	stance	is	more	often	interpreted	as	being	more	‘academic’.		As	such,	they	tend	to	
favour	the	production	of	policy-free,	as	opposed	to	policy-oriented,	scenarios.		However,	the	authors	
point	 out	 the	 conflict	 between	 the	 positivistic	 ideals	 at	 the	 basis	 of	 academic	 foresight	 and	 the	
constructive	nature	of	policy-oriented	Foresight,	and	suggest	 that	 the	 idea	of	policy-free	scenarios	
should	be	cast	aside	when	dealing	with	the	latter	(van	Asselt	et	al.,	2010).	













above)	 and	Foresight,	 and	proposed	as	more	 realistic	 and	 closer	 to	 actual	processes.	 	 It	 favours	 a	
more	 modest	 interpretation	 of	 the	 collective	 ability	 to	 ‘shape	 the	 future’,	 suggesting	 that	 a	
significant	amount	of	Technology	Foresight	theory	and	practice	may	overestimate	the	actual	ability	
to	mobilise	 innovation	system	stakeholders	to	act	according	to	visions	of	sustainable	development	
that	 have	 been	 generated	 in	 a	 participatory	 foresight	 process.	 	 This	 approach	 proposes	 that	
Foresight	 needs	 to	 go	 beyond	 the	 level	 of	 a	 collective	 process	 and	 get	 to	 the	 level	 of	 individual	
actors'	 strategies	 if	 it	 is	 to	 be	 effective,	 stressing	 the	 need	 to	 adapt	 to	 actions	 by	 others,	 and	
combines	 phases	 of	 open	 participation	 with	 closed	 processes	 of	 targeted	 strategy	 development	
carried	out	by	the	individual	actors	(Eriksson	and	Weber,	2008).	
Eriksson	 and	Weber	 (Eriksson	 and	Weber,	 2008)	 stress	 the	 importance	 of	 considering	 sequential	
decision-making,	 designed	 to	 exploit	 progressively	 improved	 understanding	 as	 time	 –	 and	
implementation	 –	 progresses,	 and	 of	 considering	 flexibility	 and	 adaptability	 as	well	 as	 robustness	
when	 looking	 at	 different	 options	 vis-à-vis	 different	 possible	 futures,	 referring	 also	 to	 the	
Collingridge	Dilemma16	in	the	context	of	technology	innovation.		
Based	on	the	ideas	of	systems	thinking,	Saritas’s	Systemic	Foresight	Methodology	(“SFM”)	proposes	
a	 conceptual	 framework	 that	 attempts	 to	 cope	 with	 the	 complexities	 of	 the	 human	 and	 social	
systems,	 integrating	both	qualitative	and	quantitative	 tools	 (Saritas,	 2013).	 	 	 Saritas	 suggests	 that,	
given	the	complexities	of	the	real	world,	conducting	Foresight	activities	systematically	–	that	is,	using	
‘systematic’	 processes	 that	 assume	 linear	 or	 otherwise	 easily	 ‘modellable’	 problems	 –	 is	 not	
appropriate	for	dealing	with	the	‘systemic’	situations	found	in	human	and	social	systems,	which	are	









Figure	 2.5.5	 below	 illustrates	 how	 Saritas	 describes	 (systemic)	 Foresight	 activity	 as	 embedded	 in	
both	an	external	context	–	constituted	by	Social,	Technological,	Economic,	Environmental,	Political,	
and	Value	(STEEPV)	systems		-	and	an	internal	context	–	constituted	by	the	Management,	Processes,	
Routines,	Motivation,	Culture,	Politics,	Power	and	Skills	of	 the	system	 in	which	Foresight	 is	carried	










generated	 by	 Foresight	 in	 the	 decision-making	 process,	 and	 issues	 affecting	 their	 ability	 to	 be	
translated	into	action	–	that	is,	their	implementation.		
In	 2013	Dreyer	 and	Stang	 (Dreyer	 and	Stang,	 2013)	 conducted	 a	 study	on	behalf	 of	 the	European	

















































approach	 foresight,	 what	 issues	 they	 try	 to	 grapple	 with,	 and	 what	 challenges	 are	 faced	 when	
attempting	to	connect	Foresight	and	policy.	
The	 internal	 context	described	by	Saritas	 (Saritas,	2013)	above	 includes	all	parties	and	 institutions	
(e.g.,	 administrative	 system	 and	 political	 system)	 that	 are	 involved	 in	 both	 the	 performance	 of	 a	
Foresight	 process	 and	 the	 implementation	 of	 the	 results.	 As	 it	 relates	 to	 the	 structures	 and	
behaviours	of	the	system,	 it	 influences	both	acceptance	and	 integration	of	the	Foresight	exercise’s	
results	(Andersen	and	Rasmussen,	2014).	
2.5.6.1 Execution	
Lack	 of	 senior	 support	 is	 seen	 by	 many	 Foresight	 analysts	 and	 experts	 as	 compromising	 the	
relationship	 between	 the	 decision-	 and	 policy-makers	 at	 the	 top,	 the	 established	 policy	 planners,	
and	the	Foresight	experts,	with	the	latter	complaining	about	the	“lack	of	senior	leadership	in	getting	
established	policy	planners	to	accept	the	foresight	community”(Dreyer	and	Stang,	2013).	
Lack	 of	 integration	 between	 different	 sectors	 and	 areas	 of	 responsibility	 is	 another	 source	 of	
problems	–	the	institutional	and	organisational	structure	reflects	clearly	delimited	areas	of	political	
responsibility,	however	“many	of	today’s	and	tomorrow’s	challenges	are	cross-cutting	in	nature,	and	
require	 impulses	 from	different	 policy	 areas	 to	 be	 tackled	 successfully”	 (Köhler,	 2015).	 Dreyer	 and	





and	 expert	 knowledge,	 where	 the	 involvement	 described	 is	 more	 consultation	 than	 actual	
participation	(Parsons,	2001).		Also	it	is	still	unclear	what	is	the	best	institutional	model	for	bringing	
together	policy	and	 futures	expertise,	as	 some	consider	 it	 important	 to	maintain	 foresight	experts	
separated	 from	 the	 policy	 community,	while	 others	 see	 it	 as	 important	 for	 the	 two	 to	 be	 closely	
connected	in	order	to	ensure	any	insight	developed	is	both	of	value	and	valued	(Dreyer	and	Stang,	
2013).	
Although	 not	 mentioned	 by	 most	 of	 the	 academic	 literature,	 the	 issues	 of	 (limited)	 resources	 is	
mentioned	 in	 most	 of	 the	 practice-driven	 and	 user-oriented	 literature,	 such	 as	 manuals	 and	
handbooks	(Miles	et	al.,	2002,	UNDP,	2014).		It	is	strongly	connected	with,	and	mutually	reinforced	
by,	 the	 issues	 of	 (poor)	 senior	 support	 mentioned	 at	 the	 beginning,	 and	 acceptability	 described	
below.	
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Emerging	 difficulties	 are	 linked	 to	 the	 trend	 towards	 wider	 inclusion	 and	 participation,	 but	 the	
literature	on	this	point	is	very	limited;	Andersen	and	Rasmussen	suggest	that	national	culture	exerts	
significant	 influence	 on	 a	 society’s	 attitude	 towards	 subordinate	 consultation	 and	 thus	 on	
















track-record	of	 implementation	of	Foresight	projects	 is	 linked	to	such	projects	being	carried	out	as	




This	 is	 quite	 a	 thorny	 issue	 –	 do	 users	 (decision-	 and	 policy-makers)	 actually	 consider	 Foresight	
‘accurate	and	trustworthy’?	Foresight	experts	and	practitioners	see	the	predominant	culture	–	and	
ensuing	attitude	–	towards	future	studies	and	Foresight	as	a	major	obstacle.	
Andersen	 and	 Rasmussen	 cite	 the	 critical	 impact	 of	 national	 political	 tradition	 and	 national	
governance	 culture	 on	 the	 development	 and	 use	 of	 Foresight	 in	 policymaking,	 in	 particular	 the	
dimensions	 of	 power	 distance	 (see	 the	 problems	 about	 participation	 in	 2.5.6.1	 above)	 and	
uncertainty	avoidance	(Andersen	and	Rasmussen,	2014).	
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Empirical	 evidence	 suggests	 that	 policy	 audiences	 tend	 to	 have	 intolerance	 for	 uncertainty	 and	
‘deviant	ideas’,	and	a	preference	for	a	positivistic	approach	towards	Foresight.		This	attitude	tend	to	
provide	 incentives	 for	 Foresight	 experts	 to	 present	 policymakers	 with	 ‘bad	 Foresight’	 –	 Foresight	
that	will	not	 actually	 help	 them	 anticipate	 the	 uncertain	 future	 (van	 Asselt	 et	 al.,	 2010)	 –	 in	 turn	
diminishing	 the	 credibility	 of	 Foresight.	 	 At	 the	 same	 time,	 Foresight	 experts	 argue	 that	 policy	
planners	 responsible	 for	 assisting	 decision-makers	 typically	 feel	 more	 comfortable	 providing	 said	
decision-makers	 with	 overly-simplistic	 3-options	models	 for	 policy	 decisions:	 a	 low,	 a	 high,	 and	 a	
middle	 (or	moderate)	 option	 (such	 as	 the	 ‘best	 case’,	 ‘worst	 case’,	 and	 ‘mid-way’	 scenarios),	 “for	
which	the	middle	option	is	always	preferred	and	recommended.”(Dreyer	and	Stang,	2013)	
Despite	warnings	 that	 policymakers	 need	 evidence	 of	 a	 qualitative	 as	well	 as	 quantitative	 nature,	
and	 would	 benefit	 from	 a	 research	 community	 in	 which	 there	 are	 strong	 bridges	 between	 both	
approaches	 (Amann,	 2004),	 the	 existing	 culture	 in	 current	 policymaking	 contexts	 demonstrates	 a	
clear	 preference	 for	 quantitative	 data	 and	 evidence.	 According	 to	 Geyer,	 despite	 the	 changes	 in	
government,	the	EBPM	and	audit	culture	are	still	very	much	alive	in	the	UK	public	machine	(Geyer,	
2012),	 and	 Foresight	 fits	 uncomfortably	 in	 the	 definition	 of	 evidence	 offered	 by	 Davies	 and	




that	 these	 approaches	 are	 not	 valuable,	 it	 is	 just	 that,	 in	 order	 to	 focus	 on	 issues	 of	 commonality	
across	sectors,	we	have	concentrated	more	on	 the	debates	surrounding	evidence	of	 effectiveness”	
[emphasis	added].	And	in	the	Professional	Policymaking	document,	the	Cabinet	Office	indicates	that,	
amongst	 the	 new	 and	 different	 skills	 that	 should	 be	 developed,	 is	 “a	 grounding	 in	 economics,	




The	 Professional	 Policymaking	 report	 states	 that	 futures	 work	 “has	 not,	 as	 yet,	 been	 joined	 up	
effectively	nor	does	it	feed	systematically	into	mainstream	policy-making	in	the	way	that	it	needs	to	
if	 long-term	 thinking	 is	 to	 become	 ingrained	 in	 the	 policy	 process”,	 pointing	 the	 need	 for	 more	
effective	 co-ordination	 in	 futures	work	 in	 order	 to	 ensure	 that	 “assumptions	 about	 the	 future	 are	













Georghiou	and	Keenan	 (Georghiou	and	Keenan,	2006)	 stress	 the	 importance	of	understanding	 the	
link	 between	 joint	 Foresight	 activities	 and	 joint	 formulation	 and	 ownership	 of	 strategies,	 and	 of	





Miles,	 2012),	 and	 the	 analysis	 of	 available	 individual	 cases	 shows	 it	 is	 likely	 to	 be	 affected	 by	
organisational	 issues	 such	 as	 the	 scope	 of	 the	 topic	 being	 covered	 and	 the	 time	 available	 for	 the	
processes	 to	 take	 place,	 as	 well	 as	 the	 provision	 of	 sufficient	 incentives	 to	 encourage	 the	




The	 enforcement	 of	 policy	 strategies	 developed	 is	 more	 difficult	 without	 the	 legitimacy	 and	









- Efficiency	 of	 implementation	 looks	 at	 the	 process,	 focusing	 on	 managerial	 and	 logistical	
issues:	participants	involved,	methods	used,	type	and	quality	of	facilitation,	etc.	
- Impact	 and	 Effectiveness	 looks	 at	 the	 results	 produced,	 typically	 in	 terms	of	 outputs	 and	
outcomes.		
- Appropriateness	looks	at	the	situation	and	objectives,	considering	also	alternatives.	
They	 however	 stress	 the	 difficulties	 of	 evaluating	 impact,	 since	 outputs	 –	 such	 as	 number	 of	
participants,	 reports	disseminated	etc.	–	would	not	be	a	meaningful	measure	of	 impact,	while	 the	
problem	of	attribution	of	impacts	renders	outcome	evaluation	difficult	to	carry	out.		Harper	(Harper,	
2013)	points	out	that	the	impact	of	Foresight	is	usually	indirect,	and	its	effects	generally	manifest	on	
other	 policy	 instruments;	 furthermore,	 the	 long-term	 nature	 of	 Foresight	 (typically	 15-25	 years)	
means	that	evaluations	aiming	at	assessing	the	accuracy	of	predictive	elements	are	seldom	carried	
out.	
Miles	 (Miles,	2012),	 too,	contests	 the	use	of	 impact	as	 it	 strongly	affected	by	the	 internal	context:	
“The	consequences	of	Foresight	activities	will	very	much	depend	on	the	orientations	of	the	‘users’	of	
the	 activity	 –their	 existing	 appraisal	 of	 the	 topic,	 the	 effort	 they	 are	 prepared	 to	 put	 into	
understanding	 alternative	 perspectives,	 the	 extent	 to	 which	 they	 can	 think	 beyond	 existing	 policy	
perspectives.”	
Georghiou	 and	 Keenan	 (Georghiou	 and	 Keenan,	 2008)	 suggest	 that	 the	 focus	 of	 the	 Foresight	
evaluation	–	whether	policy,	overall	programme,	or	practice	–	requires	different	evaluation	criteria.		
Considerations	concerning	 the	 rationale	 for	public	action	and	how	the	outcomes	of	Foresight	may	
interact	 with	 other	 (past	 or	 existing)	 policies	 are	 central	 in	 policy	 evaluation;	 the	 programme	
objectives	–	both	in	terms	of	their	achievements,	but	also	in	terms	of	their	appropriateness	–	are	the	
focus	 in	programme	evaluation;	while	 the	evaluation	of	 Foresight	 as	 practice	 centres	on	methods	
and	structures	used.	
Amanatidou	and	Guy	(Amanatidou	and	Guy,	2008)	find	that	no	common	evaluation	and	assessment	
approach	 for	 foresight	 exercises	 seems	 to	 have	 been	 developed	 to	 date	 to	 measure	 the	
unanticipated	 impacts	 falling	 outside	 the	 scope	 of	 a	 programme’s	 goals	 and	 objectives,	 such	 as	
knowledge	 creation,	 networking	 and	 social	 capital,	 shifts	 in	 culture,	 etc.,	 which	 “should	 be	
interpreted	through	the	lenses	of	epistemology,	sociology,	political	science,	management	science	and	




The	EUROPTA	research	project	was	a	 study	carried	out	over	 the	period	1998-2000	concerning	 the	
conceptualisation	 and	 evaluation	 of	 Participatory	 Technology	 Assessments	 (PTAs)	 based	 on	 the	
experience	of	selected	European	countries.	While	the	future	dimension	 is	not	explicitly	considered	
or	 explored,	 it	 looks	 at	 aspects	 of	 social	 participation	 in	 the	 assessment	of	 scientific-technological	
innovation	and	the	influence	of	PTA	in	policymaking.			Bütschi	and	Nentwich	(Bütschi	and	Nentwich,	





results	 as	 strongly	 dependent	 on	 the	 robustness	 of	 the	 evidence	 and	 the	 reputation	 of	 those	
presenting	and	validating	it	(Miles	et	al.,	2008b).	
Calof	and	Smith	(Calof	and	Smith,	2010)	reiterate	that	Foresight	is	an	overtly	socio-political	activity,	












•  Timing – needs to align with public controversy, to ensure relevance for both 
public and politicians
•  Structural properties of political system – needs to be consistent
Institutional 
Context 
•  Link to political sphere
•  Credibility and reputation for both institution and process
Properties of 
the Exercise 
•  Precise goal definition – both for design purposes and for external 
communications
•  Quality of process – unless considered fair and competent, will not be legitimate 
enough to play role in political arena
•  Quality of product – must aim at practical implementation, if too vague and 
visionary it will be difficult to translate in action
•  Involvement of political actors – ‘isolated’ processes where interaction with 
political sphere is limited to delivery of final findings typically have smaller impact
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In	 their	 2013	 study,	Dreyer	 and	 Stang	 (Dreyer	 and	 Stang,	 2013)	 highlight	 a	 number	 of	 criteria	 for	
success,	 mostly	 revolving	 about	 the	 interaction,	 communication,	 and	 engagement	 with	 the	 main	
audience	and	senior	decision	makers,	links	with	the	policy	agenda,	cooperation	with	other	national	
and	international	agencies,	etc.		





It	 is	 not	 easy	 to	 carry	 out	 a	 review	 on	 the	 literature	 concerning	 participatory	 processes	 in	 the	
abstract,	since	‘participation’	is	virtually	always	considered	together	with	its	object/context/purpose	
–	 that	 is,	 ‘what’	 one	 takes	 part	 in,	 as	well	 as	 ‘what	 for’.	 	 Nevertheless	 there	 are	 some	 aspects	 of	
participation	 that,	despite	being	considered	 for	a	specific	context,	 it	may	be	useful	 to	consider	 for	
their	applications	in	different	settings.	
In	particular,	 the	Researcher	has	 focused	on	three	bodies	of	knowledge	that	appear	to	offer	some	
useful	 additional	 insight	 when	 looking	 at	 the	 practice	 of	 participatory	 foresight	 processes	 in	 the	
public	 sector:	 	 information	 sharing	 and	 engagement	 amongst	 stakeholders	 (from	 stakeholder	
theory),	 procedural	 fairness	 (from	 judicial	 studies	 and	 negotiation	 theory),	 and	 participatory	
processes	involving	large	groups	of	people.	
Feasibility Including resource availability and appropriate timing 
Leadership Support From senior policy makers 
Involvement and Links 
with Political Sphere 
Engagement, clear commissioning and commitment of institutional 
Client 




Relevance, acceptability, accessibility (learning & understanding, 
contribution to process) 
Resilience Resilience to the difficulties of going through the policy process. Good 
timing, good links to the political sphere, consistent with context  
Quality and Credibility 
of Process 
Fairness, transparency, sufficient and appropriate participation, choice of 
methodology, management/facilitation, robustness of evidence 
Quality and Credibility 
of product 
Range and depth, robustness of outcomes, legitimacy 
Reputation of 
Institution/Professionals  
Competence and credibility of those involved in validating and 






The	 realisation	of	 the	damaging	consequences	of	 ignoring	or	misperceiving	 stakeholders’	 interests	
led	 to	 the	 development	 of	 considerable	 research	 and	 literature	 on	 the	 topic	 (de	 Gooyert	 et	 al.,	
2017).	 	 Stakeholder	 theory	 consists	 of	 a	 large	 body	 of	 knowledge	 that	 focuses	 on	 simultaneously	
taking	the	 interests	of	multiple	stakeholders	 into	account.	While	the	centre	of	analysis	 is	generally	
the	business	corporation,	its	applications	and	conclusions	can	be	generally	extended	to	other	types	
of	organisations.	Over	the	years,	it	has	moved	from	a	corporate-centric	focus	that	sees	stakeholders	







Benefits	 arise	 from	 both	 the	 information	 gained	 by	 participation	 and	 also	 through	 the	 process	 of	
participation.	Central	to	the	stakeholder	theory	is	the	concept	of	social	capital,	defined	as	“the	glue	
of	 connectivity	 that	 holds	 relationships	 together”	 but	 also	 “the	 sum	 of	 the	 actual	 and	 potential	






discourse	 occupied	 by	 those	who	 share	messy	 (complex,	 interdependent,	 emergent)	 problems	 and	
who	want/need	to	talk	about	them”,	where	the	shared	interest	can	lead	to	mutual	engagement	in	a	










way	to	gather	and	engage	 large	numbers	of	diverse	stakeholders.	 	Most	of	 the	critiques	described	
relate	 to	 the	 actual	 management	 and	 implementation	 of	 these	 processes,	 particularly	 failures	 in	
effective	facilitation,	 issues	of	distributive	as	well	as	procedural	 justice	 (see	paragraph	below),	and	
choice	 of	 unsuitable	 techniques	 and	 tools	 (Payne	 and	 Calton,	 2002),	 although	 there	 is	 a	 risk	 that	




large	 part	 because	 decision	 makers	 failed	 to	 attend	 to	 interests	 and	 information	 held	 by	 key	
stakeholders.	Other	quantitative	and	qualitative	studies	report	broadly	similar	findings	with	respect	
to	 the	 importance	 of	 paying	 attention	 to	 stakeholders,	 suggesting	 that	 failing	 to	 take	 into	
consideration	the	information	and	concerns	of	stakeholders	is	linked	to	“poor	performance,	outright	
failure	or	even	disaster”	(Bryson,	2004).	Insight	into	peoples’	concerns	and	considerations	broadens	
one’s	 views	 of	 what	 needs	 fixing	 and	 suggests	 an	 arena	 of	 action	 stakeholders	 can	 support,	 and	
ultimately	determining	whether	or	not	the	implementation	will	be	successful	(Nutt,	2004).	
Crosby	 and	 Bryson	 (Crosby	 and	 Bryson,	 2005)	 stress	 the	 importance	 of	 carrying	 out	 stakeholder	
analysis,	 exploring	 what	 the	 stakeholders’	 view/opinion	 would	 be	 with	 regards	 to	 a	 specific	
policy/decision,	as	attention	to	stakeholders	helps	assess	and	enhance	political	feasibility,	as	well	as	
reassuring	 those	 involved	 or	 affected	 that	 requirements	 for	 procedural	 justice,	 procedural	
rationality,	 and	 legitimacy	 have	 been	met,	 and	 offer	 several	 techniques	 to	 support	 such	 analysis.		
However,	people	are	more	likely	to	disclose	their	interests	in	situations	where	they	feel	they	have	a	
say	 (Nutt,	 2004).	 	 For	 the	 ability,	 as	 well	 as	 the	 willingness,	 of	 participants	 to	 communicate	
information,	see	2.6.2	below.	




result,	 both	 the	 level	 of	 information	 coming	 from	 the	public	 and	 their	 engagement	are	negatively	
affected	 (Jungk	 and	 Müllert,	 1987).	 Green	 and	 Hunton-Clarke	 (Green	 and	 Hunton-Clarke,	 2003)	
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compare	 a	 number	 of	 models	 of	 the	 different	 levels	 of	 public/stakeholder	 participation	 in	
businesses’	environmental	decision	making,	based	on	the	type	of	information	shared,	its	modalities,	
and	objectives	(see	2.7.5	below),	and	distinguish	three	different	types	of	stakeholder	engagement	–	
informative,	 consultative,	 and	 decisional.	 Similarly,	 Perret	 (Perret,	 2003)	 describes	 five	 different	
levels	of	stakeholder	dialogue,	ranging	from	simple	information-giving	to	full-on	open	dialogue.	
There	is	however	a	difference	between	‘genuine’	dialogue	–	geared	towards	mutual	education,	joint	
problem-solving,	 and	 relationship	 building	 –	 and	 a	 two-way	 communication	 designed	 for	
asymmetrical	persuasive	and	instrumental	purposes,	essentially	a	 ‘monologic’	dialogue.	 	Crane	and	
Sharon	 (Crane	and	Sharon,	2003)	 look	at	 the	 risks	 inherent	 in	 stakeholder	dialogue,	and	point	out	
that,	 in	 the	 event	 it	 is	 employed	 instrumentally	 and	 superficially,	 it	 can	 produce	 cynicism	 and	
distrust,	with	 resulting	negative	effects	on	current	problems	and	 future	collaborations	as	 it	affects	
the	image	and	reputation	of	the	organisation.	










process,	 i.e.,	procedural	 justice	 (Welsh,	2003).	 	 Studies,	which	have	been	performed	 largely	 in	 the	





- See	 a	 positive	 impact	 on	 the	 respect	 and	 loyalty	 accorded	 to	 the	 individual	 or	 institution	
that	sponsored	the	decision	making	process.	
Lind	 and	 colleagues	 (Lind	 et	 al.,	 1993)	 introduce	 the	 concept	 of	 fairness	 heuristic,	 suggesting	 that	











The	 above	 requisites	 concern	 negotiations;	 in	 the	 case	 of	 stakeholder	 participation,	 a	 further	
requirement	is	(Maguire	and	Lind,	2003):	





Referring	 to	 the	process	of	 stakeholder	dialogue,	 Perret	 (Perret,	 2003)	 stresses	 the	 importance	of	
confidence	 in	 the	 impartial	 role	 of	 the	 ‘convenor’	 –	 organisation	 or	 individual	 responsible	 for	
designing	 and	 running	 the	 process.	 It	 must	 be	 noted	 that	 perception	 of	 fairness	 is	 influenced	 by	
expectations,	so	it	is	important	that	expectations	are	explicitly	clarified	and	managed.	
Without	being	included	in	the	thinking	and	decision	making	process,	members	of	the	social	network	




involved	working	 in	small	groups	since	groups	 larger	 than	30-35	were	not	seen	as	manageable	 for	
planning	 and	 action-taking	work,	 from	 the	 late	 1980s	 some	organisational	 development	work	 has	
been	 taking	 place	 involving	 larger	 participant	 groups	 (Bunker	 and	 Alban,	 1992).	 Large	 Group	
Methods	 (“LGM”)	 are	 methods	 used	 to	 gather	 a	 whole	 system	 together	 –	 often	 referred	 to	 as	
‘getting	 the	 whole	 system	 in	 the	 room’	 -	 to	 discuss	 and	 take	 action	 on	 a	 target	 agenda.	 	 They	




presence	 of	 a	 shared	 field,	 psychological	 similarity	 amongst	 participants,	 and	 mutual	 trust	 (Oels,	
2002).			
Their	origins	can	be	traced	back	to	the	collaboration	of	Emery	and	Trist	at	the	Tavistock	Institute	of	





and	 conflicts	 (Weisbord	 and	 Janoff,	 1996).	 Most	 LGM	 were	 developed	 by	 practitioners	 more	
concerned	with	addressing	the	problems	at	hand	than	articulating	or	clarifying	the	theory	supporting	
their	 methods.	 	 Their	 particular	 advantage	 is	 the	 ability	 to	 support	 the	 generation	 of	 broader	
participation	by	key	stakeholders	when	facing	important	issues	(Payne	and	Calton,	2002).	
Weisbord	 was	 inspired	 by	 both	 the	 Search	 Conference	 methodology	 and	 Schindler-Rainman	 and	
Lippit’s	work	in	the	development	of	his	Future	Search	approach,	“a	large	group	planning	meeting	for	
people	seeking	common	ground	for	action	in	organizations	and	communities”	(Weisbord	and	Janoff,	
1996).	 	 Future	 Search	 brings	 together	 a	 broad	 spectrum	 of	 local	 stakeholders	 in	 a	 collaborative	
process	over	the	course	of	three	days,	and	it	aims	to	create	a	common	vision	not	by	negotiating	or	
resolving	 conflicts	but	 rather	by	discovering	 the	common	ground.	 	 The	process	 follows	a	 standard	
sequence	 and	 uses	 trained	 facilitators	 to	 lead	 the	 discussions.	 	 Critiques	 to	 the	 Future	 Search	














environmental	 matters	 such	 as	 ecological	 risk	 assessment,	 water	 and	 waste	 management,	 and	
generally	 other	 contentious	 situations	 where	 the	 involvement	 of	 local	 communities	 is	 crucial	 for	
success	 in	 both	 acceptance	 and	 implementation	 of	 any	 proposed	 policy	 (Eden,	 1996).	 	 The	 Rio	
Declaration	of	 key	principles	 emanating	 from	 the	United	Nations	Conference	on	Environment	 and	
Development	 in	 1992	 stated:	 “environmental	 issues	 are	 best	 handled	with	 the	 participation	 of	 all	
concerned	citizens,	at	the	relevant	level”.	Largely	thanks	to	NGOs,	a	new	language	of	empowerment,	
citizen	participation	and	multi-stakeholder	partnership	was	 integrated	 into	Agenda	21	–	the	action	
plan	 for	 sustainable	 development	 adopted	 by	 world	 governments	 during	 that	 conference	
(Macnaghten	et	al.,	1995).	
In	 the	 US,	 ‘popular’	 democratic	 theory	 sees	 public	 participation	 as	 crucial,	 both	 for	 influencing	
decisions	and	for	strengthening	civic	capacity	and	social	capital,	and	considers	 interaction	amongst	
often	 adversarial	 and	 conflicting	 interest	 as	 a	 way	 to	 identify	 common	 good	 and	 act	 on	 shared	
communal	 goals.	 	 Over	 the	 past	 few	decades,	 the	 purpose	 of	 participation	 in	 the	US	 has	 evolved	
from	 ensuring	 accountability	 to	 developing	 substance	 and	 content	 of	 policy	 (Beierle	 and	 Cayford,	
2002).		
In	the	UK,	the	1990s	saw	significant	emphasis	on	public	participation	in	areas	such	as	environmental	
policy	 and	 health,	 however	 the	 public	 involvement	 has	 been	 limited	 to	 participation	 in	 the	
implementation18	rather	 than	 in	 the	 debate	 and	 policymaking,	 maintaining	 a	 top-down	 character	
(Eden,	 1996).	 	 Thus	 the	 ‘participation’	 encouraged	 and	 promoted	 by	 Agenda	 21	 has	 mostly	

















The	 debate	 about	 greater	 citizen	 participation	 gained	 further	 impetus	 in	 the	 early	 1970s.		
Participation	theorists	argue	that,	as	people	progressively	lose	control	over	social	decisions	affecting	




1973).	 	 Thompson	 points	 to	 the	 promotion	 of	 self-realisation,	 particularly	 the	 sense	 of	 “political	
efficacy”	–	the	sense	of	one’s	ability	to	 influence	the	government’s	operations	and	decisions	–	and	
the	mutual	reinforcement	between	the	two:	a	citizen	with	a	high	sense	of	efficacy	is	more	likely	to	
participate,	 while	 greater	 participation	 is	 likely	 to	 promote	 the	 sense	 of	 efficacy	 as	 the	 citizens	
becomes	more	 knowledgeable	 about	 the	 system	 and	 develop	 connections,	 thus	 feeling	 that	 their	
efficacy	has	improved	(Thompson,	1970).		
According	to	Laird	(Laird,	1993),	public	participation	in	policy	making	“makes	people	more	aware	of	
the	 linkages	 between	 public	 and	 private	 interests,	 helps	 them	 develop	 a	 sense	 of	 justice,	 and	 is	 a	
critical	part	of	developing	a	sense	of	community”.			
Fiorino	 (Fiorino,	 1990)	 argues	 against	 the	 technocratic	 orientation	 that	 sees	 predominantly	
technocratic	–	rather	than	democratic	–	approaches	to	defining	and	solving	risks,	and	information	as	
a	 unidirectional	 flow	 from	 administrative	 authorities	 and	 experts	 to	 the	 general	 public.	 His	
arguments	are:		
- Substantive:	ordinary	citizens	often	see	problems,	issues,	and	solutions	that	experts	miss.	
















There	 are	 increasing	 calls	 for	more	 citizen-centric	 and	 participative	 forms	 of	 public	 policy	making	
characterized	 by	 a	 stronger	 interaction	 between	 government	 agencies	 and	 citizens,	 in	 order	 to	
enable	 the	 former	 to	 access	 the	 knowledge	 and	 the	 creative	 ideas	 of	 the	 latter	 about	 pressing	
‘wicked’	 problems	 (see	 2.7.3	 below),	 as	 well	 as	 to	 increase	 transparency	 and	 trust	 (Ferro	 et	 al.,	






The	 futurist	 Jungk	worked	 in	 the	 1970s	 and	 1980s	 to	 increase	 participation	 by	 ordinary	 people	 in	
decisions	 that	 affect	 their	 lives	 (Bell,	 2002),	 decrying	 that	 such	 decisions	 were	 taken	 “over	 their	
heads”	and	that	existing	democratic	systems	failed	to	 involve	adequately	those	people	affected	by	

























Rittel	 and	 Webber	 (Rittel	 and	 Webber,	 1973)	 suggested	 that	 the	 model	 for	 approaching	 wicked	





only	 be	 resolved	 through	 changes	 in	 said	 ways	 of	 life	 and	 of	 thinking.	 	 Such	 changes	 cannot	 be	
imposed	through	legislation	or	regulation	alone,	but	need	to	be	‘owned’	by	people,	requiring	a	more	
participatory	 style	 of	 governing.	 Ordinary	 citizens	 should	 be	 involved	 in	 the	 exploration	 of	 issues	
(Clarke,	1997,	APSC,	2012).	
According	 to	 Ackoff	 (Ackoff,	 1997),	 ‘messes’	 such	 as	 wicked	 problems	 can	 not	 be	 solved	 but	
managed	 through	 a	 planning	 approach	 that	 he	 calls	 ‘interactive’	 and	 that	 should	 involve	 all	 the	
stakeholders	of	the	system.	Such	complex	and	uncertain	environments	call	for	the	creation	of	“webs	
of	 interdependencies”,	 requiring	 bridging	 techniques	 and	 collaborative	 strategies	 (Andriof	 and	
Waddock,	2002)		
Roberts	 (Roberts,	 2000)	 sees	 three	 possible	 strategies	 depending	 on	 power	 distribution	 amongst	
shareholders	–	authoritative,	competitive,	and	collaborative	–	and	suggests	collaborative	strategies	
are	 the	most	 effective	 for	 wicked	 problems	 characterised	 by	many	 stakeholders	 and	 high	 power	
dispersion,	 especially	 when	 part	 of	 the	 solution	 requires	 sustained	 behavioural	 change	 by	 many	
stakeholders	 and/or	 citizens.	 The	 benefits	 from	 engagement	 need	 to	 be	 compared	 and	 balanced	
against	 the	 costs/constraints	 associated	 such	 as	 time,	 criticality,	 security,	 and	 funding	 availability	
(APSC,	2012).	Head	and	Alford	(Head	and	Alford,	2008)	suggest	that	the	dimensions	of	‘diversity’	and	
‘complexity’	can	be	combined	to	form	a	typology	of	problems	–	some	more	‘wicked’	than	others	–	




time	 on	 an	 ongoing	 basis,	 rather	 than	 two	 distinct	 and	 successive	 stages.	 	 Through	 ‘dialogue	
	 75	
mapping’	participants	can	develop	the	larger	picture,	the	broader	context	in	which	all	stakeholders	
are	on	 the	same	team	and	want	 the	same	or	 similar	outcome,	orienting	 the	group	 to	a	same-side	
spirit	of	learning	together	and	mapping	the	complexity	of	a	project.	
Also	 Rittel	 and	Webber	 (Rittel	 and	Webber,	 1973)	 suggest	 that	 wicked	 problems	 are	 a	 one-shot	
operation,	as	the	consequences	of	any	implemented	solution	can	not	be	(easily)	erased	or	undone.	
Clarke	 (Clarke,	 1997)	 stresses	 the	 crucial	 importance	 of	 continuing	 exploration	 and	 review,	 as	
additional	learning	concerning	the	issue	emerges	following	initial	actions.		
2.7.4 Objections	and	Obstacles	to	Participation	
Elitist	 democratic	 theorists	 had	 originally	 pointed	 to	 four	 arguments	 against	 greater	 political	
participation:	 instability	 of	 the	 political	 system,	 incompetence	 (and	 the	 presence	 of	 undesirable	
traits	 in	 the	non-participants),	 risks	of	 regimented	democracy,	and	 the	view	 that	 low	participation	
reflects	high	satisfaction	(Thompson,	1970).		
Schumpeter’s	critique	of	what	he	called	the	“classical	doctrine”	of	democracy	was	that	the	central	











well	 as	 the	 greater	 difficulty	with	 accountability	 and	 checks,	 that	would	 have	 to	 be	 addressed	 by	
such	new	frameworks	(Stoker,	1998).		
2.7.4.1 Lack	of	Interest	







indifference	 disappear	 once	 people	 feel	 they	 can	 be	 active	 participant	 in	 planning	 and	 decision	
making	 concerning	 issues	 that	 affect	 them.	 	 Similarly,	 Pateman	 (Pateman,	 1973)	 suggests	 that,	
rather	than	limitations	inherent	in	individuals,	 low	political	awareness	and	lack	of	 interest	in	issues	
should	be	seen	as	signs	of	deficiencies	in	public	institutions.			
In	 their	 study	 investigating	 factors	 likely	 to	 influence	 the	 way	 the	 public	 responds	 to	 proposed	
sustainability	 indicators	 in	 Lancashire,	 Macnaghten	 and	 colleagues	 (Macnaghten	 et	 al.,	 1995)	
highlight	 how	 people’s	 inclination	 and	 receptivity	 with	 regards	 to	 information	 and	 knowledge	
offered	by	 scientific	 and	public	 bodies	 such	 as	 local	 or	 central	 government	 is	 strongly	 affected	by	
both	their	sense	of	agency	 -	 that	 is	 their	 sense	of	 their	power	or	 freedom	to	act	upon	or	use	 that	
knowledge	-	and	by	their	trust	in	the	purveyors	of	such	information.		In	their	report,	they	state	that	
the	 public’s	 perceived	 inability	 or	 unwillingness	 to	 take	 in	 information	 can	 be	 often	 due	 to	
established	political	or	cultural	structure	of	empowerment,	so	that	apparent	ignorance	about	certain	
issues	can	not	be	 simply	attributable	 to	a	 lack	of	 information	or	 intelligence;	however	 “a	sense	of	
individual	 and	 social	 agency	 appears	 to	 require	 unambiguous	 central	 government	 initiatives	 to	
underpin	 it”.	 	 The	 authors	 suggest	 the	 need	 for	 the	 Lancashire	 County	 Council	 to	 develop	








risk	 minimization,	 economic	 efficiency,	 cost	 benefit	 analysis,	 or	 similar.	 	 “This	 unenthusiastic	
tolerance	 of	 a	 public	 role	 easily	 degenerates	 into	 mere	 public	 relations	 whereby	 decision-makers	
attempt	to	sell	their	favoured	outcome	to	an	uninformed	public.”	(Beierle	and	Cayford,	2002)	
Eden	 (Eden,	 1996)	 claims	 that	 the	 fact	 that,	 particularly	 in	 the	 UK	 and	 in	 Europe,	 debates	 are	
developed	by	experts	for	experts	in	scientific	disciplines	results	in	the	public	remaining	excluded	and	
the	 process	 of	 policy	 implementation	 remaining	 strictly	 ‘top-down’,	 and	 suggests	 greater	 public	
participation	 could	 be	 achieved	 through	 a	 “politicization	 and	 democratization	 of	 science”,	 which	
would	 allows	 people	 –	 often	 activists	 and	 NGOs	 representatives	 -	 to	 become	 “counter-experts”,	









modified	 through	 the	 incorporation	 of	 technical	 information,	 education,	 and	 analysis,	 in	 order	 to	
enable	 the	public	 to	 take	on	more	 influential	 roles	 in	decision-making.	 	 “Good	technical	analysis	 is	




The	 most	 common	 forms	 of	 participation	 in	 modern	 democracies	 are	 those	 connected	 with	 the	
electoral	 process,	 such	 as	 voting	 and	 discussions,	 while	 forms	 permitting	 a	 more	 direct	 role	 in	
decision-	and	policymaking	are	less	common,	and	most	of	the	time	they	are	thought	as	beyond	the	
will	(or	interest)	and	abilities	for	most	of	the	citizens.		The	ideal	in	participation	theory	is	to	achieve	a	
level	 of	 participation	 that	 is	more	 than	 symbolic,	 oppositional,	 or	 pleading,	 but	 in	which	 "citizens	
share	 in	 governing"	 (Thompson,	 1970).	 	 This	 occurs	 when	 citizens	 exercise	 decision	 authority	 or	
codetermine	policies	in	collaboration	with	government	officials	(Fiorino,	1990).	
In	 their	 study	 of	 239	 cases	 of	 public	 participation,	 Beierle	 and	 Cayford	 considered	 four	 broad	







experience	 with	 the	 issue	 discussed,	 more	 experience	 influencing	 public	 decision	 makers,	 more	
experience	 with	 participatory	 processes	 and	 efforts	 –	 enabling	 them	 to	 be	 more	 effective	 in	
participating,	solving	problems,	and	getting	decisions	implemented20,	these	participants	were	at	the	
same	time	less	likely	to	reflect	the	socioeconomic	characteristics	of	the	wider	public.		Furthermore,	





of	 interests/groups	 and	 it	may	 not	 have	 been	 representative	 of	 the	 views	 and	 preference	 of	 the	
wider	population,	ultimately	affecting	the	uptake/implementation	(see	also	2.7.7	below).	
The	 International	Association	of	Public	Participation	has	developed	a	public	participation	spectrum	





that	 may	 affect	 the	 quality	 of	 the	 actual	 participation	 and	 involvement,	 thus	 impacting	 on	 the	
success	of	the	case:	
- Responsiveness	 of	 lead	 agency	 (commitment	 to	 the	 exercise,	 communication	 with	
participants).		Low	levels	linked	to	perceptions	of	process	illegitimacy	and	lower	trust	
- Motivation	 of	 participants	 (confidence	 and	 dedication	 to	 the	 process,	 perceived	 ability	 to	
influence)	
- Quality	 of	 deliberation	 (quality	 of	 communication	 and	 dialogue,	 ability	 to	 question	 claims	
and	assumptions,	participant	sincerity	and	honesty,	quality	of	arguments	over	power)	











To provide the public 
with balanced and 
objective information 






To obtain public 
feedback on analysis, 
alternatives and/or 
decisions 
To work directly with 
the public throughout 
the process to ensure 
that public concerns 




To partner with the 
public in each aspect 
of the decision 
including the 
development of 
alternatives and the 
identification of the 
preferred solution 
To place final decision 
making in the hands 
of the public 
PROMISES TO 
THE PUBLIC 
“We will keep you 
informed” 
“We will keep you 




provide feedback on 
how public input 
influenced the 
decision” 
“We will work with you 
to ensure that your 
concerns and 
aspirations are directly 
reflected in the 
alternatives 
developed and 
provide feedback on 
how public input 
influenced the 
decision” 
“We will look to you 
for advice and 
innovation in 
formulating solutions 
and incorporate your 
advice and 
recommendations into 
the decisions to the 
maximum extent 
possible” 
“We will implement 
what you decide” 






al.,	 2013).	 O’Reilly	 (O’Reilly,	 2011)	 describes	 the	 emergence	 of	 a	 Government	 2.0	 as	 “the	 use	 of	
technology—especially	 the	 collaborative	 technologies	 at	 the	 heart	 of	 Web	 2.0—to	 better	 solve	
collective	 problems	 at	 a	 city,	 state,	 national,	 and	 international	 level.	 The	 hope	 is	 that	 Internet	
technologies	will	allow	us	to	rebuild	the	kind	of	participatory	government	envisioned	by	our	nation’s	




individualist’	 model),	 online	 deliberative	 forums	 are	 seen	 as	 opportunities	 to	 expand	 the	 public	
sphere	 of	 rational-critical	 citizen	 discourse,	 fostering	 a	 more	 deliberative	 model	 of	 democracy	
(Dahlberg,	2001).	
In	the	US,	the	Open	Government	initiative	launched	by	Obama	had	the	explicit	objective	to	increase	
transparency,	 participation	 and	 collaboration.	 	 In	 the	 UK,	 despite	 examples	 such	 as	 the	 Downing	
Street	E-petitions	launched	during	the	Blair	administration	with	the	aims	to	make	citizens	feel	more	
empowered	 as	well	 as	 to	 gather	 information	 about	 public	 sentiment,	 recent	 surveys	 suggest	 that	
local	authorities	have	yet	failed	to	engage	with	social	media	in	any	substantive	manner	(Ellison	and	
















oriented	 individuals	 with	 different	 views	 and	 interests	 are	 to	 become	 publicly-oriented	 citizens,	
capable	 of	 developing	 a	 public	 opinion	 that	 can	 rationally	 guide	 democratic	 decision-making,	
however	the	majority	of	the	existing	online	efforts	by	governments	seems	to	focus	on	(mostly	one-
way)	 communication	 of	 information	 to	 the	 public	 (‘broadcasting’).	 	 While	 other	 online	 non-
governmental	 initiatives	 exist	 that	 promote	 dialogue	 and	 debate,	 many	 are	 hosted,	 owned,	 or	
otherwise	 sponsored	by	 corporates	 as	 cyberspace	 is	 rapidly	 colonised	by	 commercial	 interests,	 so	









Consensus	 Building	 (“CB”)	 has	 emerged	 in	 the	 public	 domain	 as	 “an	 array	 of	 practices	 in	 which	
stakeholders,	 selected	 to	 represent	 different	 interests,	 come	 together	 for	 face-to-face,	 long-term	
dialogue	 to	 address	 a	 policy	 issue	 of	 common	 concern”	 that	 can	 help	 to	 break	 up	 stalemates	
situations,	 to	 incorporate	many	 	 -	often	diverging	 -	 interests,	and	to	 find	solutions	offering	mutual	
gain	 (Innes	 and	 Booher,	 1999).	 It	 should	 involve	 a	 good-faith	 effort	 to	 meet	 the	 interests	 of	 all	
stakeholders.	Consensus	is	deemed	to	have	been	reached	“when	everyone	agrees	they	can	live	with	


















objective	 encourage	 involving	 members	 of	 the	 public	 in	 a	 dialogue	 about	 policy	 while	 avoiding	
creating	the	expectation	for	any	consensus,	as	 it	can	yield	the	same	kinds	of	benefits	attributed	to	
consensus	procedures	without	creating	complications.	The	perceived	risk	is	that	“consensus-building	



















should	 be	 concerned	 with	 and	 engaged	 in	 societal	 problem-solving,	 as	 well	 as	 in	 the	 creation	 of	
opportunities	(Kooiman,	1999).		Indeed,	participation	is	increasingly	considered	“a	democratic	right,	
not	 just	 a	 normative	 goal”,	 requiring	 therefore	 that	 it	 becomes	 institutionalised	 (Richards	 et	 al.,	
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2007).	 	 A	 new	 role	 emerges	 then	 for	 the	 government	 as	 an	 enabler,	 catalyst,	 and	 commissioner	
(Stoker,	1998).	
Reed	(Reed,	2008)	identifies	eight	key	features	of	best	practice	public	participation:	














and	 suggests	 that	 many	 of	 the	 obstacles	 and	 difficulties	 experienced	 in	 participatory	 processes	
depend	on	the	organisational	cultures	of	either	sponsors	or	participants	themselves	(Reed,	2008).		
Clarke	(Clarke,	1997)	points	to	the	need	to	establish	norms	governing	the	interrelationships	between	
interested/affected	 organisations	 and	 stakeholders,	 and	 to	 reflect	 the	 complexity	 and	
interconnectedness	 in	 institutional	 structures.	 	 He	 suggests	 the	 creation	 of	 task	 forces,	 drawing	
members	 from	all	 relevant	government	department	and	other	agencies	and	organisations	with	an	
interest,	as	well	as	representatives	of	local	government	and	agencies	with	a	part	to	play.	
In	 addition	 to	 institutional	 changes,	 the	 social	 complexity	 surrounding	 the	management	of	wicked	
problems	–	a	function	of	the	number	and	diversity	of	the	players	involved	in	a	project	–	requires	also	
a	 shift	 of	 perspective	 in	 the	 approach	 to	meetings	 involving	 different	 stakeholders.	 	 This	 ensures	
they	 are	 focused	 on	 collaboration	 rather	 than	 confrontation,	 and	 can	 develop	 a	 shared	
understanding	–	not	necessarily	agreement,	but	an	understanding	of	each	others’	position	–	about	
the	problem,	as	well	as	a	shared	commitment	about	the	possible	solutions	(Conklin,	2005).	
Although	 most	 of	 the	 literature	 on	 participatory	 approaches	 to	 policymaking	 focuses	 on	 citizen	










much	 yet	 on	 how	 this	 engagement	would	 feed	 into	 the	 policymaking/governance	 process.	 	Many	
authors	point	out	the	need	to	develop	new/better	ways	to	integrate	these	new	tools	and	forms	of	
participation	 (online,	 citizens	 forums,	 etc.)	 in	 governance	 structures	 and	 models.	 	 It	 is	 worth	
repeating	 that	 the	mere	 transmission	of	 information,	 particularly	when	mostly	 one-way,	 does	not	
participation	make	–	see	Table	2.7.5.	
A	 significant	 part	 of	 the	 literature	 on	 stakeholder	 and	 public	 participation	 suggests	 that	 any	
philosophy	of	participation	should	emphasise	a	flow	of	knowledge	–	learning	–	between	participants	
that	is	iterative	and	reciprocal	(Chase	et	al.,	2004).	This	includes	learning	between	participants	who	
may	 have	 very	 different	 insights,	 information,	 and	 perspectives,	 as	 well	 as	 between	 ‘insiders’	
(stakeholders	 and	 local	 actors)	 and	outsiders	 (field	practitioners,	 researchers,	 etc.),	 and	 involves	 a	




Broad(er)	 participation	 aimed	 at	 promoting	 innovation	 is	 widely	 accepted	 in	 the	 literature	
concerning	 Technology	 Foresight	 as	 important	 for	 fostering	 and	 promoting	 coordination	 and	
mobilisation.	 	 Involving	 those	 actors	 that	 have	 an	 important	 role	 to	 play	 in	 shaping	 the	 future	 is	
expected	 to	 generate	 a	 shared	 understanding	 of	 current	 problems,	 goals,	 and	 development.	 This	
should	 in	turn	contribute	to	 improving	 implicitly	the	coherence	of	 the	distributed	decisions	of	said	




and	 the	 eventual	 users	 of	 the	outcome	of	 the	 exercise	 –	 that	 is,	 policymakers.	 	 Even	 in	 the	 Third	
Generation	 of	 Foresight	 (see	 section	 2.5.3	 above)	 the	 social	 perspective	 is	 provided	 by	 social	
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research	 domain	 experts,	 or	 by	 representatives	 of	 social	 stakeholders	 who	 are	 normally	 already	
members	of	the	decision-making	circle	through	other	activities.	Public	 is	mostly	seen	as	“a	passive	
audience	 to	 be	 addressed	 by	 communication	 strategies	 and	 through	 the	 media”,	 while	 the	 low	
numbers	 likely	 to	 be	 engaged	 would	 lead	 one	 to	 dismiss	 their	 participation	 as	 a	 way	 to	 build	
commitment.	As	a	result,	a	double	loop	mode	of	engagement	is	suggested	–	with	society	providing	
input	 on	 selected	 issues	 where	 public	 attitudes	 are	 considered	 relevant,	 and	 engaging	 with	 the	





aiming	 at	 a	 wider	 inclusion	 of	 experts,	 citizens,	 stakeholders	 or	 nongovernmental	 activists,	 that	
should	all	be	 involved	 in	the	process	of	anticipating	and	planning	the	future	(Nikolova,	2014),	 thus	
ensuring	 their	 greater	 engagement	 and	 commitment.	 	 According	 to	 Dator	 (Dator,	 2002),	 it	 is	
“absolutely	essential	that	all	people	who	have	a	stake	in	a	future	be	involved	in	determining	it.”			
Barré	(Barré,	2001)	distinguishes	a	societal	model	of	Foresight,	focussed	on	participation,	and	whose	
outcome	 is	 expressed	 in	 terms	 of	 networks	 creation	 and	 information	 sharing/leaning,	 from	 the	
analytic	 model	 of	 Foresight,	 which	 involves	 few	 people	 (experts)	 directly,	 aimed	 at	 knowledge	
production	 and	 leading	 to	 data,	 modelling	 and	 formalisation	 challenges.	 	 He	 also	 suggests	 the	
possibility	 of	 using	 Foresight	 as	 “an	 instrument	 of	 democracy	 in	 a	 knowledge	 society”,	 cautioning	
however	its	feasibility	is	likely	to	be	limited	to	countries	with	a	tradition	of	public	participation	and	
citizen	involvement.	
Further	 rationale	 for	 more	 comprehensive	 participation	 is	 provided	 when	 looking	 at	 applying	
Foresight	to	wicked	problems.		Quist	and	Vergragt	(Quist	and	Vergragt,	2006)	state	that	involving	a	
broad	range	of	stakeholders	and	actors	from	different	societal	groups	and	interests	 is	necessary	to	
achieve	 system	 innovations	 to	 cope	with	 complex	 issues,	 not	 just	 for	 problem	definition,	 but	 also	
when	searching	for	solutions	and	conditions,	and	developing	shared	visions.			





the	 risk	 of	 approaching	 such	 problems	 too	 narrowly	 (Clarke,	 1997,	 Ackoff,	 1997).	 	 Given	 the	
	 85	
characteristics	 of	 wicked	 problems	 described	 in	 2.4.3.1,	 inclusive	 participation	 in	 Foresight	 would	
allow	the	ongoing	learning	in	the	dialogue	and	discussion	around	the	problems	required	by	adaptive	
foresight	 (Eriksson	 and	 Weber,	 2008)	 as	 well	 by	 a	 sequential	 investments	 and	 decision	 making	
approach	such	as	 the	one	described	by	Gupta	with	regards	 to	 irreversible	 investments	 (Gupta	and	
Rosenhead,	1968)	that	would	reduce	the	‘one-shot	only’	risk23.	
The	shared	vision	and	coordinated	approach	developed	through	a	truly	participatory	process	would	




Nevertheless,	 the	 Concurrent	 Design	 Foresight	 Report	 to	 the	 European	 Commission	 states	 that	
“Currently,	 external	 participants	 [in	 qualitative	 Foresight	 activities	 conducted	 by	 EU	 institutions]	




large	 numbers	 –	 and	 philosophical	 –	 the	 need	 to	 simplify/dumbing	 down	 information	 for	
participants’	 use,	 compromising	 its	 scientific	 value	 and	 rigour.	 	 Looking	 at	 participatory	 Foresight	
experiences	in	France,	Barré	(Barré,	2008)	sees	participation	of	a	broader	public	in	the	production	of	
Foresight	 as	 difficult,	while	 it	 is	 easier	 to	 ask	 people	 simply	 to	 react	 to	 its	 outputs.	 	Many	 of	 the	
problems	 and	 difficulties	 cited	 echo	 those	 described	 in	 2.7.4	 about	 public	 participation	 in	
policymaking.	
Past	 attempts,	 although	 limited,	 exist:	 Jungk	 and	 Müllert	 describe	 what	 they	 called	 ‘future	
workshops’,	the	first	of	which	was	run	in	1962,	as	a	way	to	fill	a	gap	in	existing	democratic	systems,	
which	 not	 only	 failed	 to	 involve	 adequately	 into	 the	 policymaking	 process	 those	 directly	 affected	
such	policies,	but	also	to	consider	their	future	implications	at	all	(Jungk	and	Müllert,	1987).			
In	the	1970s	Toffler	introduced	the	concept	of	“Anticipatory	Democracy”	as	“a	process	for	combining	








co-founded	 with	 Bezold	 and	 Dator	 developed	 “aspirational	 futures”	 approaches	 with	 similar	
ambitions	(Bezold,	2010).				
Another	 example	 was	 the	 Electronic	 Town	Meeting	 organised	 in	 1982	 in	 Honolulu	 by	 Dator	 and	
Becker	with	the	objective	of	both	advocating	an	image	of	a	specific	future	as	well	as	increasing	the	
participation	 of	 ordinary	 citizens	 in	 shaping	 it.	 	 It	 involved	 large	 scale	 telephone	 interviews,	
coordinated	efforts	for	dissemination	through	several	public	channels,	and	discussions,	culminating	
in	 a	 vote	 and	 follow-up	 televised	presentation	where	 viewers	 could	 call	 to	 ask	questions	or	make	
comments	(Dator,	1983).		
Van	 Dijk	 (van	 Dijk,	 1991)	 also	 points	 to	 the	 advantages	 that	 wider	 stakeholder	 inclusion	 has	 on	
implementation,	 as	 the	possible	 pictures	of	 the	 future	produced	during	 the	 Foresight	 process	 can	
become	 self-fulfilling	 prophecies	 when	 participants	 act	 according	 to	 the	 knowledge	 generated	
through	the	combination	of	all	different	knowledge	and	visions.	
If	 we	 consider	 the	 policy	 cycle	 described	 in	 Figure	 2.4.2.1.b,	 more	 traditional	 Foresight	 would	
probably	 fit	 at	 the	 ‘prediction’/information	 gathering	 stage;	more	 inclusive	 participatory	 foresight	
however	would	become	involved	in	the	evaluation	and	selection,	and,	with	wicked	problems,	in	the	





An	 analysis	 of	 existing	 literature	 has	 revealed	 a	 sizeable	 amount	 of	 information	 on	 the	 use	 of	
Foresight	 in	 Policymaking	 concerning	 its	 rationale	 and	 benefits,	 the	 possible	 contexts	 of	 use,	 and	
different	models.		However,	the	researcher	has	also	identified	a	lack	of	precision	in	several	of	those	
constructs,	such	as	in	the	meaning	attributed	to	concepts	like	participation	or	engagement.	
Furthermore,	much	 of	 the	 literature	 appears	 to	 be	 prescriptive	 rather	 than	 descriptive,	while	 the	
majority	 of	 the	 detailed	 manuals	 and	 step-by-step	 instructions	 aimed	 at,	 and	 available	 to,	 civil	
servants	wishing	to	run	their	own	FA	are	clearly	derived	 from,	and	 informed	by,	 foresight	practice	
developed	in	and	for	the	private	sector.		







and	many	more),	 there	 is	 very	 little	material	 –	either	anecdotal	or	prescriptive	–	 concerning	what	
happens	to	the	insight	produced	–	and	why.	
Therefore	 the	 existing	 literature	 appears	 unable	 to	 provide	 a	 satisfactory	 answer	 to	 the	 Research	
problem.		Nevertheless,	the	Researcher	has	identified	a	number	of	concepts	(and	authors)	that	will	










generation	 of	 high	 quality	 insight,	 as	 well	 as	 in	 the	 ability	 of	 such	 insight	 to	 integrate	 into	 and	
contribute	to	the	policymaking	process.	
After	 restating	 the	 Research	 Objectives	 in	 section	 3.2,	 section	 3.3	 clarifies	 the	 theoretical	 and	
methodological	approach	underpinning	the	Research	Design	and	the	rationale	for	such	choice,	and	
summarises	 the	 research	 process	 carried	 out.	 Sections	 3.4	 and	 3.5	 provide	 further	 details	 on	 the	









and	 similar	 dimensions	 defining	 the	 content	 of	 such	 outputs,	 while	 ‘Performance’	 refers	 to	 the	




The	 objective	 of	 the	 Researcher	 was	 not	 validation	 or	 verification	 of	 pre-existing	 theories	 and	
hypotheses,	 but	 rather	 exploration	 and	 discovery	 of	 key	 concepts	 that	 could	 potentially	 lead	 to		
(Swamidass	and	Newell)	theories	and	hypotheses.		Furthermore,	since	Foresight	is	a	social	construct,	




Grounded	Theory	 (“GT”.),	 in	which	 theory	 is	developed	 from	social	 research	 through	a	methodical	
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gathering	and	analysis	of	data,	and	 the	generation	of	 theory	“goes	hand	 in	hand	with	verifying	 it”	
(Glaser	and	Strauss,	1967).		Over	the	past	few	decades	the	use	of	GT	has	extended	from	the	original	
field	of	sociology	across	a	number	of	other	disciplines	such	as	social	work,	health	studies,	psychology	
and	 more	 recently	 management,	 and	 is	 considered	 especially	 useful	 for	 the	 generation	 of	 new	
theory	in	social	contexts.	GT’s	ability	to	support	the	development	of	theory	“suited	to	its	supposed	
uses”	 (Glaser	 and	 Strauss,	 1967)	 appears	 also	 particularly	 relevant	 for	 a	 Research	whose	 ultimate	
ambition	is	to	affect	practice.		
The	Constructivist	approach	to	GT	suggests	there	is	no	objective	external	reality,	but	rather	a	social	
reality	 that	 is	 “multiple,	 processual,	 and	 constructed”,	 therefore	 such	 research	 efforts	 are	
characterised	 by	 relativism	 (Charmaz,	 2014).	 	 Given	 the	 phenomenon	 being	 researched	 here,	 the	





The	 Researcher	 wished	 to	 identify	 first	 what	 could	 negatively	 affect	 the	 production	 of	 ‘good’24	
Foresight,	 and	 then	 what	 could	 prevent	 the	 target	 recipients	 from	 using	 it.	 To	 this	 end,	 the	












al.,	2010)	 lament	 that	“the	empirical	basis	on	which	 to	draw	 is	…	rather	scarce”,	and	that	“little	 is	
known	so	far	in	terms	of	[Foresight	exercises’]	impact	assessment”,	while	van	Asselt	and	colleagues	
																																								 																				




The	 Researcher	 opted	 for	 ethnographic	 research,	 recommended	 by	 van	 Asselt	 (van	 Asselt	 et	 al.,	
2010,	van	Asselt	et	al.,	2014)	in	order	to	truly	understand	how	Foresight	practice	is	carried	out.		
While	the	Researcher	had	originally	considered	collecting	in-depth	data	across	multiple	cases,	so	as	
to	 gather	 a	 larger	 amount	 of	 data	 and	 be	 able	 to	 compare	 them	 across	 potentially	 different	




Researcher	 to	 observe	 the	 ‘phenomenon’	 –	 the	 preparation,	 execution	 and	 management	 of	
Foresight	 activities	 and	 exercises,	 and	 the	use	of	 their	 output	 to	 inform	policymaking	 –	 as	 it	 took	






concerning	 the	 generation	 of	 Foresight,	 by	 obtaining	 an	 18	month	 studentship	 agreement	with	 a	
non-departmental	public	body,	whereby	the	Researcher	was	essentially	hired	on	a	part-time	basis	by	
the	NDPB	as	part	of	 their	 Strategy	and	Futures	 team,	and	 thus	actively	 involved	 in	 the	day-to-day	
activities,	decisions,	and	communications	 related	 to	 the	preparation,	organization,	 facilitation,	and	
output	 generation	of	 a	 specific	 Foresight	 exercise,	 as	well	 as	 to	 the	 activities	 propaedeutic	 to	 the	
intended	application	of	its	outputs.	




The	overall	 data	 gathering	was	 articulated	over	 two	phases,	 carried	 out	 at	 a	 distance	of	 six	 years	
between	the	two,	during	which	the	information	obtained	during	the	first	phase	was	processed	and	
analysed,	and	used	to	 inform	and	structure	 the	second.	 	The	 first	phase	consisted	 in	an	18	month	
period	 of	 field	 participatory	 observation,	 while	 the	 second	 phase	 consisted	 in	 focused	 interviews	
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with	 relevant	 individuals.	 	 Data	 have	 thus	 been	 collected	 through	 means	 that	 were	 both	
observational	(direct-	and	participant-observation)	and	communicative	(interviews).	
3.3.3 Phase	1	–	Participant	Observation	/	Ethnographic	Approach	
The	 first	 phase	 was	 exploratory	 in	 nature,	 and	 its	 objective	 was	 to	 identify	 –	 through	 a	 direct	
observation	of	how	 Foresight	 activities	 are	 actually	managed	 and	 carried	out	 in	 the	public	 sector,	
and	what	appeared	to	be	the	consequences	and	implications	of	such	choices	–	specific	aspects	and	
elements	in	the	preparation,	management,	and	execution	of	Foresight	exercises	and	activities,	that	
appear	 to	have	an	 impact	on	 the	efficiency	and	efficacy	of	 such	exercises,	 as	well	 as	on	how	well	
their	eventual	outcome	is	likely	to	achieve	its	objectives.			
Tope	 and	 colleague	 define	 Participant	 Observation	 as	 “field	 observation	 involving	 a	 researcher’s	
active	participation	in	the	research	setting”,	stressing	its	potential	to	help	generate	rich	description	
by	 giving	 the	 researcher	 better	 opportunities	 to	 understand	 subtle	 nuances	 through	 firsthand	
experience.		Participation	is	also	seen	as	crucial	in	order	to	achieve	“insider	status”	as	someone	who	
is	 trustworthy	 (Tope	 et	 al.,	 2005).	 Non-participant	 Observation	 (Tope	 et	 al.,	 2005),	 or	 Embedded	
Observation	 (Ngoepe,	 2015),	 is	 instead	 defined	 as	 “field	 observation	 that	 does	 not	 involve	 active	
participation	 by	 the	 researcher.	 Rather,	 the	 researcher	 is	 present	 in	 the	 setting	 while	 the	 activity	
takes	place,	observing	what	transpires	and	potentially	talking	to	[the	subjects	observed]”	(Tope	et	al.,	
2005).	
The	 Researcher	 decided	 to	 set	 up	 the	 data	 gathering	 following	 the	 approach	 and	 guidelines	 of	




participant)	 observer	would	 have	 had.	 	 Simultaneously,	 as	 a	 Participant	Observer,	 the	 Researcher	
must	 recognize	 that	 they	have	 to	hold	 themselves	and	 their	 research	 to	higher	 standards	and	use	
greater	 care	 and	 awareness	 concerning	 their	 own	ability	 to	 influence	events	 and	decisions,	which	
could	 affect	 the	 data	 observed,	 as	well	 as	 using	 care	 to	 avoid	 any	 possible	 bias	 towards	 ideas	 or	
concepts	proposed.	
The	Researcher	had	the	opportunity	to	spend	a	total	of	over	18	months	working	with	the	Scenario	
team	 at	Natural	 England	 (“NE”)	 on	 the	 design,	 facilitation,	 and	 output	 production	 of	 one	 of	 their	
Foresight	projects	as	described	in	Chapter	4.		During	that	period,	working	closely	with	and	alongside	
the	Scenario	Team,	 the	Researcher	collected	ethnographic	data	 in	 the	 form	of	personal	notes	and	
comments	written	during	or	 immediately	 following	key	events	such	as	 team	meetings,	workshops,	
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and	other	meetings	–	both	internal	to	NE	and	involving	external	parties	and	organisations	–	related	
to	 the	 Foresight	 project,	 as	well	 as	 extensive	 email	 exchanges.	 	 The	 adoption	 of	 an	 ethnographic	
approach	for	detailed,	sustained	observation	was	“to	gain	an	insider’s	understanding	of	the	studied	
reality”	 (Charmaz,	 2014)	 by	 observing	 and	 experiencing	 the	 phenomenon	 the	way	 those	 typically	
involved	would,	and	had	the	advantage	of	direct	access	to	events,	scenes	and	people,	participation	
over	 time,	 and	observation	of	 actions,	 reactions,	 and	events	 in	 real	 time.	 Central	 to	 ethnographic	
research	 is	 the	 analysis	 and	 evaluation	of	 the	 relationship	 between	 “what	 people	 say	 about	what	
they	 do	 and	 what	 they	 actually	 do”	 (Mitchell,	 2007),	 which	 in	 the	 present	 study	 involved	 going	




which	allowed	 the	Researcher	both	 to	gain	 solid	data	and	 to	maintain	access	 for	 the	 collection	of	
further	data	 and	 therefore	opportunities	 to	 follow	up	on	emergent	patterns	 and	problems	during	
Phase	2	(theoretical	sampling,	see	3.5	below).		
Other	 data	 collected	 include	 the	 outputs	 produced	 from	 the	 workshops	 (from	 the	 ‘raw	material’	
generated	to	the	final	reports	circulated),	notes	from	individual	conversations,	as	well	as	documents	
received	from	NE	during	the	observation	period.		




had	 at	 the	 same	 time	 reached	 the	 furthest	 point	 in	 the	 process	 that	 it	 could	 have	 realistically	





1,	 and	 began	 by	 extracting	 ‘data’	 –	 essentially	 those	 specific	 observations	 and	 event	 descriptions	





Data	 were	 then	 subject	 to	 an	 initial	 round	 of	 coding,	 which	 in	 GT	 involves	 the	 breaking	 down,	







although	 influenced	 by	 the	 Researcher’s	 past	 professional	 and	 academic	 experience	 (see	 also	 2.2	
above),	 was	 about	 the	 ‘situation’,	 that	 is	 the	 logical	 and	 practical	 structure	 of	 the	 phenomenon,	
rather	 than	 about	 any	 pre-identified	 problems,	 so	 that	 it	 did	 not	 interfere	 with	 the	 analysis	 and	
emergence	of	constructs	and	hypotheses	and	allowed	the	Researcher	to	maintain	an	open	mind.			
The	 initial	 concepts	 (what	 Glaser	 (Glaser,	 1978)	 and	 Charmaz	 (Charmaz,	 2014)	 call	 “sensitizing	
concepts”)	 that	 the	 Researcher	 identified	 as	 emerging	 from	 this	 first	 round	 of	 data	 and	 themes	
analysis	 were	 then	 organised	 in	 preliminary	 analytic	 diagrams,	 which	 for	 each	 concept	 offered	 a	
short	 description,	 the	 perceived	 relationships	 with	 other	 concepts	 and	 ideas,	 and	 tentative	
interpretations	 and	 explanations.	 This	 was	 an	 iterative	 process,	 as	 the	 preliminary	 analysis	 and	
interpretations	 around	 one	 concept	 would	 continue	 to	 change	 and	 evolve	 as	 data	 were	 being	







This	 preliminary	 analysis	 generated	 a	 set	 of	 fifteen	 analytic	 diagrams,	 each	 considering	 a	 specific	
element	 of	 the	 practice	 concerning	 the	 preparation	 and	 management	 of	 Foresight	 Activities	 and	
Exercises	(henceforth,	“FA”)	and	its	impact	on	various	aspects	of	both	the	quality	and	the	uptake	and	




could	provide	 further	 insight	on	specific	areas	and	aspects	of	 the	emerging	concepts	and	analysis,	
	 94	







In	order	 to	properly	assess	 the	 fate	of	 the	output	 from	the	Foresight	exercise	 the	Researcher	had	
observed	during	Phase	1,	considering	how	it	had	been	received,	if	and	how	it	had	been	used,	and	–	
to	 some	 extent	 –	 with	 what	 factual	 results26,	 it	 was	 necessary	 that	 a	 suitable	 interval	 of	 time	
occurred	before	the	relevant	 information	could	be	gathered.	Given	the	 length	of	 the	policymaking	







Theoretical	 sampling	 was	 carried	 out	 (see	 3.5	 below),	 aimed	 at	 individuals	 who	 had	 first-hand	
experience	 in	 the	 production	 as	 well	 as	 use	 of	 Foresight	 within	 the	 public	 sector.	 	 Four	 of	 these	
individuals	 were	 from	 the	 NE	 Scenario	 team,	 of	 which	 two	 had	 been	 directly	 involved	 in	 the	 NE	
Foresight	exercise,	while	one	had	joined	more	recently	from	another	NDPB;	one	person	had	a	similar	
role	in	another	NDPB;	another	had	been	in	a	senior	management	position	in	one	of	the	civil	sector	











to	 capture	 facial	 expressions	 and	 body	 language,	 allowing	 both	 richer	 data	 collection	 and	 greater	
flexibility	in	the	conversation.		
When	 necessary,	 the	 Researcher	 introduced	 herself	 from	 an	 academic	 perspective,	 although	
mentioning	her	professional	background	in	foresight	and	Foresight	as	well	–	this	had	been	suggested	
by	 one	 of	 the	 first	 interviewees	 from	 NE	 as	 a	 way	 to	 reassure	 the	 other	 person	 about	 the	
Researcher’s	 ability	 to	 “understand	 what	 they’re	 saying	 and	 where	 they’re	 coming	 from”.	 	 And	
indeed,	 “how	 your	 research	 participants	 identify	 you	 influences	what	 they	will	 tell	 you”	 (Charmaz,	
2014).	 The	 objective	 of	 the	 interview	 was	 presented	 as	 being	 to	 gather	 the	 interviewee’s	 views,	







been,	 your	 experience	 with	 facilitation?	 How	 does	 it	 normally	 work?	 Who	 is	 involved?”		
Opportunistic	follow-up	questions	allowed	the	Researcher	to	deepen	the	inquiry,	focusing	on	more	
specific	elements	and	on	any	difficulties	encountered.	
At	 the	 end	 of	 the	 discussion	 on	 each	 ‘point’,	 interviewees	 were	 asked	 to	 react	 to	 a	 statement	
summarising	 the	 element	 and	 suggesting	 its	 importance	 for	 the	 generation	 and	 use	 of	 Foresight.		
This	 was	 on	 a	 5	 point	 scale,	 going	 from	 ‘Strongly	 Agree’	 (‘✓✓‘)	 to	 ‘Strongly	 Disagree’	 (‘✗✗‘)	 and	
including	an	‘Unsure’	(‘?’)	–	although	some	of	the	interviewees	spontaneously	added	an	extra	‘✓’	for	
some	of	the	concepts	they	found	particularly	compelling,	or	a	‘!’	where	they	deemed	extra	caution	
















collection	 as	well	 as	 comparison	with	 extant	 knowledge.	 	 The	Researcher	 continued	 to	 revise,	 re-
work	and	refine	the	concepts	and	preliminary	conclusions	throughout	the	research	process,	through	




and	 the	 setting	of	 its	boundaries”	 (Flyvbjerg,	2011).	 	A	case	 is	both	a	process	of	 inquiry	about	 the	
research	 topic	 and	 the	 product	 of	 such	 inquiry	 (Stake,	 2005).	 	 This	 unit	 is	 then	 studied	 in	 depth,	
looking	at	 its	development,	and	considering	 its	context	 (Flyvbjerg,	2011).	The	main	strength	of	the	
case	 study	 is	 depth	 –	 detail,	 richness,	 and	 completeness.	 	 In	 order	 to	 understand	 a	 phenomenon	
with	thoroughness	–	what	are	the	possible	causes,	what	may	cause	and/or	affect	certain	behaviours,	
how	it	may	be	possible	to	encourage,	or	prevent,	certain	results	etc.	–	it	becomes	necessary	to	study	





At	 the	 same	 time,	 in	 addition	 to	 risks	 and	 limitations	 due	 to	 poor	 design	 or	 execution,	 and	 apart	
from	 the	 unsurprisingly	 poor	 performance	 of	 case	 studies	 (a	 qualitative	 methodology)	 when	
assessed	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 criteria	 developed	 for	 quantitative	 methodologies28,	 case	 studies	 are	
weaker	at	assessing	(and	essentially	quantifying)	the	degree	of	influence	a	specific	variable	may	have	
on	 a	 certain	 outcome,	 they	 are	 dependent	 on	 the	 researcher’s	 ability	 and	 subjective	 judgment	 in	






Although	 some	 critics	 fear	 that	 case	 studies	 may	 be	 biased	 towards	 verification	 of	 researcher’s	
preconceived	notions	experience	indicates	that	case	studies	have	a	greater	bias	towards	falsification	
of	preconceived	notions	than	toward	verification	(Flyvbjerg,	2011).	
When	 deciding	 whether	 to	 conduct	 a	 single	 case	 enquiry	 or	 a	 comparison	 of	multiple	 cases,	 the	
Researcher	 considered	 the	 advantages	 and	 negatives	 of	 each	 option	 both	 from	 a	 theoretical	
strength	 and	 a	 practical	 feasibility	 point	 of	 view.	 	 While	 gathering	 and	 comparing	 data	 across	
multiple	 cases	would	have	produced	evidence	 that	would	have	been	 considered	more	 robust	 and	
reliable	(Baxter	and	Jack,	2008,	Yin,	2009),	 it	would	have	requested	a	much	higher	commitment	of	
time,	resources	and	funds	than	were	available	to	the	Researcher	–	not	to	mention	the	difficulty	 in	
securing	 the	 required	 access	 to	 suitable	 cases.	 	 Section	 3.4.1	 below	 argues	 that	 both	 the	
characteristics	 and	 the	 way	 the	 specific	 Case	 Study	 was	 carried	 out	 enable	 it	 to	 support	 theory	
generation.		
3.4.1 Generating	Theory	with	Single	Case	Study	













- there	 is	a	 longitudinal	element	that	requires	studying	the	same	single	case	at	two	or	more	
different	points	in	time.			
On	the	first	point,	the	Researcher	argues	that	the	particular	aspects	and	dynamics	considered	in	the	
case	 conducted	on	NE	 are	 indeed	 representative	 of	 those	 characterising	 comparable	 phenomena,	




On	 the	 second	 point,	 given	 the	 relatively	 limited	 access	 to	 the	 context	 itself	 and	 to	 the	 type	 of	
phenomenon	studies,	with	few	instances	occurring	and	access	being	politically	and	organisationally	
sensitive,	the	Researcher	suggests	that	the	case	can	be	defined	as	revelatory.	
Finally,	 data	 have	 been	 collected	 longitudinally	 during	 two	 different	 periods	 across	 a	 6	 year	 gap,	
giving	 the	 Researcher	 the	 opportunity	 to	 see	 how	 the	 case	 had	 developed	 over	 time,	 allowing	
consideration	 of	 the	 impact	 that	 some	 of	 the	 elements	 have	 had	 over	 such	 evolution,	 as	well	 as	
enabling	 access	 to	 information	 that	would	 have	 been	 otherwise	 difficult	 to	 obtain	 (such	 as	 being	
able	to	speak	to	two	of	the	individuals	after	they	had	retired	or	changed	job	and	therefore	were	not	
worried	about	expressing	their	views).			
On	 the	 subject	 of	 time,	 the	 Researcher	 is	 aware	 of	 the	 potential	 risks	 linked	 to	 the	 length	 of	 the	
period	 occurring	 between	 the	 participant	 observation	 of	 Phase	 1	 described	 in	 the	 case	 and	 the	
interviews	 in	 Phase	 2,	 mostly	 linked	 to	 the	 deterioration	 of	 individuals’	 memories	 and	 ability	 to	
recall;	 however	 in	 this	 case	 the	 interviews	were	 used	 not	 solely	 to	 discuss	 things	 that	 happened	




During	 Phase	 1	 and	 the	 ensuing	 preliminary	 analysis,	 the	 Researcher	 had	 begun	 to	 observe	what	
would	go	on	during	the	process	of	Foresight	production,	and	had	started	the	construct	identification	
and	development,	 including	 the	 generation	of	 hypotheses	 as	 relations	between	 the	 concepts	 that	
was	then	expanded	during	the	preliminary	data	analysis	phase.		At	this	stage	the	Researcher	started	
identifying	 any	 insufficient	 or	 missing	 data,	 and	 deducing	 where	 they	 could	 be	 found.	 	 As	 these	
‘focused’	 additional	 data	 were	 obtained,	 previous	 data,	 constructs,	 and	 conceptualisations	 were	
corrected	 (verified).	 As	 Glaser	 suggests,	 the	 focus	 of	 Phase	 1	 was	 on	 the	 induction	 from	 the	
observations	 and	 data	 obtained	 during	 the	 phenomenon,	 therefore	 excluding	 deductions	 or	
inferences	 of	what	 should	 or	 might	 have	 been	 taking	 place,	 while	 it	 included	 deductions	 about	
where	to	further	collect	data	on	“what	is	going	on”	(Glaser,	1998)	during	Phase	2.	
Qualitative	methods,	such	as	interviews,	are	believed	to	provide	a	‘deeper’	understanding	of	social	
phenomena	 than	 would	 be	 obtained	 from	 purely	 quantitative	 methods,	 such	 as	 questionnaires.	




for	 the	discovery	or	elaboration	of	 information	 that	 is	 important	 to	participants	but	may	not	have	
previously	been	thought	of	as	material	by	researchers.	
At	 the	 same	 time,	 it	 is	 important	 to	 be	 aware	 that	 the	 data	 obtained	 through	 interviews	 have	
inevitably	gone	through	the	filter	of	the	respondents,	 is	shaped	by	their	perspectives,	and	affected	
by	their	memory	 (Lune	and	Berg,	2017).	While	 this	 is	consistent	with	the	constructionist	approach	
(Charmaz,	 2014),	 it	 is	 unavoidable	 that	 some	 information	 is	 lost,	 as	 respondents	 will	 notice	 and	








category	 is	 saturated,	 in	 a	 process	 known	 as	 Theoretical	 Sampling	 (“TS”)	 (Coyne,	 1997)(Glaser,	
1992).		With	TS,	data	gathering	is	driven	by	concepts	derived	from	the	evolving	theory	and	based	on	
the	 concept	 of	making	 comparisons;	 the	 sampling,	 that	 is	 the	 theoretically	 driven	 data	 collection,	
evolves	during	the	process	and	is	based	on	concepts	that	emerged	from	analysis	and	that	appear	to	
have	 relevance	 to	 the	 evolving	 theory	 (Strauss	 and	 Corbin,	 1998).	 	 In	 GT,	 TS	 is	 aimed	 at	 theory	
construction	rather	than	population	representativeness	 (Charmaz,	2014,	Glaser	and	Strauss,	1967).		
It	is	used	as	a	way	of	checking	on	the	emerging	framework	rather	than	being	used	for	verification	of	
preconceived	 hypotheses	 (Glaser,	 1978),	 and	 it	 calls	 upon	 researchers	 to	 flexibly	 pursue	 data	
collection	to	support	category	development	(Locke,	2001).	
Accordingly,	during	the	second	phase	of	data	gathering,	the	Researcher	opted	to	focus	the	sampling	
for	 the	 interviews	 on	 sample	 accuracy,	 based	 on	 the	 needs	 emerged	 (and	 emerging)	 from	 the	
analysis	 of	 data	 from	 the	 first	 phase	 of	 the	 process,	 rather	 than	 on	 sample	 size.	 	 The	 Researcher	








representing	 thus	what	Morse	defines	as	 ‘excellent	participants’	 (Morse,	2007):	 someone	who	has	
been	through	the	experience	under	investigation,	who	is	willing	to	participate	and	has	time	to	share	
the	 necessary	 information,	 and	who	 at	 the	 same	 time	 can	 be	 reflective,	 willing,	 and	 able	 to	 talk	
about	the	subject	in	an	articulate	and	meaningful	way.		According	to	Morse,	more	targeted	content	
can	 potentially	 generate	 better	 (that	 is,	more	 relevant	 and	 insightful)	 data	 and	 thus	may	 require	
fewer	interviews	–	although	this	strongly	relies	on	the	ability	of	the	researcher.	
3.5.2 Interview	Structure	and	Format	
When	 deciding	 on	 how	 to	 structure	 the	 interviews	 and	 what	 format	 to	 use,	 the	 Researcher	
considered	 how	 best	 to	 address	 the	 trade-off	 between	 depth	 and	 breadth	 of	 data	 gathering	
determined	 by	 the	 choice	 of	 open	 versus	 more	 structured	 interviewing	 models,	 as	 well	 as	 the	
advantages	and	risks	involved	in	the	use	of	supporting	materials,	and	the	most	appropriate	ways	to	
minimise	such	risks.			
Since	the	 interviews	represented	the	TS	that	 followed	the	(wider)	 initial	data	gathering	of	 the	first	
phase,	they	were	actually	supposed	to	dig	deeper	rather	than	provide	another	round	of	data	at	the	
same	level.		Therefore	the	Researcher	decided	to	use	a	semi-structured	mode	of	interviews,	where	
the	 interview	was	articulated	around	 the	main	 concepts	 that	had	emerged	during	 the	preliminary	






avoiding	 the	 temptation	 to	 encourage	 participants’	 answers	 towards	 specific	 words	 or	 ideas.	 	 	 In	
order	 to	 reduce	 the	 risk	 of	 missing	 relevant	 data,	 the	 Researcher	 adopted	 the	 approach	
recommended	by	Strauss	and	Corbin	to	focus	on	the	interviewees’	own	experience	of	situations	and	
aspects	 linked	 to	 each	 concept	 explored.	 	 Starting	 questions	 for	 each	 element	 category	 (e.g.,	
‘facilitation’,	 ‘Client	 communication’,	 etc.)	 were	 carefully	 worded	 and	 open	 ended,	 allowing	 the	
respondents	 greater	 freedom	 to	 answer	 in	 terms	 of	 features	 and	 aspects	 that	 they	 considered	
important,	 as	well	 as	 to	offer	data	 that	 could	potentially	undermine	or	 contradict	 any	preliminary	
concepts	 or	 emerging	 theoretical	 conclusions	 –	 as	 in	 the	 question	 about	 facilitation	 mentioned	
above.		Furthermore,	the	Researcher	asked	each	interviewee	whether	they	could	think	of	any	other	




their	 agreement	 –	 or	 disagreement	 –	 on	 the	 relevance	 and	 impact	 of	 each	 one	 of	 the	 identified	
elements	with	regards	to	Foresight	processes	and	their	output.	Although	Glaser	(Glaser,	1998)	warns	
about	 the	 risks	 of	 using	 units,	 grids,	 diagrams	 and	 similar	 tools	 during	 interviews	 as	 they	
“preconceive	 the	data”	and	 thus	may	end	up	 forcing,	 the	Researcher	considered	 that	 showing	 the	
table	at	the	end	of	the	interview,	and	thus	after	the	interviewees’	 insight,	opinions,	and	views	had	
already	been	recorded,	reduced	significantly	such	risks.		Secondly,	the	interview	itself	could	help	the	
interviewees	 to	 refresh	 their	memories	 and	become	more	 aware	of	 their	 own	 views,	 allowing	 for	
more	considered	answers.		Finally,	rather	than	being	used	as	a	simple	survey,	the	preliminary	table	
was	mainly	used	as	a	prop	for	more	focused	probing	around	the	elements.	
As	 the	 Researcher	 was	 interested	 in	 the	 interviewees’	 perceptions,	 opinions,	 and	 impressions,	




appropriate	 non-verbal	 responses	 and	 appear	 both	 interested	 and	 able	 to	 follow	 and	 understand	
what	was	being	 said,	as	 recommended	by	Lune	and	Berg	 (Lune	and	Berg,	2017).	 	Although	Glaser	
recommends	against	 taping	 interviews,	 seeing	 it	as	an	excessively	 time	consuming	endeavour,	 the	





was	 aware	 of	 the	 following	 issues	 that	 could	 potentially	 affect	 the	 quality	 of	 the	 Research	 Study.		
The	 first	 two	can	be	 traced	back	 to	 the	 two	conflicting	positions	 concerning	 the	 relation	between	
data	 and	 theory	 as	 described	 by	 Glaser	 (Glaser,	 1992),	 which	 see	 in	 one	 corner	 the	 concept	 of	










knowledge	 is	 crucial	 in	 theory	 development,	 otherwise	 conclusions	 from	 data	 analysis	 would	 be	
limited	to	the	obvious	and	the	superficial	(Glaser,	1978).	Locke	describes	theoretical	sensitivity	as	a	





privileges	 and	 preconceptions	 shape	 not	 only	 their	 analysis	 and	 interpretation,	 but	 also	 the	 facts	
they	can	identify,	and	thus	the	data	they	gather:	“We	construct	our	grounded	theories	through	our	
past	 and	 present	 involvements	 and	 interactions	with	 people,	 perspectives,	 and	 research	 practices”	
(Charmaz,	2014).	
Indeed,	 the	 vantage	point	 offered	by	 researchers’	 academic	 and	professional	 experience	 can	help	
seeing	certain	aspects32,	 leading	at	 the	same	time	 to	 the	 ignoring	of	others.	 	Therefore,	while	 it	 is	
useful	for	researchers	to	start	their	studies	from	such	vantage	points,	it	is	crucial	for	them	to	remain	
open	 to	 all	 they	 see	 and	 sense	 during	 the	 research.	 The	 self-awareness	 of	 their	 position	 and	
consequent	sensitivity	can	help	them	consciously	make	that	effort,	minimising	the	risk	of	remaining	
blindsided.		






Glaser,	 data	 vary	 in	quality,	 relevance,	 and	usefulness	 (Charmaz,	 2014),	 and	a	 level	 of	 selection	 is	
desirable	and	even	necessary	to	ensure	that	analysis	can	actually	be	done.			
During	 the	 participant-observation	 stage,	 adopting	 an	 exploring	 rather	 than	 verifying	 approach	
meant	that	the	Researcher	focused	on	what	was	going	on,	deliberately	trying	to	maintain	an	open	
stance	and	capture	as	much	data	as	possible;	the	fact	that	the	observations	were	carried	out	over	an	









as	 well	 as	 to	 appreciate	 the	 confluence	 of	 conditions	 that	 inevitably	 frames	 the	 data	 eventually	
collected	(Charmaz,	2014).	
3.6.2 Forcing	
As	 Glaser	 suggests,	 forcing	 –	 the	 imposition	 of	 preconceived	 ideas	 over	 the	 information,	 forcing	







confirm)	 to	 that	 theory.	 	And	 the	problem	 is	 that	 “if	 you	 torture	 the	data	enough,	 it	will	 give	up”	
(Glaser,	1998).				








all	 its	 various	 iterations,	 but	 particularly	 during	 the	 preliminary	 data	 analysis	 described	 in	 3.3.4	
above)	 and	 during	 the	 Second	 Phase	 of	 data	 gathering.	 	 With	 regards	 to	 the	 preliminary	 data	
analysis,	the	Researcher	made	a	conscious	effort	to	suspend	her	own	judgement	and	to	concentrate	
on	 all	 data	 as	 ‘neutrally’	 as	 possible,	 regardless	 of	 either	 previous	 professional	 experience	 or	
knowledge.		In	the	interviews,	as	described	in	3.3.5,	the	Researcher	managed	the	risk	of	forcing	by	











As	a	 result,	despite	being	 in	a	prime	position	 for	observing	them,	this	Researcher	had	very	 limited	
influence	on	the	particular	issues	considered	in	Chapter	5,	e.g.,	facilitators’	number	and	preparation,	
invitees,	 interaction	 and	 communications	with	 Client	 and	 other	 organisations,	 etc.	 	 Therefore	 the	




study	and	semi-structured	 interviews	 in	her	research.	 	Other	methodologies	were	also	considered,	
balancing	their	strengths	and	advantages	against	their	disadvantages,	and	assessing	their	suitability	
vis-à-vis	 both	 the	 research	 objectives	 and	 the	 specific	 situation;	 they	 were	 eventually	 discarded	
based	on	the	considerations	below.			
A	theory-based	research	would	have	the	advantages	of	building	and	further	developing	existing	and	
accepted	 theories	 and	 literature.	 It	 depends	 critically	 on	 the	 availability	 of	 relevant	 information	 –	




Questionnaires	 would	 have	 been	 faster	 and	 easier	 to	 administer,	 while	 the	 results	 are	 generally	
considered	more	objective	and	would	have	been	easier	to	compare	and	analyse.		Nevertheless	they	
presume	 a	 theoretical	 framework	 and	 stance,	 and	 are	 better	 suited	 for	 verification	 rather	 than	
exploration,	with	a	high	 risk	of	 failing	 to	capture	new	or	unexpected	 information.	The	 inclusion	of	
open	questions,	requiring	respondents	to	provide	ad	hoc	input	and	details,	could	have	been	used	to	
obviate	at	least	partly	to	this	last	point,	however	it	would	have	likely	impacted	on	the	response	rate.		
Finally,	 the	 lack	 of	 personal	 contact	 and	 trust-building	 would	 have	 made	 it	 more	 difficult	 for	
respondent	 to	 offer	 information	 that	 they	 fear	 may	 reflect	 negatively	 on	 them	 and/or	 on	 their	
organisation.		
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Fully	structured	 interviews,	also	generally	 faster	and	easier	to	carry	out,	would	have	 likely	allowed	
the	Researcher	 to	obtain	more	as	well	 as	more	easily	 comparable	and	 ‘objective’	data	given	 their	
lower	 dependence	 on	 interviewers’	 skills.	 	 As	 with	 questionnaires	 however	 their	 reliance	 on	 a	







public	 body	 (“NDPB”),	 in	 order	 to	 observe	 and	 identify	 elements	 affecting	 the	 organisation,	
management,	and	insight	development	of	participatory	FAs	aimed	at	producing	Foresight	to	support	
and	inform	policymaking.		




Section	 4.12	 offers	 a	 concise	 description	 of	 the	 principal	 developments	 concerning	 the	 outcomes	
and	 products	 of	 the	 project,	while	 section	 4.13	 summarises	 the	 subsequent	 interactions	 between	
the	Researchers	and	members	of	the	Futures	Team	after	the	conclusion	of	the	observation	period.	




Natural	 England	 (“NE”)	 is	 a	 NDPB	 in	 the	 United	 Kingdom	 sponsored	 by	 the	 Department	 for	




responsible	 for	 ensuring	 that	 England's	 natural	 environment,	 including	 its	 land,	 flora	 and	 fauna,	










































to	 help	 design	 and	 facilitate	 the	 scenario	 building	
exercises	 and	 draft	 the	 summary	 scenarios.	 	 Over	 a	
series	of	three	workshops,	which	involved	NE	staff	and	
key	 stakeholders,	 four	 scenario	 narratives	 were	
produced,	which	were	 subsequently	 further	 expanded	







































































The	Researcher	had	originally	met	with	 the	Specialist,	who	was	 later	 to	 lead	 the	 scenarios	project	
team	 at	 NE,	 in	 the	 spring	 of	 2008	 during	 a	 workshop	 organised	 by	 the	 European	 Environmental	
Agency33.		In	April	2009	the	Researcher	contacted	the	Specialist	in	order	to	discuss	his	views	and	ask	




2	 of	 NE’s	 Foresight	 project	 was	 being	 completed.	 	 	 In	 particular,	 the	 Specialist	 asked	 that	 the	
Researcher	 help	 them	 with	 developing	 practices	 and	 processes	 to	 support	 what	 NE	 called	
embedding,	defined	as	“facilitating	the	use	of	scenarios	 in	a	range	of	planning	processes	to	enable	
more	detailed	analysis	of	issues	and	activities	that	influence	change”34.		
At	 the	end	of	 the	 three-month	period,	 the	 team	offered	 the	Researcher	 a	 studentship	 to	work	as	
part	of	the	Futures	team,	assisting	them	with	the	design	and	implementation	of	a	Foresight	process	
to	support	NE’s	planning	and	strategy	activities	in	Phase	3	as	well	as	with	the	ongoing	development	
and	 refinement	 of	 the	 Vision	 for	 Phase	 2.	 	 The	 studentship	 lasted	 12	 months	 and	 was	 formally	
concluded	 in	 November	 2010,	 essentially	 due	 to	 the	 end	 of	 the	 team’s	 available	 funding;	
nevertheless,	 the	Researcher	was	asked	–	and	agreed	–	 to	 continue	working	on	a	voluntary	basis,	
which	she	did	until	the	end	of	February	2011.	
4.4 	Working	with	the	NE	Futures	Team	
The	 Researcher	 started	 working	 with	 the	 Futures	 team	 in	 July	 2009.	 	 Due	 to	 the	 geographical	
dispersion	of	 the	members	of	 the	 team,	who	were	each	based	 in	different	offices	across	England,	
interactions	 relied	 for	 the	 majority	 on	 email	 exchanges	 and	 conference	 calls,	 interspersed	 with	











Changes	 in	 the	 political	 context	 had	 a	 significant	 impact,	 even	 several	 months	 before	 the	 actual	
change	 in	government	took	place	 in	2010.	 	This	 led	to	a	shift	 in	the	government’s	view	of	the	role	
and	purpose	of	all	NDPBs,	such	as	NE;	so	that	the	expectation	was	now	for	such	bodies	to	limit	their	




noted	 in	 an	 email	 received	 by	 the	 Researcher	 in	 November	 2009	 from	 the	 Specialist	 stating	
“apparently	 […]	 we	 don’t	 do	 ‘policy’	 anymore,	 but	 we	 do	 develop	 our	 position	 on	 things	 –	 subtle	
change!”		By	late	Spring	2010,	however,	it	had	been	made	clear	by	DEFRA	that	the	original	visioning	
and	 goal-setting	 objectives	 of	NE’s	 Pathways	 to	 2060	project	were	outside	NE’s	 scope	of	 purpose	
and	NE	had,	again	in	the	words	of	the	Specialist,	to	“retreat	from	that	space”.	
Stage Period Description 
Embedding Jul 09 – 
Oct 09 and 
further 
Help team with writing a scenario report and 
presenting scenarios in more user-friendly ways. 
Introduce Foresight methodologies and techniques 





Nov 09 –  
Jan 10 
Work with the Futures team to develop the Vision, to 
identify appropriate Foresight methodologies and 
techniques and to design a Foresight process aimed at 
supporting Phase 3 
1st workshop Feb 10 –  
Mar 10 
Organization and preparatory work ahead of first 
workshop on March 5, 2010; participation in workshop 
facilitation 
2nd workshop March 2010 Integration and processing of materials generated 
during first workshop, organization and preparatory 
work ahead of second workshop on March 31, 2010; 




Apr 10 –  
Jul 10 
Integration and processing of material generated so 
far, additional activities linked to process such as 
causal mapping and intermediate scenarios, beginning 
of report writing 
3rd and 4th  
workshop 
Jul 10 –  
Sep 10 
Design, organization and preparatory work ahead of 




Sep 10 –  
Nov 10 
Integration and processing of material generated, 
followed by other meetings both internal to present 
and with DEFRA to discuss the process and some of its 
outcomes; finalisation of report 
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As	 a	 result,	 the	 design	 for	 the	 remaining	 portion	 of	 the	 process	 had	 to	 be	 modified,	 and	 the	
subsequent	work	stages	saw	a	change	in	overall	objectives,	approaches,	attitudes	(both	internal	and	
external	to	NE),	and	output	formats.	





During	 the	 first	 three	 months	 of	 her	 involvement	 and	 interactions	 with	 NE,	 the	 Researcher	
supported	the	Futures	team	in	their	effort	to	develop	working	practices	(both	formal	and	informal)	
aimed	 at	 enabling	 NE	 to	 embed	 strategic	 thinking	 into	 NE’s	 business	 planning	 and	 performance	
management	processes	and	 into	 their	 corporate	culture.	 In	particular,	 the	Researcher	assisted	 the	
Futures	team	in:	
- Developing	NE’s	Vision	from	the	four	scenarios	
- Using	 the	 four	 scenarios	 to	 test	 and	 support	 the	 strategy	 development	 for	 a	 specific	
geographic	and	environmental	context	(the	Uplands	Futures	project)	
- Incorporating	the	 insight	gained	during	Futures	and	Foresight	activities	 into	NE’s	corporate	
planning	process.				
The	Researcher	was	 very	well	 accepted	by	 the	Futures	 team,	who	on	 several	occasions	expressed	
their	appreciation	for	her	contribution.	
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Part	 of	 the	work	was	 carried	out	 on	 a	 voluntary	 basis	 and	was	 framed	as	 one	or	 two	days/week,	
either	 from	 NE’s	 Cambridge	 office	 or	 remotely,	 and	 involved	 –	 in	 addition	 to	 numerous	 email	
exchanges	 –	 several	 meetings	 with	 the	 Futures	 team	 and	 other	 members	 of	 NE’s	 Strategic	 and	
Environmental	Futures	 team,	as	well	as	with	other	public	 sector	organisation	such	as	 the	National	
School	of	Government35.		At	the	request	of	the	Specialist,	the	Researcher	was	also	asked	to	produce	
a	 short	 report	 on	 “the	 practicalities	 of	 using	 scenarios	 in	 future-proofing	 policy	 and	 strategy”36,	
which	included	an	overview	of	the	various	policymaking	activities	and	Foresight	activities	and	tools	
that	can	be	used	to	support	policy	 formulation	and	 implementation,	particularly	 in	the	embedding	
and	implementing	phases.	
At	 the	 end	 of	 October	 2009,	 as	 the	 date	 of	 the	 end	 of	 the	 volunteering	 period	 approached,	 the	
Specialist	offered	the	Researcher	a	studentship	that	would	allow	the	Futures	team	to	“benefit	from	
access	 to	 expert	 advice	 and	 insight	 on	 its	 approach	 to	 building	 strategic	 capability,	 particularly	 in	
applying	 its	 scenarios.	 NE	 will	 also	 benefit	 from	 practical	 hands-on	 support	 in	 designing	 and	
delivering	resources	and	activities	in	this	area”	[stress	added],	while	the	Researcher	would	“benefit	
from	 the	 opportunity	 to	 develop	 case	 study	 material	 for	 her	 PhD	 research	 by	 gaining	 close	 and	







The	 Futures	 team	 identified	 Backcasting	 and	 Roadmapping	 as	 the	 most	 appropriate	 techniques,	
based	 both	 on	 the	 quality	 and	 nature	 of	 the	 input	 (i.e.,	 the	 scenarios	 and	 the	Vision)	 and	 on	 the	
objectives	of	the	whole	exercise.		The	team	then	went	on	to	design	a	process	that	would	integrate	











The	main	objective	of	 the	workshop	on	March	5th	at	DEFRA's	 Innovation	Centre	 in	Reading	was	to	
identify	 the	main	steps	and	milestones	necessary	 to	move	 from	the	present	 situation	 towards	 the	
preferred	 future	described	 in	Pathways	 to	2060,	as	well	as	 the	main	conditions	and	requirements.	
The	exercise	would	also	 test	whether	such	a	 future	was	 indeed	attainable	–	 in	case	no	 feasible	or	
realistic	steps	could	be	identified.		
Ahead	 of	 the	 workshop,	 the	 team	 worked	 to	 regroup	 and	 distil	 the	 description	 of	 the	 preferred	
future,	 which	 had	 been	 originally	 structured	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 different	 Landscapes	 (i.e.,	 Uplands,	
Wetlands	etc.),	 into	nine	 ‘topics’:	Biodiversity,	Access,	 Sustainability,	Protection,	 Impact	of	 climate	
change,	Living,	Landscape,	Attitudes	and	Values,	and	Governance.		The	objective	was	to	enable	each	
topic	 to	 be	 considered	 and	 addressed	 as	 a	 whole	 rather	 than	 fragmented	 geographically,	 thus	
ensuring	a	more	integrated	and	consistent	approach.	The	result	was	a	set	of	‘end	statements’,	each	
describing	the	characteristics	and	conditions	of	a	specific	topic	by	the	year	2060.		
The	 team	 experienced	 difficulties	 in	 getting	 a	 sufficient	 number	 of	 attendees	 and	 in	 ensuring	
appropriate	 representation.	 	 Nine	 of	 the	 11	 participants	 in	 the	 workshop	were	members	 of	 NE’s	
Communities	of	Practice,	which	contributed	relevant	 information	and	expertise	concerning	the	key	
aspects	 and	 components	 described	 in	 the	 preferred	 future.	 	 The	 other	 two	 participants	 were	
member	 of	 NE’s	 Strategy	 and	 Environmental	 Futures	 Team.	 	 The	 Futures	 team	 had	 divided	
participants	into	three	groups,	aiming	at	ensuring	as	much	variety	and	balance	as	possible.		
Not	 all	 of	 the	 people	 involved	 in	 the	 facilitation	 of	 the	 workshop	 had	 had	 previous	 facilitation	
experience	or	specific	training.		The	discussions	ahead	of	the	workshop	focussed	on	content	and	on	












Groups	were	 asked	 to	write	 the	 results	 from	 their	work	 on	 the	whiteboards	 that	 constituted	 the	
walls	 in	 the	room,	proceeding	 ‘backward	from	the	future’	and	along	a	 timeline	divided	by	decade.	
Each	group	then	presented	back	to	the	rest	of	participants,	who	asked	for	clarifications	and	provided	
comments.		
In	 the	 following	 session,	 again	 working	 in	 groups,	 participants	 were	 asked	 to	 think	 about	 the	
conditions	(defined	‘dependencies’)	for	each	of	the	various	elements	that	had	been	identified	in	the	
previous	session.			
The	output	 from	these	 two	sessions	consisted	of	a	 timeline	 for	each	 topic,	describing	what	would	
have	been	achieved	by	each	decade	and	indicating	what	such	achievements	would	be	depending	on.			
In	the	last	session,	participants	were	asked	to	consider	and	discuss	the	possible	implications	of	the	
results	 of	 the	 previous	 sessions	 for	 the	 current	 structure	 of	NE’s	 Communities	 of	 Practice	 (“CoP”)	
and	Communities	of	Delivery	(“CoD”).	
The	raw	outcome	from	this	workshop	was	processed	by	the	Futures	team	during	a	day-long	group	







concerning	 some	 of	 the	 points	 had	 not	 been	 sufficiently	 developed.	 	 For	 practical	 and	 logistic	




participants	 to	 include	 representatives	 of	 partners	 as	 well	 as	 stakeholders	 and	 experts.	 	 The	
objectives	of	the	workshop	were	to	offer	comments	and	further	input	regarding	the	future	described	
in	Pathways	to	2060,	to	refine	and	validate	the	results	from	the	previous	workshop,	and	to	advance	
further	 in	 the	 roadmapping	 process	 by	 identifying	 the	 key	 dependencies	 and	 some	 of	 the	 main	
initiatives	and	actions	that	could	support	them.		
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In	order	 to	 identify	 invitees,	 the	heads	of	NE’s	CoPs	were	asked	 to	provide	 the	names	of	 “experts	
that	 could	 contribute	with	 relevant	 expertise	 and	 insight”38,	while	 other	members	of	 the	 Strategic	
and	Environmental	Futures	team	forwarded	the	details	of	individuals	from	academia	and	from	other	
organisations	 in	 the	public	 sector	who	 they	 thought	could	be	 interested	as	 they	had	already	been	
involved	in	similar	or	related	projects,	or	who	had	already	expressed	the	desire	to	be	involved.	The	
team	 saw	 it	 as	 an	 opportunity	 to	 start	 engagement	with	 some	 of	 the	 stakeholders39	and	 to	 build	
consensus	 to	 pave	 the	way	 for	 the	 presentation	 of	 the	Vision	 to	 the	wider	 public.	 	 There	was	 no	
mention	of	using	the	workshop	to	engage	and	win	over	potential	opponents.	
Members	 of	 the	 Futures	 team	 and	 of	 the	 larger	 Strategy	 and	 Futures	 team	 acted	 as	 facilitators;	






groups	on	 individual	Topics,	with	 two	Topics	assigned	 to	each	group.	 	 For	each	Topic,	participants	
were	asked	to	discuss	and	comment	on	its	2060	end	statement,	to	ensure	that	its	different	aspects	
and	 dimensions	were	 covered	 (even	while	 avoiding	 going	 into	 excessive	 detail),	 and	 any	 possible	
tensions	 and	 issues	 were	 highlighted.	 	 This	 would	 have	 fed	 back	 into	 the	 next	 version	 of	 the	
Pathways	document,	scheduled	for	late	summer	2010.	
After	 looking	at	 the	 intermediate	steps	and	achievements	and	at	 the	conditions	and	requirements	
previously	identified	for	that	topic,	groups	were	asked	to	suggest	any	missing	steps	or	conditions,	as	
well	 as	 providing	 comments	 and	 pointing	 to	 potential	 obstacles	 and	 issues.	 	 Each	 group	 then	
presented	their	results	to	the	rest	of	the	participants	for	their	questions	and	further	comments.	
The	 second	 part	 of	 the	 workshop	 focussed	 on	 the	 conditions	 (defined	 “Conditionalities”)	 and	
requirements.		A	vote	on	which	Conditionalities,	or	subset	of	Conditionalities,	participants	felt	were	


















options	 for	 a	 “forum	 for	 the	 Vision	 to	work	 across	 the	 DEFRA	 family	 -	 once	 position	 clearer	 after	
election”40.	
Over	the	months	of	May	and	June	2010,	the	team	had	several	meetings	to	review	outputs	from	the	







‘Webinars’	 were	 also	 organised	 for	 those	 employees	 of	 NE	 who	 had	 missed	 the	 workshops	 –	
although	eventually	the	interest	and	the	uptake	was	not	as	high	as	the	Futures	team	had	hoped.	
Additionally,	 the	 Researcher	 took	 part	 in	 multiple	 meetings	 with	 the	 broader	 Strategy	 and	
Environmental	 Futures	 team	 and	 with	 NE’s	 Environmental	 Advice	 and	 Analysis	 Team	 aimed	 at	
presenting	 the	work	 completed	 up	 to	 that	 point	 and	 how	 it	 contributed	 to	 the	 identification	 and	













In	 addition	 to	 the	work	 on	 roadmapping,	 the	 Futures	 team	was	 involved	 in	 two	other	 streams	 of	
work	 stemming	 from	 the	 original	 scenarios,	 aimed	 at	 improving	 understanding	 and	 supporting	
strategy:	causal	maps	and	intermediate	scenarios.				
For	 each	 of	 the	 four	 Scenarios	 to	 2060	 originally	 developed,	 the	 team	 produced	 a	 visual	
representation	 –	 a	 causal	 map	 –	 of	 the	 connections,	 mutual	 influences,	 interdependencies,	 and	
circular	 causality	 existing	 between	 the	 different	 variables	 involved,	 using	 a	 System	 Dynamics-
inspired	approach.	 	 	The	team	sought	to	make	more	explicit	the	progress	and	evolution	that	could	




Building	 on	 the	 understanding	 gained	 from	 the	 causal	 maps,	 the	 team	 also	 produced	 four	
intermediate	scenarios	–	Scenarios	to	2030	–	that	proposed,	for	each	of	the	long	term	scenarios,	a	
view	of	what	 the	 future	could	be	midway	along	 the	path	 to	 that	end	 state,	as	well	 as	providing	a	
storyline	 towards	 that	 end	 state	 over	 the	 next	 20	 years.	 	 The	 objective	 was	 to	 achieve	 a	 better	




By	 September	 the	 roadmapping	 work	 was	 increasingly	 “aimed	 at	 informing	 the	 decisions	 and	
programmes	we	need	for	the	next	decade	as	part	of	our	Strategic	Direction”41,	therefore	something	
targeting	 an	 internal	 audience	 and	 their	 needs	 rather	 than	 aimed	 at	 external	 users.	 The	 team’s	
ultimate	 goal,	 however,	 was	 for	 their	 overall	 work,	 both	 completed	 and	 underway	 –	 including	















The	 objective	 of	 the	 first	 half	 of	 the	 workshops	 was	 to	 refine,	 integrate	 and	 validate	 the	 tables	
describing	 the	 intermediate	 achievements	 and	 the	 requirements	 for	 the	 delivery	 of	 the	 preferred	
future.		The	second	half	was	expected	to	focus	on	further	developing	the	list	of	initiatives,	schemes,	
and	programmes	produced	during	the	March	31st	workshop,	and	on	selecting	those	that	would	be	





June,	 had	 been	 to	 include	 stakeholder	 and	 partners	 in	 the	 list	 of	 15-20	 participants	 required	 to	
ensure	robust	process	and	outcomes	of	the	workshops,	in	order	to	engage	and	involve	them	in	the	















Following	 the	 two	 September	 workshops,	 members	 of	 the	 Futures	 team	 had	 several	 email	














Over	 the	months	of	August	 to	 January	2011	 the	Researcher	 spent	 time	attempting	 to	 include	 the	
required	 input	 and	 feedback	 from	 NE	 Communities	 that	 had	 been	 notably	 absent	 from	 the	
workshops,	 and	 whose	 contribution	 was	 considered	 highly	 important,	 such	 as	 the	 Marine	
Community	of	Expertise.	This	effort	included	several	calls	and	videoconferences,	so	that	the	Marine	
expert	 could	 “download	 his	 thoughts”43,	 and	 a	 number	 of	 face-to-face	meetings	with	 the	Marine	




the	 Scenarios	 to	 2030,	 windtunnelling,	 and	 the	 development	 of	 a	 framework	 to	 support	 NE’s	
Strategic	Direction.		Such	framework	would	look	at	the	various	challenges	and	issues	emerging	from	











In	 this	 case’s	 specific	 circumstances,	 the	 Researcher’s	 collaboration	 with	 NE,	 first	 during	 the	
studentship	 and	 later	 on	 a	 volunteer	 basis,	 significantly	 wound	 down	 after	 the	 end	 of	 December	
2010,	due	to	increasingly	limited	access	to	politically	sensitive	and	thus	confidential	documents	and	
information,	and	essentially	concluded	as	 the	Researcher’s	parental	 leave	began.	 	As	a	 result	both	
activities	and	direct	access	to	data	came	to	an	end	by	February	2011.	
4.12 What	Happened	Next	(to	NE)	
Following	 the	elections	 in	May	2010	 the	visioning	work	had	slowed	down	significantly,	and	by	 the	
first	months	of	2011	it	essentially	ground	to	a	halt.	NE	therefore	shifted	its	aims	from	expressing	a	
vision	towards	helping	and	supporting	the	sector	to	achieve	the	goals	expressed	by	the	government.		
This	 was	 pursued	 along	 two	 separate	 routes:	 both	 continuing	 the	 roadmapping	 work,	 moving	





efforts	 in	 this	 regard,	 the	 Specialist	 had	 succeeded	 in	 being	 included	 in	 the	DEFRA	 team	 that	 had	
been	 tasked	with	 the	 development	 of	 the	NEWP,	 and	 that	 had	 begun	discussions	 as	 early	 as	 July	
2010.	 The	NEWP	was	published	 in	May	2011,	 and	 in	 addition	 to	 a	 longer-term	 vision	 to	 2060,	 92	
shorter-term	commitments	were	identified	to	support	the	goals	and	objectives	stated	in	the	NEWP	
itself.	 	 Eight	 implementation	 updates	 have	 been	 subsequently	 published,	 the	 latest	 in	 October	
201444,	reporting	on	the	achievements	in	the	shorter-term	commitments.	
By	2012	the	Specialist	had	reached	out	to	a	group	of	NDPBs	(such	as	the	Environment	Agency	and	
the	 Forestry	 Commission)	 and	 started	 a	 discussion	 on	 the	 implication	 of	 the	 NEWP	 for	 their	
respective	 organizations,	 and	 came	 to	 the	 conclusion	 that	 their	 respective	 boards	 needed	 to	
understand	the	implications	of	the	NEWP	for	their	role	and	strategy.		
Within	NE,	the	Specialist	and	his	team	used	the	materials	produced	from	foresight	activities	such	as	
scanning	of	 futures,	 roadmapping,	analysis	of	 the	NEWP,	etc.	 to	produce	a	document	called	“NE’s	
Strategic	Context”	which	was	given	to	the	executive	board.		In	the	document,	the	outcome	from	the	
foresight	 activities	 was	 used	 to	 identify	 opportunities	 and	 threats	 stemming	 from	 the	 policy	
expressed	in	the	NEWP,	which	were	then	compared	to	NE’s	strengths	and	weaknesses	in	a	two-by-













the	 longer-term	vision	–	 “i.e.,	 your	 roadmap”	–	as	he	 felt	 that	 the	development	of	 the	NEWP	had	
focused	on	the	policies	but	still	had	to	provide	guidance	with	regards	to	their	implementation.	
In	2015,	the	Researcher	approached	the	Specialist	and	other	team	members	from	the	Strategic	and	
Futures	team	in	order	to	ascertain	their	availability	 for	being	 interviewed	by	the	Researcher	 in	the	
context	of	the	case.		While	some	of	the	people	in	the	Futures	team	had	since	changed	job	or	retired,	
and	thus	were	not	accessible,	the	Researcher	was	able	to	secure	interviews	with	four	team	members	




As	 is	 typical	 in	 Participatory	Observation	 cases,	 during	 the	 Case	 the	 Researcher	 had	 to	 cover	 two	
roles	at	the	same	time.		On	one	hand,	the	Researcher’s	objectives	meant	that	the	Researcher	was	an	
observer	of	the	activities,	individuals’	 interactions,	and	events	that	took	place	in	the	context	of	the	
case.	 	On	 the	 other	 hand,	 the	 conditions	 and	 rationale	 that	 allowed	 the	Researcher	 to	 undertake	
such	observation	was	that	the	Researcher	herself	would	take	part	and	be	directly	 involved	 in	such	
activities,	interactions,	and	events.	




and	operations,	such	as	 the	choice	of	 invitees,	 the	relationship	with	 teams	and	organisations	both	
internal	and	external,	the	assignation	of	roles,	any	follow-up	activities,	and	so	on.			
The	above	set-up	ensured	that	the	Researcher	carefully	minimised	any	influence	or	interference	on	
the	 way	 activities,	 interactions	 and	 events	 were	 carried	 out	 and	 took	 place,	 and	 the	 Researcher	
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believes	 it	 enabled	 the	 observation	 of	 situations	 and	 behaviours	without	 leading	 others	 or	 in	 any	
way	affecting	their	developments	and	choices.		This	supports	the	assumption	that	such	observations	
can	be	considered	 representative	of	participatory	 foresight	activities	 in	 the	public	 sector,	and	 that	
the	analysis	and	conclusions	can	be	extended	beyond	the	single	Case	considered.	
4.14.2 The	Case	in	Numbers	
Below	 is	 a	 summary	 quantifying	 the	 Researcher’s	 data	 collection	 activities	 during	 the	 participant-
observation	stage	of	data	gathering:	









telephone	calls,	and	 through	 the	perusal	of	 internal	documents	 that	 the	Researcher	had	access	 to	














described	 in	 3.3.	 	 Findings	 have	 been	 organised	 in	 fifteen	 elements	 of	 practice	 (see	 3.3.4),	 each	















As	 described	 in	 2.3.5	 above,	 key	 to	 participatory	 Foresight	 methodologies	 is	 the	 sharing	 of	
information	and	ideas	by	participants	during	collective	sessions.		In	the	absence	of	clear	and	credible	
reassurance	 that	 what	 they	 say	 can	 not	 and	 will	 not	 be	 traced	 back	 to	 them,	 it	 is	 argued	 that	
participants	 are	 more	 likely	 to	 self-censor	 what	 they	 say	 and	 what	 information	 they	 share	 with	






























Two	 of	 the	 interviewees	 pointed	 out	 the	 importance	 of	 ensuring	 that	 participants	 understand	
correctly	what	the	adoption	of	CHR	imply,	as	they	were	concerned	that	it	is	often	misinterpreted	to	
mean	“what	is	said	in	this	room	stays	in	this	room“.	












should	be	–	 in	other	words,	 [people	 think]	you	can	say	whatever	you	 like	and	 it	 stays	within	 these	
four	walls.”		




NGOs	 is	 thinking	 that,	 everybody	 from	 the	 delivering	 bodies	 is	 thinking	 that’,	 so	 you	 are	 not	




and	credible	 reassurance	 that	 the	 information	and	opinions	 shared	 in	 the	context	of	public	 sector	
participatory	FA	will	remain	anonymous,	and	thus	that	source(s)	will	not	and	can	not	be	identified,	
participants	are	less	likely	to	offer	information	and	views	that	are	unfiltered	and	that	have	not	been	




The	 participatory	 nature	 of	 most	 FA	 relies	 on	 skilled	 facilitators	 to	 encourage	 and	 support	
participants’	 involvement	and	contribution.		Facilitators	are	also	normally	responsible	for	recording	
the	information	and	gathering	the	output	produced	during	a	FA	workshop	by	various	groups	and	in	
different	activities.	 	Effective	 facilitators	should	be	 familiar	with	useful	group	work	 techniques	and	
tools.	
The	 number	 of	 facilitators	 and	 the	 category	 of	 skills	 required	 customarily	 depend	 on	 the	 type	 of	
activity	carried	out	at	each	step	of	the	FA’s	process.	
At	the	same	time,	the	majority	of	organisations	leading/sponsoring	any	FAs	must	operate	within	the	
constraints	 of	 their	 budget	 and	 of	 their	 resources.	 	 The	 daily	 rate	 of	 an	 external,	 professional	
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and	 more	 flexible	 cost.	 	 Furthermore,	 in	 particular	 for	 organisations	 without	 a	 strong	 foresight	
culture	 or	 previous	 experience	 in	 FA,	 this	 cost	 can	 be	more	 difficult	 to	 justify.	 	 This	may	 result	 in	








“I	 think	 this	 is	 really	 important.	 	Otherwise	you	 lose	all	 the	benefits	of	CHR.	 […]	 “If	 you	don’t	have	
enough	[facilitators],	if	you	don’t	do	this	properly	it’s	not	just	that	you	are	missing	information,	you	
are	 running	 the	 risk	 of	 the	 whole	 thing	 just	 not	 be	 worth	 doing,	 a	 bit	 like	 a	 science	 experiment	
without	having	good	measurements.”			
- The	March	workshops	had	only	 a	 limited	number	of	people	 involved	 in	 the	 facilitation	and	a	
large	physical	space	in	which	the	FA	took	place.	
- Three	 times	during	 the	 first	workshop	and	 twice	during	 the	second	workshop	 the	Researcher	
overheard	 participants	 who	 appeared	 unable	 to	 move	 forward	 in	 their	 activity,	 and	 with	
questions/comments	 that	 needed	 addressing;	 however	 all	 the	 available	 facilitators	 were	
engaged	in	other	activities	or	with	other	participants,	and	those	participants	eventually	moved	
on	abandoning	the	point/issue	without	completing	the	tasks.	
- Twice	 during	 the	 second	 workshop	 the	 Researcher	 could	 see	 comments	 being	made	 at	 one	
table	that	were	not	being	picked	up	or	recorded.	
- At	 last	once	 in	each	workshop	the	researcher	noted	a	table	discussion	being	 limited	to	only	a	
few	of	the	participants	sitting	at	that	table,	while	the	others	were	not	involved.	









	“Yes,	absolutely.	 	 I	 think	this	 is	 really	 important,	as	 is	 [the	 fact]	 that	then	 it	 is	easier	 to	ensure	the	
rules	are	followed,	like	this	CHR	thing.”			
Interviewees	also	stressed	the	importance	of	facilitators	in	enabling	all	participants	to	contribute	to	
the	 discussion	 –	 both	 for	 the	 quality	 of	 the	 output	 and	 for	 the	 reputation	 of	 the	 project,	 and	
potentially	for	relationships	with	various	parties.	






“The	other	key	thing	 is	 this	 thing	of	ensuring	all	voices	are	heard,	and	that	again	 is	 in	some	of	 the	
work	that	Angela	Wilkinson	has	done	about	the	epistemological	value	of	future	thinking,	and	if	you	
don’t	have	a	sufficient	 range	of	epistemologies	 in	 the	room	then	you	end	up	with	a	very	dominant	
framework;	 so	you	ensure	all	 voices	are	heard	and	you	have	a	broad	enough	range	of	output	 that	
relate	to	a	range	of	different	perspectives	and	you	avoid	that	group	thinking.”		




































Facilitators,	 as	 described	 in	 the	 previous	 point,	 are	 in	 a	 position	 to	 influence	 the	 discussion,	 the	
conclusions,	 and	 often	 what	 information	 is	 actually	 recorded	 and	 how.	 	 FA,	 particularly	 those	
involving	 different	 stakeholders	 with	 conflicting	 interests,	 should	 be	 led	 and	 facilitated	 ideally	 by	















“And	 the	worse	 type	 of	 facilitators	 I	 have	 seen	 are	 people	who	 just	 dominate	 the	 discussion,	 you	
know,	stay	 in	 front	of	a	 flipchart	–	 I	have	been	guilty	of	that	as	well!	–	and	 lead	so	much	they	 just	
take	 it	down	the	path	 they	want	 it	 to	go.	 	And	 that’s	 the	dangerous	 facilitation,	 that	actually	gets	









“Well,	of	course	we	ended	up	discussing	that	 idea,	 it	 is	one	of	his	 [the	 facilitator	at	 the	table]	
main	projects	and	he’s	keen	on	it”.	
- Two	participants	at	the	table	facilitated	by	the	Researcher	asked	the	Researcher	outright	who	








“The	 [issue	 of]	 breach	of	 trust	 is	 absolutely	 key…	 […]	 and	 the	 fact	 that	 the	 process	may	 fall	 apart	









they	will	 not	 have	 an	 agenda.	 	But	 also	 they	 have	 no	way	 of	 understanding	 and	 helping	 evaluate	












“Yes,	 and	with…I	mean,	 having	 sufficient	 knowledge	 of	what	 it	 is	 you	 are	 doing,	 to	 know	what	 is	





The	 researcher’s	 observations	 and	 the	 interviews	 both	 suggest	 that	 the	 facilitators’	 impartiality	 –	
perceived	 as	 well	 as	 actual	 –	 strongly	 affect	 the	 quality	 of	 the	 discussions	 and	 of	 the	 outputs	
generated	by	the	FA,	as	well	as	its	likelihood	to	be	accepted	and	backed.		
	The	 perception	 of	 a	 facilitator’s	 impartiality	 appears	 to	 significantly	 influence	 participants’	
willingness	 to	 open	 up	 and	 both	 share	 and	 accept	 information,	 and	 their	 attitude	 towards	 the	
outcome.		It	also	seems	to	affects	the	participants’	impression	of	the	fairness	and	trustworthiness	of	
the	proceedings	and	thus	their	attitude	towards	the	outcomes.		







during	participatory	FA	 it	 is	useful	 to	separate	participants	 into	smaller	groups.	Each	group	then	 is	


























may	 be	 the	 25	 year	 plan.	 	 And	 they	 did	 that	 in	 a	 consistent	 way,	 facilitated	 –	 I	 was	 one	 of	 the	
facilitators	–	in	the	same	way.		So	when	they	wanted	to	bring	the	key	points	back	in,	and	crunch	them	





range	 of	 audiences,	 of	 people,	 of	 organisations,	 it	 is	 better	 to	 use	 a	 consistent	 approach	 there.	
Because	it	makes	combining	outputs	so	much	more	easy.”			
	












that	 all	 government	 departments	 and	 all	 civil	 servants	 can	 interact	 with,	 that	 I	 think	 would	 be	
better.”			




Data	 from	 both	 Phases	 suggest	 that	 consistency	 in	 the	 approach	 and	 formats	 adopted	 for	 the	
various	activities	and	exercises	carried	out	during	the	FA,	as	well	as	for	reporting	the	outcome	of	said	










Silos	 mentality	 appears	 still	 prevalent,	 not	 only	 between	 organisations,	 but	 also	 between	
departments	within	the	same	organisation,	limiting	the	amount	of	information	shared	in	the	course	
of	day-to-day	interactions.					
Furthermore,	 for	outsiders	an	organisation’s	 full	attendance	 inevitably	reflects	the	 importance	and	
commitment	that	the	organisation	itself	assigns	to	the	FA,	and	thus	its	willingness	to	support	it.	
Nonetheless,	 the	 overall	 majority	 of	 the	 interviewees	 report	 securing	 internal	 attendance	 to	
participatory	 FA	 as	 challenging.	 	 One	 of	 the	 main	 problems	 appear	 to	 be	 that,	 even	 in	 those	
organisations	within	the	public	sector	that	may	have	a	“mindset	for	future	thinking”,	as	defined	by	














“I	 think	 it	 is	 quite	 important,	 as	 long	 as	 you	 have	 the	 right	 people	 in	 the	 room.	 	 If	 you	 know,	 the	
people	who	 are	 coming	 to	 that	meeting,	 or	 workshop,	 or	 whatever	 you	want	 to	 say,	 are	 actively	
contributing,	 and	 the	 range	 of	 people	 you’ve	 got	 from	 NE	 or	 DEFRA	 or	 whoever,	 provide	 a	 good	
range	of	backgrounds	on	whatever	you	want	to	talk	about	to	come	into	this.”			
“And	 the	 disadvantage	 of	 that	 [missing	 key	 departments]	 is	 that	 they	 are	 not	 part	 of	 the	












several	 points	 had	 a	 “subject	 to”	 related	 to	 the	 agreement/feasibility	 assessment/implication	
analysis	from	those	divisions,	partially	undermining	the	solidity	of	the	outcome.	














absence	 of	 suitable	 incentive	 mechanisms,	 and	 the	 relatively	 high	 cost	 in	 resources	 required	 to	
ensure	that	all	relevant	input	and	views	are	gathered	and	included	(see	also	5.7).	
Full	 attendance47	can	 also,	 according	 to	 the	 data	 from	 interviews,	 be	 used	 to	 reinforce	 in	 other	




Despite	 the	best	efforts,	 it	may	be	difficult	 to	ensure	that	all	 those	who	should	participate	and	be	
engaged	in	a	FA,	can	actually	attend.			
When	the	contribution	of	certain	departments	or	individuals	is	critical,	it	may	be	necessary	to	solicit	
their	 input	outside	of	 the	 FA.	 	 Such	 solicitations,	when	 they	do	 take	place,	 are	mostly	 carried	out	
after	the	FA,	generally	through	meetings	or	e-mails	where	the	outcomes	from	the	FA	are	presented	
and	comments	are	solicited.			










There	 is	 a	 general	 agreement	 from	 interviewees	 on	 the	 benefits	 and	 desirability	 of	 ex-ante	
engagement	and	input	gathering	from	key	invitees	who	are	unable	to	attend	the	main	FA,	although	
they	also	point	out	the	potential	difficulties:		








sense.	 	 It	 does	 presuppose	 though	 that	 you	 CAN	 actually	 have	 those…	 ‘pre-medial’	 discussions,	
doesn’t	it.”		












- 	Getting	 the	 views	 and	 inputs	 from	 those	 departments	 who	 had	 not	 participated	 in	 the	
workshop	afterwards	was	extremely	time	consuming.	










an	 intermediate	 stage	 while	 input	 is	 still	 being	 gathered	 and	 included	 in	 discussions,	 would	
significantly	 improve	 the	 information	 exchange	 and	 thus	 strengthen	 the	 quality	 of	 the	 FA	 and	 its	
outputs.	
Carrying	 this	 activity	 ex-ante	 appears	 to	 generate	 better	 pay-offs	 compared	 to	 ex-post,	 as	 in	 the	
latter	case	absent	invitees	can	only	be	asked	to	agree	or	disagree	with	the	outcome	presented,	and	




Amongst	 the	preliminary	 activities	 ahead	of	 a	 participatory	 FA	workshop	 is	 the	drafting	of	 invitee	
lists	and	the	subsequent	issuing	–	and	follow-up	–	of	invites.		Several	texts	and	manuals	mention	the	
importance	of	ensuring	an	appropriate	range	of	backgrounds,	areas	of	expertise	and	views	to	ensure	
a	 rich	 enough	 discussion.	 	 The	 credibility	 of	 the	 outcomes	 from	 such	 activities	 depends	 also	 on	
whether	a	sufficient	number	of	participants	was	involved.	
In	 addition	 to	 the	 quality	 of	 the	 discussion,	 in	 a	 highly-politicised	 context	 the	 provenance	 and	




- When	deciding	whom	to	 invite	 to	 the	second	March	workshop,	 the	main	 focus	and	emphasis	
was	expertise.		Having	asked	NE’s	heads	of	Communities	to	suggest	experts	and	practitioners	to	
invite,	 the	resulting	 invitee	 list	was	mostly	populated	by	 ‘friendly’	academics	and	experts	 that	
effectively	had	concerns	and	objectives	very	similar	to	those	of	NE.				
- When	the	team	experienced	some	difficulties	in	securing	sufficient	numbers	of	participants,	and	
was	experiencing	 time	pressure,	 efforts	were	 focused	on	 inviting	 individuals	 that	had	already	
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expressed	 an	 interest	 in	 NE’s	 foresight	 activities	 and/or	 that	 the	 team	 thought	 could	 be	
interested,	 thus	 again	 targeting	 organisations	 and	 individuals	 that	 were	 already	 positively	
disposed	towards	NE	and	their	activities.	
- During	 the	discussions	at	both	 the	March	31	and	September	workshops,	on	several	occasions	








in	 the	 Vital	 Uplands	 document,	 NE	 said:	 “Our	 [Uplands]	 vision	 has	 never	 been	 accepted	 by	
everyone	that	we	need	to	work	with	to	make	 it	happen.	 	We	have	decided	we	should	signal	a	
clear	move	away	 from	a	document	which	has	been	 interpreted	by	some	as	a	Natural	England	








understanding	 of	 other	 interests	 that	 will	 be	 affected	 by,	 and	 those	 interests	 do	 feel	 that	 we	
understand	their	perspectives	on	this.”				
“You	 really	 need	 a	 cross	 section,	 and	 this	 [only	 inviting	 friends/allies/people	 aligned,	 avoiding	 the	
troublemakers]	is	done	so	often	isn’t	it,	so	you	may	suggest	to	invite	all	the	environmental	NGOs	and	





“Yes,	 outside	 of	 the	 usual	 suspects…	 	Well	 it	 is	 all	 part	 of	 the	 same	 thing	 that	 you	 can’t	 solve	 a	
problem	in	the	framework	it	was	created.		So	yeah,	it	is	how	you	break	out	of	it	isn’t	it.”			




get	much	 saying	over	 that	as	 you	 say,	 somebody	else	decides	who’s	 coming	along,	and	 there	 isn’t	
much	 that	 you	 can	 say	 about	 that,	 you	 can	maybe	 suggest	 people,	 suggest	 that	 you	 want	 some	
external	 people	 and	 that	 you	 will	 find	 them	 and	 bring	 them	 along.	 […]	 Otherwise	 you	 get	 group	
thinking,	and	you	can	use	different	methods	and	techniques,	you	can	expand	the	thinking	a	bit	but	if	
you	have	effectively	a	closed	shop,	it	is	difficult	to	do.”			
“See,	 it	 is	 the	 issue	 of	 representativeness,	 which	 starts	 to	 become	 really,	 really	 important	 in	 that	









“And	 to	be	honest	 the	Upland	Futures	 report	 showed	all	 of	 that	 in	 spades	 […]	 it	 got	 shot	down	 in	
flames	by	 the	NFU,	partly	 strategically	 and	politically	 in	my	 view,	but	partly	 because	actually	 they	
weren’t	 nailed	 into	 what	 was	 the	 output	 of	 each	 of	 the	 workshops	 as	 they	 went	 along,	 because	
actually	 far	 too	 junior	 people	 were	 involved.	 And	 they	 weren’t	 engaged	 early	 enough	 in	 the,	 you	
know,	“you’ve	got	a	clear	interest	in	this,	you	are	a	clear	party,	and	therefore	we’d	like	you	to	help	us	








that	 DEFRA	 produced	 back	 in	 2011,	 you	 know,	 they	 didn’t	 have	 enough	 conversations	 with	 the	





policy-supporting	 participatory	 FA	 –	 even	 unwittingly	 –	 only	 to	 neutral	 and	 sympathetic/aligned	
individuals	and	organisations	appears	to	reduce	significantly	the	scope	and	depth	of	the	discussions,	
and	can	 lead	to	group-thinking.	 	As	a	result,	 it	can	critically	affect	the	quality	and	credibility	of	the	




Engagement	 and	 participation	 in	 a	 FA	 involves	 costs	 –	 financial	 as	 well	 as	 in	 man-hours	 –	 that	



















- Team	 members	 often	 complained	 of	 the	 limited	 engagement	 and	 interest	 from	 heads	 of	
Communities	of	Practice,	and	of	the	lukewarm	backing	of	the	project	from	leadership49.	
- On	several	occasions,	members	of	the	team	expressed	their	feeling	that	top	management	was	








management,	and	saw	 it	as	a	condition	for	ensuring	that	 individuals	 from	the	 leading	organisation	
would	actually	attend	and	contribute	to	the	FA.	
They	 also	 indicated	 that	 the	 their	 attendance	 to	 all	 or	 at	 least	 key	 parts	 of	 the	 FA	 would	 both	















times	 I	 have	 seen	 things	 bought	 and	 run	 with,	 by,	 you	 know,	 a	 chief	 exec	 or	 a	 director	 in	 an	
organisation,	because	 they	are	actually	 there	 in	 the	discussion.	 	 […]	 	And	yes,	having	 their	 support	
beforehand,	their	endorsement,	their	support	through	it,	yeah	absolutely.	“		
“I	have	seen	examples	of	chief	exec	being	 in	discussions,	where	…	so,	green	 infrastructure	work,	 in	
NE,	struggling	really	hard	to	get	the	buy-in	on	that,	you	know	the	chief	exec	was	there,	presentation,	
little	workshop	around	it,	and	suddenly	 it	kicked	on.	 	So	 it	 is	really	 important,	 it	 is	really	 important.		
Because	then	they	are	part	of	it.”	
“So	you	normally	work	within	the	policy	and	all	the	rest	of	it	but	this	is	thinking	differently	and	as	you	

























important	messages	both	 internally	 to	 their	 own	organisation,	 in	 terms	of	 their	 ‘approval’	 of,	 and	
interest	in,	the	FA,	and	externally	to	other	organisations,	in	terms	of	their	belief	in	its	activities	and	
willingness	 to	 stand	behind	 it.	 	 	 The	evidence	 from	the	case	appears	 to	 confirm	 the	view	 that	 the	
‘internal’	message	helps	ensure	that	internal	participants	(and	those	being	asked	to	contribute)	see	
such	activities	as	allowed	and	encouraged	as	well	 as	actually	 valued,	while	 the	 ‘external’	message	
reinforces	the	credibility	and	weight	of	the	FA’s	outcomes	amongst	external	organisations	-	as	one	of	































	“Absolutely,	 but	 you	 also	 have	 to	 be	 a	 little	 bit	 careful	 that	 you	 don’t	 stray	 into	 the	 territory	 of	
lobbying	 […]	 	 It	 is	 just	 something	 to	 be	 aware	 of	 and	 if	 you	 are	 in	 the	 private	 sector,	 it	 is	 not	 a	
question	at	all,	but	when	you	are	in	the	civil	service,	yeah…”			
“No	I	think	that’s	absolutely	right,	information	and	involvement	of	leaders	in	other	departments	and	



























In	addition,	government	 changes	–	particularly	when	 they	 see	a	 change	 in	 the	 ruling	party	and/or	
majority	 -	are	often	followed	by	changes	 in	policy	directions,	especially	concerning	highly	sensitive	
issues	and	topics	where	the	different	parties’	positions	are	strongly	polarised.		
Finally,	organisations	and	parties	 involved	 in	the	 implementation	of	any	proposed	action	are	more	
likely	to	feel	committed	to	solutions	they	have	been	consulted	about	and	involved	in	developing.	
5.11.2 Direct	Observations	from	Case	
- The	 Researcher	 observed	 at	 several	 points	 that	 the	 discussions	 and	 ideas	 put	 forth	 were	
becoming	 quite	 idealistic	 and	 utopian	 and	 were	 not	 fully	 considering	 the	 opposition	 and	
resistance	 that	 certain	 options/proposals	were	 likely	 to	 encounter	 from	 some	 parties	 and/or	
constituencies].	
- During	 the	 second	workshop,	 one	 of	 the	 participants	 said	 “I	 really	wish	 [an	MP	 he	 had	 been	
discussing	with]	was	here,	he	should	really	listen	to	this,	it	would	make	it	so	much	easier!”	
- Several	 times,	 particularly	 during	 the	 activities	 surrounding	 the	 third	 set	 of	workshops	which	
increasingly	 focused	 on	 implementation	 and	 planning,	 it	 was	 mentioned	 and	 agreed	 by	
members	 of	 the	 Scenario	 team	 that	 “we	 really	 need	 to	 get	 these	 people	 [DEFRA	 and	 others	
involved	 in	 policymaking	 and	 implementation]	 around	 the	 [workshop]	 table	 if	 we	 want	 it	 to	
really	happen”,	although	only	at	a	very	late	stage	in	the	project	a	small	number	of	participants	
from	 DEFRA	 attended	 some	 parts	 of	 the	 last	 workshop,	 and	 at	 no	 stage	 were	 any	 MPs/	
politicians	involved.	
5.11.3 	Feedback	and	Quotes	from	Interviewees	
This	 point	 was	 relatively	 contentious,	 and	 opinions	were	 divided.	 	 Some	 of	 the	 interviewees	 saw	
advantages,	although	they	were	quick	to	point	out	the	practical	difficulties.	














is	a	 little	bit	more	…	well	 I	 should	not	use	this	word,	but	a	 little	more	 forward-thinking,	a	bit	more	
strategic	 in	the	way	they	think…	but	then	again	you	may	be	accused	of	cherry-picking…	but	 I	 think	
you	have	to	have	departments	around,	because	what	is	the	point	in	doing	futures	if	you	are	not	going	
to	 try	 to	 influence	 the	 government	 at	 the	 time	 of	 the	 importance	 of	 them?	 Surely	 climate	 change	
would	 have	 never	 have	 [been	 considered]	 if	 they	 didn’t	 have	 some	 departmental	 people	 in	 those	
early	conversations	way	back?	I	don’t	know,	it	would	seem	to	be	very	important	to	me.	The	trouble	is	
getting,	you	know,	which	departments,	which	parts	of	government	do	you	want	in	a	room,	because	



















going	 to	 have	 the	 political	 one	 or	 the	 apolitical	 one?	 And	 if	 it	 get	 to	 the	 political	 one,	 it	 is	 very	
uncomfortable	and	difficult	for	civil	servants	to	participate,	so	I	would	probably	do	them	separately”	
“I	have	seen	events	where	that	happens,	and	it	completely	changes	the	dynamics,	so	you’d	have	to	












“Understanding	 the	 context	 and	 how	 the	 issue	 is	 evolving	 and	when	 the	 right	 time	 to	 involve	 the	










Phase	 2	 data	 support	 the	 view	 that	 FA	 which	 include	 participants	 from	 key	 departments	 and	
executive	bodies	are	more	effective	in	informing	and	influencing	the	policymaking	discussion,	as	said	
participants	 are	 likely	 to	 be	 involved	 in	 such	 discussions	 and	 can	 bring	 the	 information	 they	 have	
gained.		
Data	 also	 suggest	 involving	 representatives	 of	 the	 executive	 bodies	 and	 departments	 ultimately	








As	 individuals’	 participation	 in	 foresight	 activities	 is	 typically	 in	 addition	 to	 their	 everyday	 job	 and	
responsibilities,	 the	 time	 they	 have	 available	 for	 the	 actual	 exercise	 as	well	 as	 for	 any	 connected	









solicit	 information	 from	participants,	which	can	then	be	used	as	 input	 for	some	of	 the	activities	 in	
the	FA	itself.	
5.12.2 Direct	Observations	from	Case	





- One	 of	 the	 facilitators	 later	 said	 that	 “a	 couple	 of	 people	 who	 were	 at	 Reading	 on	 the	 5th	
commented	 that	 they	 found	 it	 hard	 to	 come	 up	 to	 speed	with	what	we	were	 presenting	 and	
what	we	wanted	from	them”	and	that	maybe	we	were	“pushing	them	too	hard	or	too	quickly.”50	
- 	Some	 participants	 tried	 to	 'force'	 some	 specific	 view/point	 during	 the	 activities;	 the	
Researcher’s	 impression	 was	 that	 they	 were	 doing	 so	 as	 they	 were	 concerned	 that	 such	
info/input	would	not	be	considered	otherwise.	
5.12.3 Feedback	and	Quotes	from	Interviewees	
All	 interviewees	 agreed	 on	 the	 usefulness	 and	 importance	 of	 preliminary	 communication	 and	
engagement	with	participants.	
“Top	importance.”		
“It	 can	 help,	 certainly	 to	 explain	 what	 the	 event	 is	 going	 to	 be	 and	what’s	 behind	 it,	 to	 reassure	
people,	and	yes	 if	 you	have	got	 some	supporting	 information	 that	would	help	get	 them	ready	and	




civil	 service	 standard	 review-type	 discussion,	meeting,	 is	 something	 different,	 so	 that	 they	 are	 not	
made	uncomfortable	once	they	arrive.”			
“Yeah,	 yeah,	 I	would	 also	 say,	 give	 them	 some	 assurance	 that	 it	 is	 a	 useful	 thing	 for	 them	 to	 get	
involved	with,	so	again	if	you	just	say,	we	are	going	to	suck	your	brain	dry	and	leave	you	as	a	dried	






























Evidence	 from	 both	 Phases	 supports	 the	 proposition	 that	 judicious	 use	 of	 preliminary	
communications	 with	 participants	 can	 improve	 the	 efficiency	 of	 the	 FA	 and	 the	 quality	 of	 the	
discussions,	and	thus	of	the	output.		
To	 the	extent	 it	 is	 feasible	and	 reasonable,	 completing	 some	of	 the	 information	 sharing/gathering	
activities	ahead	of	the	FA	itself	through	such	communications	appears	to	help	making	the	time	spent	
in	 plenary	 activities	 as	 productive	 as	 possible.	 	 Conversely,	 the	 absence	 or	 low	 level	 of	 such	
preliminary	information	exchanges	has	appeared	to	affect	negatively	the	efficiency	of	the	FA	and	the	
quality	of	its	discussions,	as	well	as	the	experience	of	participants.	
The	 use	 of	 preliminary	 communications	 to	 solicit	 information	 from	 invitees	 appears	 effective	 in	
ensuring	 that	 the	 content	 of	 the	 FA	 is	 relevant	 for	 those	 attending	 as	well	 as	 appropriate	 for	 the	





Solicitation	 and	 circulation	of	 information	plays	 a	 key	 role	 in	 Participatory	 foresight	 activities	 (see	
also	other	points	in	this	chapter	and	especially	5.2,	5.3,	5.12	and	5.14).			
The	majority	of	these	communications,	particularly	in	the	public	sector,	are	done	using	the	written	
word	 as	 a	 medium	 –	 even	 when	 in	 electronic	 format,	 via	 emails	 or	 web	 pages.	 	 This	 type	 of	
communication	is	typically	cheap	and	relatively	fast	to	produce.	The	time	required	for	its	absorption	













Interviewees	were	all	 in	agreement	on	 the	 importance	of	avoiding	circulation	of	 large	 information	




was	well	written,	 that	 you	wanted	 to	 read,	 and	 subliminally	 you	were	 collecting	 all	 the	 stuff	 that	
were	around	that	issue…	and	if	it	is	well	written	you	end	up	inferring	also	a	lot	of	things	that	are	not	














video	 without	 even	 realizing…	 […]	 yeah,	 and	 cartoons,	 cartoon	 drawings	 are	 always	 a	 good	 way	





the	key	 trends’,	whatever	 they	are,	or	 ‘go	off	and	do	your	own	bit	of	 research’	and	hope	someone	
does.”			
There	 were	 also	 several	 positive	 reactions	 to	 the	 idea	 of	 soliciting,	 and	 giving	 participants	 the	
opportunity	to	offer,	feedback	using	online	formats.	
“Oh	email,	paper,	is	hopeless,	isn’t	it.		Whereas	if	you	had	it	as	a	blog	with	comments,	or	as	a	video,	
that	 would	 have	 been	 quite	 good,	 because	 it’s	 so	 much	 easier,	 no?,	 and	 you	 can	 look	 at	 all	 the	
comments	at	one	time”			
	“Yes	I	mean	there	must	be	so	much	you	could	do,	in	terms	of,	well	you	know	I	am	not	tech	savvy,	but	
you	 know,	 use	 the	web	 and	 stuff	 to	 get	 post-workshop	 feedback	 and	 further	 input.	 	 I	mean,	 how	
many	 review	 sheets	 have	 you	put	 out	 there,	 that	 don’t	 get	 filled	 in?	Or	 you	have	asked	people	 to	










Evidence	 from	 both	 Phases	 supports	 the	 view	 that	 the	 exclusive	 use	 of	 standard	 written	
communication	as	the	means	and	format	when	providing	and	requesting	information	leads	to	a	less	
efficient	use	of	the	time	during	the	actual	event,	as	participants	are	 less	 likely	to	read	 information	
circulated	 ahead	 in	 that	 format,	 and	 thus	 longer	 needs	 to	 be	 spent	 to	 inform	 them,	 and	 to	 a	
potentially	 lower	quality	of	 final	output,	as	participants	are	 less	 inclined	to	provide	feedback	 if	 the	
format	and	media	involved	appear	time	consuming	and	cumbersome.		
Evidence	 also	 points	 to	 the	 fact	 that	 more	 interactive,	 engaging,	 and	 easily	 accessible	 means	 of	





facilitators	 and	other	 people	 involved	 in	 the	 FA	process	 to	 allow	 the	 resulting	 information,	 views,	
ideas,	risks,	concerns	etc.,	to	be	combined	into	an	aggregated	format,	suitable	for	the	desired	use.			
The	raw	output	is	thus	analysed,	digested,	and	elaborated	to	produce	the	final	outcome	and	possible	
recommendations.	 During	 all	 such	 activities	 further	 insight	 into	 any	 problems,	 difficulties,	missing	











Due	 to	 the	 situation	with	DEFRA,	NE	was	 very	 concerned	and	 somewhat	nervous	 about	upsetting	
DEFRA	by	appearing	to	overstep	their	mandate	and	to	assume	a	role	that	had	not	been	sanctioned.		









would	 do,	 not	 sure	 how	 the	 others	 [the	 other	 participants,	 both	 NE	 and	 external]	 would	 feel	
about	that.”	
- The	output	became	very	much	a	NE	product,	using	their	taxonomy	and	vocabulary,	articulated	
around	 their	 organisation	 and	 structure,	 and	 tailored	 to	NE’s	 purposes	 of	 support	 to	 internal	
strategy	 and	 planning.	 	 So,	when	 it	was	 eventually	 circulated,	 it	was	 very	much	 “NE’s	 baby”.		
This,	 combined	 to	 the	 lack	 of	 ongoing	 engagement	 and	 communication	 with	 external	




Interviewees	 agreed	 on	 the	 importance	 of	 follow-up	 communication	 with	 participants	 aimed	 at	
requesting	feedback	on	and	reviews	of	preliminary	output	to	ensure	quality	in	the	outcome	as	well	
as	 a	 way	 to	 maintain	 their	 attention	 and	 involvement,	 and	 see	 it	 as	 an	 “ideal”	 practice.	 	 They	






























make	 use	 of	 it,	 that	 this	 is	 not	 really	 useful	 for	 them,	 that	 there	 is	 something	 missing,	 that	 it	
duplicates	whatever	happens	to	be	–	you	have	to	do	that”				
5.14.4 Preliminary	Observations	and	Conclusions	
The	 data	 suggest	 that	 soliciting	 feedback	 on	 the	 intermediate	 output	 of	 the	 FA	 from	 participants	
after	 the	 FA	 can	 improve	 the	 quality	 of	 the	 results,	 as	 it	 allows	 both	 to	 identify	 and	 correct	 any	





Other	 data	 from	 interviews	 indicate	 that	 there	 could	 be	 advantages	 in	 soliciting	 feedback	 and	





In	 the	 public	 sector,	 FAs	 are	 generally	 commissioned	 by	 potential	 Clients	 to	 the	 team	 –	whether	
internal	or	external	to	the	Client	 itself	–	with	the	necessary	expertise.	 	 It	 is	not	uncommon	for	the	
Client,	particularly	when	there	is	no	in-house	foresight	expertise,	to	have	only	a	superficial	familiarity	
and	 understanding	 of	 foresight	 methodologies,	 their	 characteristics,	 resources	 and	 time	
requirements,	and	types	of	outputs.			
Furthermore,	the	issues	and	questions	central	to	the	FA,	and	the	format	–	or	formats	–	that	can	be	
most	 appropriately	 used	 to	 present	 the	 outputs	 of	 the	 FA,	 depends	 on	 the	 ultimate	 purpose	 and	
objectives	of	the	FA	itself,	and	on	who	the	final	audience	would	be.	
5.15.2 Direct	Observations	from	Case	
- The	 original	 client	 for	 the	 Futures	 team’s	 visioning	 work	 had	 been	 the	 Board	 of	 NE	 itself;	










- According	 to	 the	Specialist,	 it	was	only	once	the	outcomes	and	results	 from	the	roadmapping	
























“There	 is	 this	 whole	 thing	 about	 being	 an	 informed	 client,	 isn’t	 it,	 and	 how	many	 times	we	 have	


















Following	 the	 initial	 discussions	 and	 mandate	 with	 the	 Client,	 a	 Foresight	 project	 typically	 lasts	
several	months	before	the	final	outcomes	and	conclusions	can	be	presented	to	the	Client	and	final	
users.	 	 During	 the	 various	 phases	 of	 preliminary	 data	 gathering	 and	 event	 organisation,	 and	 even	












Once	 the	 final	outcome	 is	out,	 it	 is	mostly	up	 to	 the	Client	 to	use	 it	and	 ‘sell’	 it	 to	other	potential	
users,	ensuring	it	is	included	in	the	political	debate.	
5.16.2 Direct	Observations	from	Case	
- There	 were	 no	 regular	 updates,	 linked	 to	 the	 fact	 that	 there	 was	 not	 significant	 support	 or	
interest	 from	 the	 original	 Client	 (NE’s	 board	 of	 directors)	 beyond	 the	 internal	 strategy	




on	 the	 NEWP,	 so	 that	 from	 that	 moment	 it	 was	 possible	 for	 the	 team	 to	 have	 a	 better	
understanding	 of	 what	 needs,	 in	 the	 context	 of	 the	 NEWP,	 their	 work	 –	 current	 and	 to	 be	










Interviewees	 broadly	 agreed	 with	 the	 importance	 of	 implementing	 ongoing	 updates	 and	





“This	 is	 the	 issue	about	 co-creation	 –	 if	 the	ultimate	 client	 is	 genuinely	 interested	 in	 this,	 they	are	
going	 to	 have	 to	 be	 part	 of	 the	 process	 in	 saying	 what	 this	 is	 at	 the	 end,	 they	 haven’t	 made	 a	
commissioned	process	saying	‘show	me	the	fairy	when	it	comes	out’!”	
	“I	would	add,	 ‘and	constantly	 renewed	and	review’	–	 I	mean	not	every	week,	but	 if	 it	 is	 important	
enough	over	the	project’s	life	there	ought	to	be	points	when	this	is	reflected	upon	–	reminding	them	
what	they	have	agreed	to,	basically!”			










but	you’ve	got	 to	ask	 that	person,	or	 that	organisation,	what	 involvement	 they	want	 to	have.	 	But	
you	can	make	that	offer	at	the	end,	can’t	you?	You	can	say,	‘OK,	so,	we’ve	got	to	this	point,	we	are	













Data	 support	 the	 view	 that	 involving	 the	 Client	 at	 key	 points	 of	 the	 Foresight	 process,	 and	
particularly	 ahead	 of	 the	 delivery	 of	 the	 final	 version	 of	 the	 outcomes,	 can	 help	 promoting	
















their	 implementation,	 as	well	 as	 –	where	 appropriate	 –	 areas	where	 particular	 caution	 should	 be	
exercised	and	assessments	should	be	carried	out	on	a	case-by-case	basis.	
6.2 	Elements	of	Practice	






































































































Although	on	element	#1	Durand	 (Durand,	 2003)	does	mention	 the	 importance	of	warning	
participants	explicitly	that	they	participate	‘as	themselves’	and	not	as	representatives	of	the	
organisation	 they	 normally	 work	 for/are	 affiliated	 with,	 this	 is	 said	 in	 the	 context	 of	
Technology	 Foresight	 exercises	 aimed	 at	 identifying	 key	 technologies,	 and	 thus	 his	




considered	 here;	 for	 example,	 on	 elements	 #2	 and	 #3,	 authors	 such	 as	 Georghiou	 and	
Keenan	(Georghiou	and	Keenan,	2006)	mention	that	part	of	 the	process	evaluation	should	







government	 and	 private	 sector	 facilitators	 that	 work	 in	 futures”	 –	 however	 the	 first	 two	
options	 do	 not	 take	 into	 consideration	 whether	 those	 individuals	 actually	 do	 have	 any	
facilitation	 skills,	 while	 the	 issue	 of	 neutrality	 is	 not	 addressed.	 There	 are	 suggestions	 on	
numbers,	 for	both	workshops	 (“between	15	and	40”)	and	participants	per	 table	 (“4	to	8”),	
although	no	further	indication	is	given	on	what	should	influence	the	final	choice	apart	from	
opportunity.	 	 The	 current	 Futures	 Toolkit	 (GOS,	 2017)	 produced	 for	 the	 UK	 Government	
Office	 for	 Science	 by	Waverley	 Consultants	 suggests	 that	 an	 external	 facilitator	 should	 be	
brought	 in	 if	 there	 is	 no	 internal	 facilitator	 or	 if	 the	 latter	 feels	 they	 don’t	 have	 the	 skills	
required,	they	are	not	going	to	be	impartial,	or	if	they	are	perceived	to	have	an	interest	in	a	
specific	outcome.	Other	manuals	for	futures-oriented	work	aimed	at	civil	servants	(such	as	
the	 toolkit	 for	 the	 Department	 for	 Transport,	 developed	 again	 by	 Waverley	 Consultants)	




Elements	 #3,	 #5,	 and	 #11	 are	 explicitly	 discussed	 in	 other	 contexts,	 such	 as	 multiple-
stakeholder	 and	 consensus	 building	 processes	 and	 participatory	 governance	 models,	
particularly	 from	 the	 perspective	 of	 ensuring	 that	 the	 process	 is	 perceived	 as	 fair	 and	 of	
building	 trust	 (Welsh,	 2003,	 Susskind	 and	 Thomas-Larmer,	 1999,	 Hemmati,	 2012);	 this	
Research	highlights	the	importance	of	extending	them	to	Foresight	processes.	
Despite	some	experts	mentioning	the	importance	of	engaging	“relevant	(and	seemingly	less	
relevant)	 stakeholders	…	wherever	possible,	 either	 in	 the	 exercise	 itself	 or	 in	pre-and	post-	
foresight	 activities”	 (Miles	 et	 al.,	 2008b)	 ,	 there	 is	 no	 explicit	 indication	 of	 what	 type	 of	





Element	 #7	 is	 widely	 mentioned	 in	 literature	 on	 stakeholder	 management	 and	 wicked	
problems,	but	only	recently	is	beginning	to	appear	in	Participatory	Foresight,	and	particularly	
in	 literature	on	Regional	Foresight	 (FOREN,	Miles,	2002).	Miles	and	colleagues	recommend	
wider	 inclusion	 in	 their	Fully	Fledged	Foresight,	although	 it	appears	still	mostly	 focused	on	
ensuring	 access	 to	 better/key	 information	 (one-way	 learning)	 and	 on	 networking	 of	 key	
actors,	 such	as	 in	 Innovation	Technology	Foresight	 (Miles	et	al.,	2002,	Miles	et	al.,	2008a);	
others,	 such	 as	 Havas	 (Havas	 et	 al.,	 2010),	 suggest	 a	 wider	 inclusion	 mostly	 focused	 on	
ensuring	 access	 to	 better	 information	 and	 networking,	 or	 on	 supporting	 implementation,	
rather	than	on	the	“social	friction”	(Chermack,	2004)	important	to	avoid	decision	failures.	In	
the	 wider	 foresight	 literature,	 the	 inclusion	 of	 ‘external’	 participants	 is	 seen	 as	 a	 way	 to	













It	 is	worth	 noting	 that,	 looking	 at	 the	way	 Foresight	 is	 currently	 carried	 out	 in	 support	 of	
policymaking,	 the	roles	of	Sponsor/Leading	organisation	and	Client/Final	user	often	do	not	
coincide.		For	example,	in	the	case	study,	while	NE	was	the	Leading	organisation	for	the	FA,	
the	 Client	 eventually	 was	 (or	 was	 hoped	 to	 be)	 DEFRA	 and	 ultimately	 the	 policymakers.		
Another	 frequent	 occurrence,	 given	 the	 fact	 that	 not	 all	 public	 organisations	 and	
departments	 have	 in-house	 Futures	 expertise	 and	 capabilities,	 is	 that	 such	 expertise	 and	
capabilities	 are	 ‘borrowed’	 from	 another	 organisation	 (as	 often	 is	 the	 case	 for	 the	 NE	
Futures	 team).	 	 These	 considerations	 have	 led	 the	 Researcher	 to	 distinguish	 between	 the	
two	roles	in	#5	and	#8,	and	in	#14	and	#15.	
With	regards	to	a	clear	mandate		and	ongoing	updates	and	communications	with	the	Client	,	
Calof	 and	 colleagues	 (Calof	 and	 Smith,	 2010)	 do	 include	 a	 “direct	 link	 to	 senior	 policy	
managers”	 amongst	 the	 key	 success	 factors	 for	 Foresight	 programmes,	 although	 their	
narrower	 context	 is	 Technology	 and	 Innovation	 Foresight.	 	 Bütschi	 and	Nentwich	 (Bütschi	
and	Nentwich,	2002)	talk	generally	of	“links	to	the	political	sphere”	as	key	success	factors	for	
PTAs.	
In	 the	 HSPT	 Futures	 Toolkit,	 communication	 with	 the	 ultimate	 Client	 	 is	 recommended	
where	possible	 for	 the	co-design	of	 the	workshop	 in	order	 to	 “ensure	 that	 their	 views	are	
built	 in	 to	 ensure	 the	 product	 is	 wanted”,	 although	 it	 does	 not	 extend	 to	 ongoing	
communication	 and	 updates	 concerning	 the	 final	 output.	 	 The	 GOS	 Futures	 toolkit	
recommends	that	“anyone	who	is	likely	to	use	the	project	outputs	should	be	involved	in	their	
development	if	possible”,	although	it	is	unclear	how	this	involvement	should	be	achieved.	
Table	 6.2.b	 summarises	 the	 presence	 of	 extant	 literature	 for	 each	 one	 of	 the	 fifteen	





the	 fifteen	 elements	 of	 practice	 identified	 could	 affect	 the	 quality	 and/or	 the	 use	 and	
performance	of	FA	outcomes.		This	analysis,	building	on	and	integrating	the	literature	on	the	

















































































































that	 mostly	 affect	 the	 practical	 feasibility	 and	 management	 of	 the	 FA	 and	 as	 such	 are	
necessary,	although	clearly	not	sufficient,	and	should	not	be	overlooked.		
For	 example,	 there	 is	 a	 general	 agreement	 in	 the	 existing	 literature	 on	 Foresight	 that	 the	
overall	 quality	 of	 the	 final	 outcome	 is	 affected	 by	 the	 quality	 of	 the	 process	 (FA	 Quality)	
(Miles	 et	 al.,	 2008b),	 that	 the	 uptake	 will	 depend	 on	 the	 relevance,	 acceptability,	 and	





in	 the	 literature	 on	 Foresight	 reviewed,	 although	 their	 relevance	 and	 significance	 emerge	
both	from	analysis	of	the	data	and	from	a	review	of	other	relevant	literature.		
These	 thirteen	 areas	 are	 summarised	 in	 Table	 6.2.c.	 	 Like	 the	 criteria	 described	 in	 Table	 ,	
these	 areas	 too,	 although	 distinct,	 are	 mutually	 influencing	 and	 reinforcing	 –	 particularly	
when	considering	that	Foresight	exercises,	like	policymaking,	can	and	should	be	regarded	as	















A	 ‘High’	 level	of	 influence	was	 recognised	 in	circumstances	where	 links	between	elements	
are	 areas	 of	 impact	 were	 explicitly	 and	 emphatically	 made	 during	 interviews	 by	 several	
respondents,	often	recalling	specific	examples	and	direct	experiences	(e.g.,	with	reference	to	
the	 influence	of	element	#7	on	Buy-in	and	on	Policy	Delivery,	 one	 interviewee	mentioned	
“the	debacle	of	[stakeholder]“	and	their	“shooting	down”	of	the	FA	outcomes	because	of	the	
“failure	 to	 […]	 properly	 engage	 them	 through	 participation”);	 these	 comments	 indicate	 a	
Availability of 
Resources 
In terms of time, human and financial resources made 
available; a sort of pre-condition, not sufficient but 
necessary 
Efficient use of 
Resources 
Crucial, particularly when availability is limited to start 
with 
FA Appeal for 
Participants 
Very important as external participation is typically 
voluntary 




External perception of quality of process and 
management 
Outcome Quality E.g., internal consistency, depth of analysis, 
understanding of consequences 
Outcome Robustness E.g., breadth of alternatives considered, resilience to 
possible futures 
Outcome Credibility External perception of validity and ‘authority’ of results 








Key in new/emerging governance models 
Resilience of 
Outcome 
Ability to survive objections and oppositions in political 
debate 




strong	 relationship	 between	 those	 specific	 element	 of	 practice	 and	 area	 of	 impact.		
Therefore	 any	 practitioners,	 sponsors,	 or	 users	 wishing	 to	 address	 a	 specific	 concern	 in	
quality	 and/or	 performance	 should	 ensure	 sufficient	 attention	 and	 resources	 are	 directed	
towards	those	elements	of	practice	where	the	relationship	with	that	concern	is	mapped	as	
‘High’,	as	they	are	the	one	that	are	likely	to	offer	the	most	‘bang	for	the	buck’.			
An	 influence	 was	 categorised	 as	 ‘Light’	 when	 the	 interviewees	 indicated	 an	 impact	 as	
‘potential’,	‘occasional’,	generally	not	as	strong	as	another/the	main	one.	For	example,	using	
consistent	 techniques	 	 was	 indicated	 by	 a	 respondent	 as	 something	 that	 “can	 also	 help	
potentially	with	credibility,	you	know,	easier	to	present	and	explain	the	data,	particularly	to	
non	initiated!”	
When	 there	 is	 a	 general	 consensus	 from	 the	 data	 that	 there	 is	 an	 influence,	 albeit	 not	
immediately	linked	to	that	specific	point	–	for	example	by	affecting	other	areas	that	in	turn	
are	connected	to	that	one,	or	by	affecting	it	in	subsequent	rounds	of	foresight	–	it	has	been	
indicated	 as	 an	 ‘Indirect’	 relationship.	 	 For	 example,	 facilitators’	 neutrality	was	pointed	 as	
being	 directly	 and	 strongly	 linked	 (‘High’)	 to	 trust	 and	 relationship	 building,	 as	 it	 would	
support	 the	 perception	 of	 process	 fairness	 by	 participants;	 it	 was	 also	 suggested	 it	 could	
“eventually”	 (indirectly)	help	ensuring	 the	 resilience	of	 the	 resulting	outcomes	as	no	party	
would	have	“an	axe	to	grind”.	




remarked	that	 in	a	specific	situation	 it	can	“show	[participants]	 that	someone	 is	 interested	
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- The	 identification	of	 thirteen	 areas	 of	 impact/concern	 that	 appear	 to	 be	 currently	
affecting	 the	 ability	 of	 Foresight	 to	 undertake	 a	more	 active	 and	 effective	 role	 in	
policymaking.	These	areas	relate	not	only	to	the	quality	of	the	outcome	generated	
by	 the	 FA	 but	 also	 to	 its	 ability	 to	 reach	 and	 inform	 policymaking	 and	 to	 support	
policy	delivery.		If	an	area	is	negatively	affected,	it	causes	a	decrease	in	the	quality	of	
the	outcome	and/or	in	its	effectiveness	
- The	 proposal	 of	 fifteen	 elements	 of	 practice	 concerning	 the	 organisation	 and	
management	 of	 FAs.	 	 Each	 practice,	 if	 followed	 appropriately	 and	 taking	 into	
consideration	the	specific	circumstances	and	context	of	the	FA	they	are	applied	to	as	
recommended,	 can	positively	 affect	one	or	more	of	 the	 identified	areas	of	 impact	
thus	improving	the	quality	and	effectiveness	of	the	FA’s	outcome	

















This	 should	 be	 explicitly	 and	 unambiguously	 conveyed	 to	 invitees	 ahead	 of	 the	 FA,	 and	 again	
reiterated	 at	 the	 start	 of	 proceedings.	 	 It	 appears	 useful	 to	 clarify	 at	 that	 point	 the	 exact	 and	







- Difficulty	 in	 attracting	 participants	 (as	 invitees	may	 be	 concerned	 about	 the	 risks	 of	 their	
views	being	made	public)	
- Fewer	 opportunities	 for	 participants	 to	 learn	 from	 one	 another,	 therefore	 attendance	 is	
perceived	 as	 less	 useful;	 this	 will	 likely	 make	 attracting	 participants	 harder	 in	 the	 longer	
term.		
Conversely,	when	 it	 is	 credibly	 and	 unambiguously	 guaranteed	 to	 participants	 that	 the	 FA	 and	 its	




The	 consequences	 are	 symmetrical	 to	 those	 mentioned	 above:	 greater	 sharing	 of	 information,	
improved	learning	and	overall	experience,	and	higher	quality	of	output	with	a	wider	range	of	options	
explored	and	more	robust	proposals	generated.	




guest	 who	 breaks	 the	 Rule;	 this	 is	 likely	 to	 mean	 future	 exclusion	 from	 all	 institute	 activities	 including	 events	 and	




FA	 should	 be	 facilitated	by	 an	 adequate	 number	 of	 individuals,	who	 should	 have	 the	 necessary	
skills	and	who	should	have	been	adequately	trained	and	briefed.	






- All	voices	are	heard,	allowing	for	greater	 information	flow	and	 learning,	 richer	discussions,	
more	 robust	 outcomes	with	 a	 potentially	wider	 range	 of	 options	 explored,	 and	 increased	
buy-in	and	ownership	by	participants.	 	Conversely,	not	having	enough	facilitators	may	lead	





- Any	 disruptive	 behaviours	 can	 be	 avoided/reduced,	 benefitting	 the	 quality	 of	 discussions	
and	 the	 flow	 of	 information	 as	 well	 as	 the	 experience	 of	 participants	 and	 the	 resulting	
reputation	of	FA	organisers.	
- Rules	are	followed,	and	process	mistakes	are	prevented,	again	contributing	to	the	quality	of	
outcomes	and	 to	 the	experience	of	participants	as	well	 as	 increasing	 the	 credibility	of	 the	
final	product.	
6.4.3 Neutrality	of	Facilitators	
Regardless	 of	 the	 organisation	 leading	 the	 FA,	 Facilitators	 should	 be,	 and	 should	 be	 presented,	
perceived,	and	act	as	impartial	and	without	personal	views	or	agendas	that	they	wish	to	promote.	
The	 impact	 of	 the	 above	 observation	 is	 very	 similar	 to	 that	 of	 the	 previous	 point	 concerning	 the	
number	and	skills	of	facilitators,	as	the	perception	–	or	even	just	the	concern	–	that	facilitators	may	
influence	the	debate	and	the	recording	first,	and	then	the	elaboration	of	the	views	and	information	




- As	participants	are	confident	 that	all	 views	and	opinions	will	be	heard	and	 included	 in	 the	
discussion,	they	are	more	 likely	to	agree	to	get	 involved;	this	encourages	a	greater	flow	of	




- It	 becomes	 easier	 to	 involve	 participants	 (or	 their	 organisation)	 in	 follow-up	 activities	




and	 the	 various	 activities;	 however,	 it	 is	 important	 that	 such	 facilitators	 know	 how	 to	 facilitate	
without	leading	and	without	letting	their	personal	opinions	and	positions	shape	the	debate	and	the	
outcome.		Because	of	that,	regardless	of	how	appealing	it	may	seem,	asking	well-known	experts	to	
facilitate	 and	 moderate	 a	 table	 on	 the	 topic	 of	 their	 expertise	 may	 actually	 end	 up	 being	
counterproductive.	
6.4.4 Consistent	Techniques	and	Approach	
The	 preparatory	 work	 ahead	 of	 a	 FA	 should	 include	 an	 agreement	 on	 the	 approach,	
methodologies	and	 techniques	 to	be	adopted	by	 facilitators	 for	managing	participants	and	 their	
contributions,	and	for	recording	activities	and	outputs.	
While	 it	 may	 be	 acceptable,	 and	 occasionally	 opportune,	 for	 some	 of	 the	 facilitators	 to	 use	
alternative	 techniques	 and	 facilitation	 tools	 to	 better	 support	 participants’	 engagement	 and	
interaction,	 these	 should	 be	 chosen	 from	 a	 previously	 agreed	 upon	 set,	 and	 the	 format	 of	 the	
output	 generated	 should	 be	 consistent	 –	 to	 the	 extent	 possible	 –	 with	 that	 of	 other	 outputs	
produced	within	the	same	exercise/activity.	
Adopting	 consistent	approach,	 techniques	and	 formats	offers	 several	 advantages,	 as	well	 as	 some	
potential	disadvantages.	 	The	decision	on	 the	 level	of	 consistency	and	on	 the	stage	 in	 the	process	
where	 it	should	be	enforced	needs	to	take	 into	consideration	the	particular	circumstances	of	each	
FA,	 such	 as	 level	 and	 provenance	 of	 participants,	 main	 objectives	 of	 the	 FA,	 topics	 considered,	
resources	available,	and	so	on.	
- The	 use	 of	 consistent	 style	 and	 techniques	 by	 different	 facilitators	 to	 involve	 and	 engage	
participants	during	the	same	exercise	makes	it	easier	to	ensure	that	all	participants	and	their	
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views	 are	 treated	 in	 the	 same	 way;	 this	 can	 reinforce	 the	 perception	 of	 ‘fairness’	 and	
neutrality	of	facilitators,	as	participants	are	given	the	same	opportunities	to	contribute	and	
object,	and	they	feel	that	their	views	are	treated	in	the	same	way	regardless	of	who	they	are	
–	or	where	 they	 sit.	 	At	 the	 same	 time,	 inflexibility	 in	adapting	 to	a	particular	difficulty	or	
obstacle	may	affect	and	compromise	the	actual	ability	of	the	set	of	participants	to	effectively	
engage	and	complete	the	task	at	hand.	
- Using	 a	 consistent	 approach	by	 facilitators	 in	 each	 group	of	 participants	 for	 recording	 the	
content	of	the	group’s	discussion	during	the	activity	and	its	output	can	help	ensure	that	the	
information	 shared	 is	 considered	 and	 treated	 in	 a	 similar	 way,	 facilitating	 the	 buy-in	 of	
participants,	who	may	otherwise	question	the	fairness	of	the	process.	
- The	 use	 by	 different	 facilitators	 of	 a	 consistent	 format	 for	 the	 output	 of	 their	 respective	
group	 makes	 combining	 such	 results	 easier	 and	 more	 efficient,	 reducing	 the	 time	 and	








- More	 complete	 information	 and	 insight	 can	 be	 accessed,	 thus	 contributing	 to	 greater	
learning	 and	 a	 better	 experience	 for	 participants,	 and	 better	 quality	 of	 the	 output	
generated.	
- Greater	opportunity	 for	objections	or	critiques	to	options	and	proposals	 to	come	from	the	







- Greater	 credibility	 vis-à-vis	 other	 organisations	 that	 have	 been	 invited	 to	 engage	 and	
collaborate,	as	they	can	be	reassured	that	the	leading	organisation	is	fully	behind	it.	
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Based	 on	 the	 comments	 offered	 by	 the	 majority	 of	 interviewees,	 a	 corollary	 of	 the	 above	
recommendation	is:	





workshops,	 preferably	 ahead	 of	 the	 main	 FA;	 this	 would	 ensure	 their	 input	 is	 captured	 and	
included	in	the	main	workshop	and	in	its	discussions.	





While	a	preliminary	engagement	would	undeniably	 require	additional	costs	 in	 time	and	resources,	
these	are	likely	to	be	significantly	 less	than	those	that	would	be	required	for	the	ex-post	gathering	
and	integration	of	input	and	comments	from	invitees	who	were	unable	to	attend.	
Again,	a	change	 in	 the	way	participation	and	contribution	 to	FA	 is	evaluated	and	rewarded	during	
individuals’	appraisals	would	significantly	facilitate	this.		
6.4.7 Engagement	of	All	Relevant	and	Affected	Parties	
Organisers	 should	 ensure	 participation	 and	 engagement	 at	 the	 appropriate	 level	 of	 all	 relevant	
parties	and	actors,	defined	as	those	who	will	be	involved	in,	and	affected	by	–	particularly	in	terms	
of	costs,	efforts,	and/or	sacrifices	–	any	potential	outcomes	and	proposed	solutions.		
Suitable	 time	 should	 be	 invested	 in	 the	 identification	 and	 engagement	 of	 the	 organisations,	
representatives,	and	individuals	that	should	be	sitting	around	the	FA	table.		
As	 emerged	 from	 data	 analysis,	 the	 involvement	 of	 all	 relevant	 and	 affected	 parties	 considerably	
affects	 both	 the	 quality	 of	 the	 output	 and	 its	 robustness,	 as	 well	 as	 its	 resilience	 in	 the	 political	
conversation	and	its	likelihood	of	use	and	implementation:	
- The	diversity	of	views	and	positions	helps	to	avoid	any	group	thinking,	ensuring	that	not	only	
there	 is	 greater	 information	 shared,	 but	 also	 that	 any	 difficulties	 are	 considered	 and	
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objections	are	addressed;	 this	has	an	 impact	on	 the	 learning	experience,	on	 the	quality	of	
the	output,	and	on	its	robustness.	
- The	 involvement	of	potential	opponents	 in	the	FA	gives	them	the	opportunity	to	put	forth	
their	issues	and	concerns	so	they	can	be	addressed	as	they	emerge,	ensuring	they	feel	more	
engaged	in	the	process.		This	is	likely	to	affect	their	attitude	towards	the	final	output.	
- Objections	can	be	 raised	and	alternatives	can	be	sought	and	evaluated	 jointly,	 so	 that	 the	
resulting	proposed	outputs	are	more	likely	to	be	accepted	by	the	various	parties	if	they	have	
been	co-developed	even	when	involving	costs	or	losses.	









Senior	management	 and	key	decision	makers	 in	 the	organisation	 leading	 the	 FA	 should	be	 fully	
engaged	 and	 committed	 to	 support	 the	 FA	 and	 its	 outcomes.	 	 This	 should	 be	 made	 clear	 and	


















- The	morale	 amongst	 those	 involved	 in	 leading	 and	managing	 the	 FA	 would	 be	 positively	
affected,	likely	to	impact	the	quality	of	their	work.		















- External	 invitees	 are	more	 likely	 to	 accept	 and	 attend	 the	 FA,	 and	 participants	 are	more	
likely	 to	 devote	 time	 both	 ahead	 of	 and	 subsequent	 to	 the	 FA,	 knowing	 that	 their	
involvement	and	contribution	has	been	sanctioned	and	is	considered	positively	by	their	own	
organisation;	apart	from	reducing	the	time	spent	trying	to	convince	invitees	to	attend,	this	
can	 facilitate	 securing	 valuable	 input,	 ensuring	 a	 positive	 learning	 experience	 for	 all	
participants,	supporting	the	production	of	better	quality	output,	and	helping	ensure	process	
legitimacy	and	results	credibility.	
- A	potentially	 less	defensive	attitude	of	 such	external	organisations	 towards	 the	FA	and	 its	
outcomes,	 together	 with	 greater	 buy-in	 and	 commitment	 to	 what	 are	 perceived	 to	 be	
jointly-reached	 conclusions,	 means	 that	 relevant	 parties	 are	 more	 likely	 to	 support	 and	
stand	behind	proposed	 solutions/output,	 giving	 them	greater	weight	 and	 credibility	 in	 the	
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Inviting	 participants	 from	 the	 legislative	 and/or	 executive	 areas	 of	 the	 public	 sector	 can	 have	 a	
number	 of	 advantages	 –	 in	 terms	of	 quality	 of	 outcome,	 but	 also	 and	 especially	 in	 terms	of	 their	
likelihood	of	contributing	to	the	policy	debate	and	being	implemented.	
- Improve	confidence	and	motivation	–	Their	presence	can	lend	credibility	to	the	seriousness	
of	 the	policymakers’	 interest	 in	 the	outcomes	of	 the	FA,	 and	 thus	 reassure	participants	of	
the	 relevance	 of	 what	 they	 are	 doing.	 	 This	 can	 in	 turn	 result	 in	 greater	 willingness	 of	
participants	to	engage,	get	involved	and	contribute,	benefitting	the	quality	of	the	outcomes	
and	their	credibility.		
- Improve	 politicians/executives’	 understanding	 of	 issues	 and	 their	 appreciation	 of	 areas	 of	
possible	 resistance	 and	 opposition,	 and	 of	 dissenting	 views,	 especially	 if	 they	 are	 also	
involved	in	discussions	about	possible	solutions;	participating	politicians/civil	servants	could	
also	 act	 as	 ‘champions’,	 ‘selling’	 any	 proposed	 solutions	 back	 to	 their	
department/party/constituency/committee,	 which	 could	 engender	 greater	 buy-in	 and	
commitment,	as	well	as	support	for	eventual	implementation.	




- In	 the	 event	 of	 projects	 carried	 on	 under	 a	 bi-partisan	 banner,	 the	 presence	 of	










involvement,	 assessing	 and	 evaluating	 the	 potential	 risks	 and	 balancing	 against	 the	 potential	





This	 preliminary	 engagement	 should	 also	 be	 used	 to	 solicit	 information	 from	 the	 participants	
themselves,	concerning	the	topics	and	issues	to	be	discussed,	and	any	concerns	they	may	have.	
In	addition	to	the	advantages	of	early	engagement	mentioned	in	6.4.8	and	6.4.9,	particularly	in	the	
case	 of	 participants	 from	 external	 organisations	 that	 are	 non-aligned,	 preliminary	 communication	
with	 participants	 aimed	 at	 both	 providing	 and	 soliciting	 information	 can	 have	 the	 following	
advantages:	





- More	 relevant	 input	 and	 content	 of	 the	 FA	 –	 receiving	 additional	 information	 from	









chest’,	 can	 help	 them	 feel	 less	 defensive	 and	 more	 open	 to	 other	 views.	 	 This	 benefits	
discussions	and	thus	output	quality	as	well	as	commitment.	
Nevertheless,	 this	 tool	 should	 not	 be	 abused,	 and	 it	 is	 important	 not	 to	 drown	 invitees	 in	
information	 (especially	 if	 unedited),	 in	 order	 to	 avoid	 a	 backlash	whereby	 the	 result	 is	 actually	 to	
deter	 access	 to	 said	 information.	 	 So	 sufficient	 time	 should	 go	 in	 the	 selection	 and	 editing	 of	
preliminary	information	sent	to	participants.	
The	 information	 should	 also	 take	 the	 format	 and	 use	 the	 media	 that	 are	 –	 within	 the	 available	
budget	 –	 the	most	 appropriate	 and	 both	 effective	 and	 efficient	 based	 on	 content,	 audience,	 and	
purpose	–	see	below.	
6.4.12 Use	of	Engaging	Media	for	Communication	
Preliminary	 activities	 ahead	 of	 the	 FA	 should	 include	 the	 investment	 in	 and	 development	 of	
suitable	 formats	 and	 media	 for	 the	 soliciting	 and	 communication	 of	 information	 to	 and	 from	
participants.		
While	using	written	 standard	 communication	–	whether	printed	or,	more	often,	electronic	 and/or	
online	–	has	 the	advantage	of	being	generally	 faster	and	relatively	cheaper	 to	produce	 than	other	
methods,	 and	 can	 somehow	 give	 the	 perception	 of	 being	 more	 impartial	 and	 credible,	 it	 often	
requires	a	significant	amount	of	time	on	the	recipient’s	side	for	its	ingestion	and	digestion.	
Furthermore,	the	need	to	receive	feedback	from	participants	(see	6.4.13)	may	remain	frustrated	 if	
they	 find	 this	 to	 be	 relatively	 onerous	 in	 terms	 of	 their	 time	 and	 effort	 for	 both	 producing	 and	
delivering	it.	
The	 choice	 for	 the	 appropriate	 format	 and	media	 should	 aim	 at	 getting	 the	 ‘most	 bang	 for	 your	
bucks’	 in	 terms	 of	 both	 efficiency	 and	 effectiveness	 with	 regards	 to	 its	 access	 and	 assimilation,	
where	 the	 efficiency	 relates	 to	 the	 time	 and	 effort	 required	 by	 the	 recipient	 to	 absorb	 –	 or	
communicate	 –	 the	 information,	 while	 the	 effectiveness	 refers	 to	 the	 amount	 of	 relevant	














the	 combined	 output	 post-FA,	 facilitators	 and/or	 FA	 experts	 have	 to	 take	 on	 themselves	 the	





mistakes	 and	 human	 error,	 both	 from	 the	 participants	 and	 from	 the	 facilitators’	 side.	 If	 such	
mistakes	are	not	identified	and	removed	or	corrected	before	the	final	output	reaches	its	final	form,	
the	 quality	 and	 credibility	 –	 not	 just	 of	 the	 single	 FA	 and	 its	 output,	 but	 potentially	 of	 the	
organisation	leading	or	sponsoring	it	and	of	future	FA	efforts	–	can	be	compromised.			
Finally,	the	time	occurring	between	the	FA	and	the	publication	of	 its	final	output	 is	generally	quite	






- Mistakes	 and	 inconsistencies	 are	 not	 spotted,	 decreasing	 the	 quality	 of	 the	 output	 and	
making	it	less	resilient.	










The	 circulation	 and	 communication	 of	 output	 at	 its	 preliminary	 and	 intermediate	 stages	 to	
participants	 can	 help	 counteract	 and	 reverse	 the	 negative	 impacts	 listed	 above.	 There	 are	 some	
areas	of	risk	and	potential	concern,	such	as	a	possible	increase	in	costs	and	timing	due	to	a	greater	
use	 of	 resources	 for	 solicitation	 and	 integration	 of	 feedback	 and	 comments,	 and	 breaches	 of	
confidentiality.		The	use	of	suitable	technology	can	help	overcome	some	of	these	concerns,	such	as	
the	use	of	password-protected	access	and	disabled	forwarding	capabilities	for	electronic	documents.		




The	 team	managing	 the	 FA	 should	 have	 a	 clear	mandate	 from	 the	 final	 Client	 from	 the	 outset,	








products,	 so	 that	 the	 conversation	may	 clarify	what	 the	 actual	 needs	 are	 beyond	what	 the	 initial	
request	may	have	indicated,	and	expectations	are	managed.		The	potential	benefits	include:	
- More	efficient	use	of	resources	and	more	effective	outputs	–	a	greater	clarity	on	scope	and	
objectives	 can	help	ensure	 that	 the	 (inevitably	 limited)	 resources	are	better	deployed	and	
that	the	output’s	content	and	format	are	appropriate	for	the	Client’s	needs	and	purposes.		
- Greater	 resilience	 and	 effectiveness	 of	 outputs	 –	 with	 a	 stronger	 commitment	 from	 the	
Client	towards	the	FA	and	its	outputs,	the	resulting	outcomes	and	proposals	are	more	likely	
to	make	their	way	to	–	if	not	through	–	the	policy	debate	and	inform	it.	







In	 addition,	 greater	 certainty	 and	 clarity	 concerning	 the	 project	 and	 its	 support	 by	 the	 Client	 can	














needs,	 the	 scope,	or	 the	uses	of	 the	original	 Foresight.	 	Ongoing	 communication	 can	help	
ensure	that	the	FA	and	its	outcomes	–	both	in	topic	of	analysis	and	format	-	can	continue	to	
be	fit	for	use.			
- Actually	 used	–	 The	purpose	 and	objective	of	 Foresight	 is	 to	deliver	 quality	 insight	 and	 to	
inform	the	policymaking	debate,	rather	than	to	provide	the	Client	with	agreeable	alternative	
(future)	 facts	 that	 may	 suit	 the	 Client’s	 current	 agenda	 or	 manifesto.	 	 However,	 an	
unpleasant	message	 is	more	 likely	 to	 be	 listened	 to,	 rather	 than	 being	 brushed	 aside	 and	












How	 can	 Foresight	 practice	 be	 improved,	 in	 order	 to	 better	 support	 Public	 Policymaking	 –	 where	
‘Foresight	practice’	encompasses	the	preparation,	execution,	and	management	of	Foresight	exercises	
and	 activities,	 while	 the	 ‘support	 of	 Public	 Policymaking’	 extends	 from	 the	 stimulation	 and	
information	 of	 the	 political	 debate	 up	 to	 the	 delivery	 and	 implementation	 of	 the	 resulting	 policy	
directives.	
The	Researcher	believes	that	the	Objective	has	been	met,	within	the	caveats	and	possible	limitations	
indicated	 in	 the	Thesis,	 specifically	 in	Chapter	3	with	 regards	 to	 the	research	methodology	design,	
choices,	and	implementation.	
In	particular,	the	Research	has	been	carried	out	and	the	conclusions	have	been	reached	within	the	




be	 generalized	 and	 applied	 to	 any	 foresight60	activities,	while	 some	of	 the	 elements	 (such	 as	 no.5	
and	no.10)	are	clearly	specific	to	the	context	set	by	the	Research	Objective.	
6.6 	Further	Research	
Each	 of	 the	 13	 areas	 of	 impact/concern	 and	 of	 the	 15	 elements	 of	 practice	 is	 essentially	 a	
hypothesis,	developed	following	a	Grounded	Theory	approach,	and	should	be	further	studied.	
In	addition,	based	on	the	analysis	of	the	data	gathered	during	this	Research	and	of	the	study	of	the	

















an	 even	 wider	 societal	 engagement	 (see	 2.5.3	 and	 2.8).	 This	 reflects	 different	 rationales	 and	
objectives	for	such	widening	inclusion,	which	have	shifted	from	process	dynamics,	to	ensuring	that	
the	right	information	is	‘in	the	room’,	to	guaranteeing	commitment	and	coordination	for	innovation,	
to	 supporting	 successful	 implementation,	widespread	 social	 acceptance,	 and	 –	 eventually	 –	more	
distributed	models	of	governance.	
At	 the	 same	 time,	 the	 ‘future	 imposed’	 of	 normative	 Foresight	 is	 increasingly	 at	 odds	 with	 the	
growing	mistrust	and	lack	of	confidence	experienced	by	the	majority	of	the	public/citizenship,	while	
most	 of	 the	most	 recent	 policy	models	 centred	 on	 governance	 highlight	 the	 importance	 of	 trust,	
participation,	and	 interaction.	 	Policy	networks	approach	highlights	 the	need	 for	cooperation	 from	
the	network	for	implementation,	and	it	requires	trust	rather	than	a	contract	(Rhodes,	2007)	as	well	
as	greater	transparency,	as	does	Reflexive	Governance.		The	core	governance	mechanisms	of	trust,	





assessment	of	 views,	 interests,	 and	possible	 actions	 and	 reactions	of	 those	 involved,	 thus	 limiting	
unintended	consequences	as	much	as	possible.	









but	 counterproductive.	 	 This	 highlights	 the	 importance	 of	 including	 procedural	 justice	 elements	
	 186	
when	 designing	 processes	 requiring	 the	 engagement	 of	 diverse	 and	 different	 stakeholders	 with	










to	 the	 cost	 of	 NOT	 doing	 Foresight,	 or	 –	 as	 mentioned	 –	 of	 not	 doing	 it	 properly	 and	 actually	
compounding	the	issues.	
7.1 	Foresight	≠	Technology	Foresight	≠	foresight	
As	 mentioned	 above	 in	 2.3.1,	 the	 word	 ‘foresight’	 has	 been	 and	 continues	 to	 be	 used	 to	 mean	
slightly	different	things.		This	seems	to	give	the	impression	that	the	theory	and	practice	developed	in	
one	 specific	 context	 can	 be	 easily	 transposed	 to	 another.	 	 However,	 as	 Saritas	 (Saritas,	 2013)	
suggests,	in	foresight	(and	Foresight)	context	matters.	
So	on	one	side	much	of	 the	recent	practice	 	–	and	 literature	–	has	been	developed	 in	response	to	
demand	 from	 the	 corporate	 world	 for	 step-by-step	 instructions	 and	 handbooks	 to	 help	 private	
organisations	carry	out	their	own	futures	oriented	activities	(see	2.3.3).		Their	adoption	in	the	public	
sector	 was	 encouraged	 as	 part	 of	 the	 push	 towards	 a	 ‘professionalisation’	 of	 the	 public	
administration	 (see	 2.4.2.5).	 Yet,	 futures	 activities	 carried	 out	within	 a	 corporate	 organisation	 are	
unlikely	to	contain	the	exact	same	potential	for	conflicting	interests	and	views	as	those	carried	out	in	
the	public	policy	 arena,	 and	 implementation	 is	 likely	 to	be	 less	problematic	 (though	never	 trivial),	
while	the	concepts	of	trust	and	social	capital	are	of	reduced	relevance.		
On	the	other	side,	Foresight	actually	started	as	Technology	Foresight	(see	2.3.2,	2.5.2	and	2.5.3)	and	
the	 two	 are	 often	 used	 interchangeably.	 	 However,	 while	 both	 may	 seek	 to	 actively	 shape	 and	
influence	 the	 future,	 their	 focus	 is	 different;	 discussions	 about	 innovation	 and	 technological	
advancement	generally	are	not	as	politically	charged	and	rife	with	conflicts	as	 those	about	wicked	
issues;	 and	 participation,	 while	 important	 in	 Technology	 Foresight	 to	 encourage	 networking	 and	
coordination,	becomes	critical	in	discussions	where	it	can	affect	perceptions	of	fairness,	legitimacy,	
and	trust.	
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If	Foresight	is	a	socio-political	activity	(Calof	and	Smith,	2010)	then	it	appears	that	the	process	of	FA	
should	also	be	approached	in	a	politically	mindful	manner.					
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